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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I will defend a new kind of compatibilist account of free action, indirect 
conscious control compatibilism (or indirect compatibilism for short), and argue that some of 
our actions are free according to it. My argument has three components, and involves the 
development of a brand new tool for experimental philosophy, and the use of cognitive 
neuroscience. The first component of the argument shows that compatibilism (of some kind) is a 
conceptual truth. Contrary to the current orthodoxy in the free will literature, which is that our 
concept of free will is an incompatibilist concept - a concept according to which we have free 
will only if determinism is false - I will show that our concept of free will is in fact a 
compatibilist concept - a concept according to which we can have free will even if 
determinism is true - and I do so using a new experimental philosophy methodology inspired by 
two-dimensional semantics.  
Of course, even if our concept of free will is a compatibilist concept, this does not mean 
that there are any free actions in the world: the current empirical evidence from the brain 
sciences appears to show that there might be no, or very few, free actions in the world, even on 
many compatibilist understandings of what it would take for there to be free will. The second 
component of the argument addresses this concern by extending our understanding of 
compatibilism. Agents act freely either when their actions are caused by compatibilistically 
acceptable psychological processes, or are indirectly caused by those same processes. Hence the 
name of my account: indirect compatibilism.  
The final component of the argument defends my new account against some interesting 
objections and provides evidence from cognitive neuroscience that some of our actions count as 
free by the lights of indirect compatibilism. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I will defend a new compatibilist account of free action: indirect conscious 
control compatibilism. Henceforth, I will refer to this view as indirect compatibilism. It is a 
new, compatibilist account of free action that is the combination of two theses. The first is that 
the best understanding of the conceptual relationship between determinism and free will is that it 
is a conditional concept - roughly, that indeterminism or libertarian powers are necessary if 
they are actual, but not if they are not. The second is indirection – roughly, that actions are free 
either when they are caused by standard conscious deliberative processes, or else by sub-personal 
level processes influenced in various ways by conscious deliberative processes. 
 One way to understand indirect compatibilism is as an extension and modification of one 
of the simplest and most basic thoughts about free action: that we act freely when and only when 
we consciously choose actions on the basis of our desires, in the ordinary way, and then we 
perform those actions that we choose, and there is no objectionable defeater of an alarming 
kind.1 While this is not my view - the ‘only when’ clause in particular is something this thesis 
modifies - it does inherit the basic intuition that choice of this kind is sufficient for there being 
free will, and that those choices play some role in there being free actions even where they are 
not necessary. 
 Interestingly, such a view has rarely been explicitly defended – and I do not plan to 
defend it explicitly at any length either. Instead this thesis primarily proceeds by considering two 
important impediments to this idea. 
 The first is that the ‘ordinary way’ in which we consciously choose actions on the basis of 
our desires is either deterministic or merely chancy, and it is a necessary condition for the will to 
be free that this process is neither deterministic nor merely chancy. That is, for there to be free 
will, these conscious choices must be indeterministic, whilst not being merely chancy. 
 I will attempt to overcome this impediment partly by appealing to experimental 
philosophy (as I will foreshadow in greater detail shortly), which shows that, in a subtle and 
interesting way, the folk concept is friendly to compatibilism. Of course, there are other ways to 
proceed here: one could agree that the folk concept is incompatibilist (as much of the previous 
evidence seemed to suggest) but suggest conceptual reform of some kind. But even if one 
proceeded that way, it is important that the reformed concept be recognisably a concept of free 
                                                          
1Example defeaters might include mind control, neurological intervention, the wrong kind of advertising, and so on. 
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will, and my work here suggests that such reformed concepts can indeed be concepts of free will, 
while explaining why it might seem otherwise. 
 The second impediment is the suggestion that as a matter of fact few actions are under 
the direct control of conscious processes on the basis of our desires, and thus that few actions 
are free and, perhaps, thus that according to this simple and basic account we do not have free 
will. My solution here will be to suggest a way in which many such actions might be indirectly 
under the control of these conscious processes, and that it is (modulo defeaters perhaps) 
necessary and sufficient for free action that the action be either directly or indirectly under 
conscious control. 
 So much for the modifications: but what of the basic idea? Why am I addressing 
objections to a theory and modifying it in light of them, without specifically defending it? Why 
do I regard it as any kind of default? 
 One thing to say, and perhaps my official reply, is that this dissertation is a defence of a 
conditional claim: that if you find such a simple account pre-theoretically attractive, there are 
modifications and responses which allow it to survive the most powerful objections. 
 But there is a little more to be said. Much of the free will debate seems to accept, more 
or less, that something like this default account is appealing, because much of the literature is 
concerned with objections to that default account, or exploring the consequences of it. 
 Let me illustrate this with a few examples. First: Galen Strawson. Strawson gives an 
argument that no-one ultimately possesses moral responsibility. What are the assumptions of this 
argument? In part that conscious control is a necessary condition of freedom of the will: 
“[...] it is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally 
speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally 
speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one 
is that way.” (pg. 6). 
Strawson makes trouble for the idea of responsibility by requiring this to iterate: he thinks that 
you need to have conscious control of the psychological features which are the prerequisites for 
conscious control as well, and obviously this iteration is going to fail. I do not think that the 
default conscious control account is committed to the view that we need conscious control of 
our conscious control. Instead, it’s just the view that conscious control plays the role that we 
suppose it does in the ordinary cases that we think of as free. But that need not detain us here. 
The thought is just that this conscious control requirement seems like an obvious one to start 
with - something that is either obviously true and will cause trouble, or is an obvious starting 
point, to be revised only when required by that trouble. 
10 
 Consider another example. Peter Van Inwagen thinks that the thesis that we have free 
will is “the thesis that we are sometimes in the following position with respect to a contemplated 
future act: we simultaneously have both the following abilities: the ability to perform the act and 
the ability to refrain from performing that act.” (2008; pg. 330). I think that what Van Inwagen 
has in mind with respect to contemplating future acts is the default conscious control account. 
Consider the following excerpt from his seminal paper The Incompatibility of Free Will and 
Determinism (1975) that describes a judge who chooses not to raise their hand in order to spare a 
criminal’s life (he very rarely goes into much detail on the psychological processes that surround 
our free actions, so savour it): 
“We may also suppose that the judge was unbound, uninjured, and free from paralysis; 
that he decided not to raise his hand at T only after a period of calm, rational, and 
relevant deliberation; that he had not been subjected to any ‘pressure’ to decide one way 
or the other about the criminal’s death; that he was not under the influence of drugs, 
hypnosis, or anything of that sort; and finally that there was no element in his 
deliberations that would have been of any special interest to a student of abnormal 
psychology.” (pg. 190-191). 
Recall that according to the default conscious control account, an agent acts freely only if their 
action is caused by their conscious deliberation and standard decision making processes. 
According to the default account, the judge clearly acts freely. The judge’s action was caused by 
“a period of calm, rational and relevant deliberation”. Further there was nothing abnormal about 
the judge’s decision making processes that brought about his action: “there was no element in his 
deliberations that would have been of any special interest to a student of abnormal psychology”. 
However, Van Inwagen does not think that the judge acts freely in a deterministic world. In a 
deterministic world containing only deterministically governed conscious deliberations and 
standard decision making processes, the judge does not act freely. So what appears to be going 
on is that Van Inwagen is taking this ‘calm rational and relevant deliberation’ - surely something 
that entails that there is conscious control, with perhaps some extra rationality requirements – to 
be both necessary for free will, and also prima facie sufficient, such that it comes as worthwhile 
news to note that, given the possibility of determinism, it is not sufficient. 
 One of the many seminal contributions made by Harry Frankfurt to the free will 
literature was the establishment of a new kind of compatibilist account of free will: so-called 
higher-order accounts of free will. This account was first articulated in Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person (1971). I think this intervention, too, makes most sense understood as a 
surprising response to the default conception (exactly how I think it connects with my account 
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will come later). The key insight of these accounts is that what it is to be free is not a question 
that concerns the connection between conscious deliberation and standard decision making 
processes, and actions, rather, questions of freedom just concern the connections within our 
own psychologies. As Frankfurt writes: 
“The question of the freedom of his will does not concern the relationship between what 
he does and what he wants to do. Rather, it concerns his desires themselves.” (pg. 15). 
But what is the relevant connection between “what he does and what he wants to do” that we 
might have originally thought questions about freedom were concerned about? Here I think 
Frankfurt has something like the default conscious control account in mind. As he writes: 
“Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. They 
share these things with the members of certain other species, some of whom even appear 
to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based on prior thought.” (pg. 6). 
He elaborates later when describing a ‘wanton’, someone who lacks any higher-order desires. He 
writes: 
“The fact that a wanton has no second-order volitions does not mean that each of his 
first-order desires is translated heedlessly and at once into action. He may have no 
opportunity to act in accordance with some of his desires. Moreover, the translation of 
his desires into action may be delayed or precluded either by conflicting desires of the 
first order or by the intervention of deliberation. For a wanton may possess and employ 
rational faculties of a higher order. Nothing in the concept of a wanton implies that he 
cannot reason or that he cannot deliberate concerning how to do what he wants to do.” 
(pg. 11). 
According to the default conscious control account, someone acts freely only if their action is 
caused by their conscious deliberation and standard decision making processes. The wanton in 
this example has desires, and, what’s more, is able to reason and deliberate concerning how to do 
what he wants to do. Thus according to the default account the wanton acts freely.2 The surprise 
and interest in Frankfurt’s and other higher-order theorists view comes from seeing a psychology 
which seems to satisfy the default conception and yet allegedly lacks freedom and autonomy 
altogether. That’s because, according to Frankfurt, free will is not about the connection between 
psychological processes and actions as the default conscious control account tells us. Instead, it 
                                                          
2I think that the reason we are taken aback by this conclusion is not for the reason that Frankfurt and other higher-
order theorists think. Higher-order desires seem ubiquitous to us and are a common feature in our own conscious 
deliberations and standard decision making processes. Thus while wantons might act freely according to the default 
conscious control account of free action they are deeply psychologically impoverished relative to you and I. 
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is to be found in the structure of the psychological processes themselves, and if those structures 
are lacking then there are no free actions. 
 Finally, in the cognitive neuroscience literature about free will it is especially clear that 
most have something like the default conscious control account in mind. For example, Haggard, 
et al. (2002) write: 
“Humans have the conscious experience of “free will”: we feel we can generate our 
actions, and thus affect our environment [...] Normal human experience consists of a 
coherent stream of sensorimotor events, in which we formulate intentions to act and 
then move our bodies to produce a desired effect.” (pg. 382). 
Similarly, Bode, et al. (2014) write: 
“The belief that we have free will - that we are the authors of our own fate - is 
fundamental tor our self-concept and our identity as human beings. Our intuition tells us 
[...] we can reflect on our reasons, deliberate on our options, and consciously choose to 
do otherwise if we wish.” (pg. 636). 
What concerns brain scientists is whether our default conscious control account is answered to 
by anything in the world. More specifically, is there any evidence in the brain sciences that can 
vindicate the idea that our conscious experience of reflecting on reasons, deliberating on options, 
formulating intentions, and consciously choosing, is causally efficacious in the generation of our 
actions. Surprisingly there is accumulating, albeit contentious, evidence that the opposite is true: 
our conscious deliberations and standard decision making processes do not cause actions. And if 
that is right then none of our actions are free.  
 Of course, the fact that these authors, and many others, have taken it to be clear that 
what I am calling the ‘default view’ is an obvious starting point does not make the view true, nor 
even make true that it is the correct starting point. But it does make it something worth 
exploring. This thesis will respond to the most powerful objections to the basic idea behind the 
default view, and make some suggestions about how to think about others. If the reader accepts 
that these objections are dealt with, she will then be in a better position to decide if the whole 
package I propose is acceptable to her.    
Just how crucial is the conscious control requirement to the upshot of this thesis? The 
first half of the thesis does not depend on it in any way. The first half establishes that a certain, 
unusual, version of compatibilism appears to hold of the folk concept of free action. That will be 
of interest to readers who have little interest in the conscious control thesis, and accept versions 
of compatibilism which do not rely on that thesis. It is, however, necessary to show this for 
conscious control compatibilism to be vindicated. The second half of the thesis is more directly 
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concerned with conscious control. But this is not only because I am inclined to accept indirect 
conscious control as a necessary condition for free action, and hope to show that it can be 
accepted consistently with holding that enough of our actions are free for us to have free will. 
It’s also because it’s a requirement which, as I have shown, is accepted by most researchers in the 
brain sciences who aim to show that our actions are not free. In criticising their work, it’s helpful 
to accept as many of their assumptions as possible and see if nonetheless most of the actions we 
intuitively take to be free can be seen to be free. So apart from my own interest in showing that 
this assumption - which I take to be compelling - is consistent with free will, it also plays a 
dialectical role in the strongest criticism of these authors. 
So, in this thesis, I will defend in detail a new compatibilist account of free action centred 
on conscious control, against two profound charges: that our concept of free action is 
incompatibilist, and that our conscious deliberations and standard decision making processes 
cause no, or very few, actions. I will begin by establishing that our concept of free action is 
compatibilist, using a new experimental philosophy methodology inspired by two-dimensional 
semantics. Then I will show that we can address the concerns of the brain sciences by extending 
our understanding of which actions are under our conscious control. Agents act freely either 
when their actions are caused by conscious deliberations and standard decision making processes 
or when their actions are indirectly caused by these same processes. Hence the name of my 
account: indirect compatibilism. At the end of this thesis, I will defend indirect compatibilism against 
some interesting objections and provide evidence from cognitive neuroscience that some of our 
actions count as free according to this new account.  
 
1.1. Freedom-conferring mechanisms 
In order to introduce the topic of free action from the perspective of a conscious control 
account, we do best to begin with an example. For now, I will bracket the relevance of 
determinism to free will. While all these psychological processes might be determined I will 
assume compatibilism is true for the moment. So, consider the following paradigm case of 
someone who acts freely. Katie is deliberating about whether to pursue a PhD in Philosophy at 
the University of Sydney or a PhD in Psychology at the University of Auckland. Before making 
her decision, she consciously deliberates. Currently living in Auckland, she weighs up the costs of 
uprooting and moving away from her friends, family and partner, against the benefits to her 
education, job prospects and passion for knowledge and learning. She simulates an assortment of 
various possible outcomes for each choice. Eventually, she chooses one option or the other, and 
through that choice adopts one class of actions over the other. For example, if Katie chooses to 
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pursue a PhD in Sydney she performs the set of actions that will bring about her choice to study 
there. By doing so, she refrains from performing the alternative set of actions that would have 
led her to study in Auckland. 
To get clearer on what I mean to be the rough intuitive target for what it takes to rightly 
say someone ‘acts freely’, we can contrast Katie’s case with a paradigm case of someone who acts 
unfreely. At a medical check-up, Mila’s doctor tests her patella-reflex. When Mila is struck just 
below the knee-cap with a little rubber hammer, her leg jerks upwards. The leg-movement is 
automatic. Mila does not choose to move her leg. Exhibiting the patella-reflex is simply a 
consequence of the physiology of bipedal beings like us, which allows us to maintain balance 
with little to no conscious thought or control.  
Generally speaking, whenever we act freely it’s because our actions are caused by certain 
psychological processes and whenever we act unfreely it’s because those psychological processes 
that cause free actions are absent. For example, the reason Katie acts freely when she decides to 
pursue a PhD in Sydney is because her actions were presumably caused by her conscious 
deliberations, her desire to study at Sydney, her reasons to study at Sydney, and so on. 
Conversely, the reason Mila’s action is unfree is because her action was not caused by any 
psychological processes of the kind that caused Katie’s action. Mila’s reflex was not caused by 
the conclusion of any conscious deliberation, nor was it caused by any of her desires or reasons 
for action, or any psychological processes at all for that matter. Instead, Mila’s action was simply 
the result of being struck below the patella in conjunction with some facts about her physiology 
and the physiology of beings like us. When we act freely then, we act for our reasons, to fulfil 
our desires, or after having mentally simulated various course of actions and their projected 
outcomes, and so on. Perhaps we act freely, as a result of all or some combination of these 
psychological processes. Of course, the factors listed here do not exhaust all the differences 
between the two examples. Nor am I taking any specific psychological processes to be necessary 
or sufficient for free action at this moment in the thesis. 
One way we can get clearer on the difference between cases where people act freely and 
cases where people act unfreely is by appealing to the personal and sub-personal distinction first 
introduced by Daniel Dennett in Content and Consciousness (1968). Dennett distinguishes between 
the “explanatory level of people and their sensations and activities” and “the sub-personal level 
of brains and events in the nervous system”. Applied to the case of free action, we might think 
that people act freely only if their actions are caused by certain personal-level psychological 
processes. So when Katie reports her reasons, or her desires, or the outcome of her deliberation, 
she acts freely only if her reasons, desires, or conscious deliberation, and so on, played the role 
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she supposed they did in causing her actions. Conversely, the reason Mila’s action is unfree is 
because there are no personal-level explanations for her action. Instead, Mila’s action was caused 
by some sub-personal level mechanism. I will call the conscious psychological processes (along 
with their neural correlates)3 that cause free actions: freedom-conferring mechanisms. One of 
the major issues I will address in this thesis is whether any of our actions are caused by freedom-
conferring mechanisms, or whether they are, as some brain scientists claim, all caused by sub-
personal level mechanisms. Briefly, my answer will be that while I think some of our actions are 
caused directly (in a sense which will be made more precise later) by freedom-conferring 
mechanisms, the number that are is likely far fewer than we might have originally thought. For 
the time being though, let’s set this worry aside. 
Why should we care about freedom-conferring mechanisms? One reason is because the 
notion captures the vast majority of compatibilistically acceptable psychological processes free 
will theorists think, or might think, are crucial for free actions (for an up to date review see 
McKenna & Coates, 2015; O’Connor & Franklin, 2018).4 If all our actions are caused by sub-
personal level mechanisms, which are not themselves under the control of compatibilistically 
acceptable psychological processes along with their neural correlates, then almost every free will 
theorist is going to think there are no free actions (see Mele 2010). Of course, according to 
different accounts of free will some psychological processes are more crucial than others. For 
example, the idea that actions caused by our desires are free has its roots as far back as Hobbes 
(1651/1997) and Hume (1740/1978). Further, according to Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998; though 
see also Fischer, 2004) popular reasons-responsiveness account, an agent acts freely when they 
recognize and react in a flexible manner towards reasons for action. In this thesis, I will make no 
attempt to adjudicate which psychological processes are crucial, or most important, for free 
action, though I am partial to desire-based accounts. Instead, one of the major tasks of this thesis 
is to argue that actions indirectly caused by freedom-conferring mechanisms (again, something I 
will spell out more shortly), in some circumstances, are free as well as are those directly caused 
by those mechanisms. However, if you have prior theoretical commitments in this area, 
whenever you read ‘freedom-conferring mechanism’, feel free to read-in your preferred 
compatibilistically acceptable psychological process, or processes. 
                                                          
3Some possible accounts of the personal-level include global neuronal workspace theory (e.g., Dehaene, Kerszberg, 
& Changeux, 1998; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; though 
see also Baars, 1988), recurrent-processing theories (e.g., Lamme, 2006; 2010), higher-order representational theories 
(e.g., Kriegel, 2003; Carruthers, 2005; Rosenthal, 2005) and information integration theory (e.g., Tononi, 2004; 2008; 
though see also Latham, Ellis, Chan, Braddon-Mitchell, 2017). While I prefer global neuronal workspace theory, 
nothing that I say in this thesis hangs on this. 
4With any attempt to introduce broad categorizations in philosophy there are always exceptions. For example, see 
Ned Markosian’s agent-causal compatibilism (1999; 2012). 
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Another reason to care about freedom-conferring mechanisms is because the folk also 
care about these mechanisms with respect to free action. For example, Daniel Shepherd (2012; 
2015) observed that people only straightforwardly judge that an agent acts freely when the 
agent’s conscious psychological processes were central to causing their actions and controlling 
their behaviour. Furthermore, when brain scientists attempt to show that people do not act 
freely, their arguments are informed by results that purport to show that the real causes of our 
actions are sub-personal level mechanisms, not, as we might have supposed, freedom-conferring 
mechanisms. Once again, I will return to introduce the challenge posed by the brain sciences in 
more detail in §1.3. However, before I do that I want to introduce and outline my response to 
the defining problem of the free will literature: the problem of determinism. 
 
1.2. Conditionalism and the problem of determinism 
Until now, I have bracketed off the problem of determinism for free will. Determinism is the 
thesis that any earlier state of the universe, in conjunction with the laws of nature, is logically 
sufficient for any later state of the universe. Free will theorists who think that free will is 
compatible with determinism being true are referred to as compatibilists. On the other hand, free 
will theorists who think that free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism are referred 
to as incompatibilists, and incompatibilists who think that we have free will are referred to as 
libertarians.5 Many libertarians have been convinced by arguments, such as Peter van Inwagen’s 
Consequence argument, (1983), that purports to show that if determinism is true then there are 
sufficient causes for our behaviour that are outside our control, and if that’s true then we could 
not have done anything other than what we actually did, so we are not free.6 For example, recall 
the case of Katie choosing between the University of Sydney and the University of Auckland. If 
determinism is true, then it was always the case that Katie would go to the University of Sydney. 
                                                          
5Libertarians can be further classified according to the kinds of powers they think agents exercise to overcome 
indeterminacies. Event-causal theorists think there are certain reducible psychological processes that can overcome 
indeterminacies. Perhaps the most widely known account of this type comes from Robert Kane in The Significance of 
Free Will (1996). On Kane’s account indeterminacies are present inside the agent when they are deciding between 
competing visions about what to do or who they should become. These indeterminacies, stirred-up and magnified 
by chaos in the brain, impede either vision from being actualized. Only through the agent’s ‘efforts’ is the 
indeterminacy overcome resulting in one of their actions being actualized. However, I find it difficult to grasp how 
the psychological effort of an agent can overcome genuine chance in the world.  
Agent-causal theories posit the strong emergence of fundamental agent-causal powers (see for example, 
Clarke 1993; 1996; O’Connor, 1995; 2000). I tend to think that these views properly understood either collapse into 
event-causal libertarianism, or are dualistic. This is not to say that these positions are necessarily false. For example, 
some such as Derek Pereboom (2001) think that agent-causal powers are necessary by the lights of our concept of 
free will. However, their unintelligibility and drastic departure from current scientific understanding that leads us to 
be error theorists about free will. 
6In his own words van Inwagen (1983) summarises the Consequence argument as follows: “If determinism is true, 
then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what 
went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of 
these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.” (pg. 5). See also Strawson’s (1994) Basic argument.   
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Libertarian free will requires that Katie could have gone to the University of Auckland, even 
given with the same past and the same laws of nature.  
The idea that free will is incompatible with determinism is not an idiosyncratic worry of 
some free will theorists. The orthodox view in the literature is that our folk concept of free will is 
incompatibilist. This is supported by some excellent evidence from experimental philosophy 
(e.g., Nichols, 2004; Nichols and Knobe, 2007) and the numerous self-reports provided by free 
will theorists in the literature. For example, Robert Kane (2005) writes:  
“In my experience, most persons resist the idea that free will and determinism might be 
compatible when they first encounter it. The idea that determinism might be compatible 
with free will looks at first like a “quagmire of evasion,” as William James called it, or a 
“wretched subterfuge” as Kant called the compatibilism of Hobbes and Hume. If 
compatibilism is to be taken serious by ordinary persons, they have to be talked out of 
this natural belief in the incompatibilism of free will and determinism by means of 
philosophical arguments.” (pg. 12-13). 
It is commonly thought that our concept of free will requires that indeterminism be true in order 
for any of our actions to be free. Hence in order for me to be free there must be at least one 
action where I could have acted otherwise, given the same past and the same laws of nature.7 
This is to think that our folk concept of free will is incompatibilist. In Chapter 2 of this thesis I 
will argue that the current orthodoxy is wrong about the folk concept of free will. The folk 
concept of free will is not incompatibilist; instead compatibilism of some kind is a conceptual 
truth. 
The main reason I think it is important to show that our concept of free will is 
compatible with determinism (that is that the folk think it is possible to act freely in a 
deterministic universe) - or, as I will say, that our concept of free will is compatibilist - is because 
if our concept is not compatibilist then it will prove a major obstacle to the development of my 
new account of free action: indirect compatibilism. If the folk do not think it is possible to act 
freely in a deterministic universe, then it is hard to see how any supposed account of free action 
of a compatibilist kind could deserve to be called ‘free action’. By extension if there are no free 
actions in the world because our world is deterministic then it is hard to see how we could 
vindicate the idea that we have free will. That is not to say that what is described in this thesis 
would not be an account of something, just that it would not be, as I might have hoped, an 
                                                          
7Once again there are exceptions to this broad categorization. For example, Erkstrom (e.g., 2000; 2003) defends a 
libertarian account of free will that locates indeterminacies at the input of preferences into deliberation. Deliberation 
itself proceeds in a deterministic fashion. Similar accounts have been described Mele (e.g., 1995; 2006) who refers to 
the position as soft libertarianism, and Dennett (1978). 
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account of what it takes to act freely. That’s because our concepts of free action and free will 
would be incompatibilist and so indeterminism would be a necessary condition for there being 
free will. 
What is the relationship between our concept of free action and our concept of free will? 
As I see it our concept of free action is about the aetiology of our actions and our concept of 
free will is about the general capacity of an agent to reliably act freely. According to indirect 
compatibilism an action is free only if either it is caused by freedom-conferring mechanisms, or 
is indirectly caused by freedom-conferring mechanisms. Shortly, I will outline how freedom-
conferring mechanisms can indirectly cause free actions. Briefly for now though, I will say that 
any sub-personal level mechanism influenced8 by a freedom-conferring mechanism causes free 
actions, albeit indirectly. An agent has free will then only if their actions are reliably caused by 
their freedom-conferring mechanisms, or sub-personal level mechanisms influenced by freedom-
conferring mechanisms. In this thesis I will not attempt to say how many of our actions have to 
be free in order for us to have free will. However, at the very least I think that the number of 
actual free actions will need to roughly align with the number of actions that we typically and 
pre-theoretically judge to be free, which I tend to think, along with the folk, is a significant 
proportion of our actions.  
It’s important to note that one major strategy to downplay the importance of findings 
that the folk conception of free will is incompatibilist, is to argue that while the folk concept of 
free will is indeed an incompatibilist one, the best concept of free will we can deploy is 
compatibilist. Most compatibilists, I think, are not engaged in the descriptive project of giving an 
account of our concept of free will. Instead, they are engaged in the project of conceptual 
engineering, developing what they think is the best concept of free will for us to deploy (see 
Manuel Vargas Building Better Beings (2013) for an excellent example of this type of project). One 
of the reasons they are engaged in this project is because they think there is something deeply 
problematic with libertarian free will. For example, many compatibilists have been convinced by 
arguments such as the Luck argument (e.g., Mele, 1999; Haji, 2000; Levy, 2011) and others like it. 
These arguments purport to show that if indeterminism is true and so our actions are 
undetermined, then it’s a matter of chance what we do, and if that’s true then we are not free.9 
For example, recall again the case of Katie who is torn between studying at the University of 
Sydney and the University of Auckland. If indeterminism is true, then whether or not Katie goes 
to the University of Sydney is a matter of chance. Katie’s freedom-conferring mechanisms 
                                                          
8Exactly what sort of connections count as influence will be introduced in §1.3 and discussed in Chapter 4. 
9See also the closely related Mind argument (e.g., Hobart, 1934; Nowell-Smith, 1948; Smart, 1961). So-called by van 
Inwagen (1983) because they were all published in the journal Mind. 
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cannot determine what she will do because if they do then it’s no longer true that she could have 
acted otherwise given the same past and the same laws of nature. 
While I think that libertarian accounts of free will are problematic I will not argue to that 
conclusion in this thesis (though in the midst of a dark night of the soul I think libertarian 
accounts might be right). Nor, will I argue that we should conceptually engineer and deploy a 
compatibilist concept of free will because that is the best concept of its kind. Instead, in this 
thesis I will take a different route and argue that the folk concept of free will is already a 
compatibilist one. 
In Chapter 2, I will argue for an unorthodox view in the literature, according to which 
our folk concept of free will is a compatibilist concept, albeit of a unique kind. The folk concept 
of free will is a conditional concept. Briefly, a conditional concept is a single concept that has an 
indexical component which fixes what is necessary for the concept to be satisfied, depending on 
what the actual world is like (Braddon-Mitchell, 2003). So roughly, if the actual world is 
indeterministic, then indeterminism is necessary for free will. However, if the actual world is 
deterministic, then indeterminism is not necessary for free will. The reason the conditional 
concept is a compatibilist one is because once you have fixed the personal-level processes you 
think are necessary for free will, then no matter how things turn out to be with respect to 
determinism, you will judge that we sometimes act freely. In this chapter I will also present 
evidence from my own experimental philosophy investigation that shows the folk concept of 
free will has a conditional structure, and thus shows the folk are free will compatibilists. 
 
1.3. Indirection and the problem of the brain sciences 
One of the ways we act freely, according to indirect compatibilism, is when our actions are 
directly caused by freedom-conferring mechanisms. I will call the view that an action is free only 
if it is directly caused by freedom-conferring mechanisms: direct conscious control 
compatibilism. Henceforth, I will refer to that view as direct compatibilism. However, even 
after I have established that these compatibilistically acceptable psychological processes are 
acceptable as causes of our free actions, it could still turn out that there are no free actions, and 
thus no one in the world has free will. 
There is accumulating, albeit contentious, evidence that freedom-conferring mechanisms 
cannot be playing the role we suppose they do in causing actions. Consider the following basic 
paradigm. Participants are asked to watch a time-keeping device and report the time shown when 
they first feel the urge to perform some simple motor action, such as a wrist flex, or cognitive 
action, such as basic arithmetic. Shortly after they have performed the simple action, the time-
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keeping device stops and the experimental task is reset. It’s robustly found that the onset of 
neural activity associated with an action occurs well before participant’s first report their urge to 
perform the action (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Bode, He, Soon, Trampel, 
Turner, & Haynes, 2011). On the basis of these results, some brain scientists conclude that our 
freedom-conferring mechanisms cannot be the cause of our actions (e.g., Gazzaniga, 2011; 
Greene & Cohen, 2004; Libet, 1999). After all, if freedom-conferring mechanisms were causing 
actions, then the time participant’s first report their urge to perform an action should occur 
before (or at least roughly in line with) the onset of supposed neural activity for that action. 
In this thesis, I will not argue that there is anything wrong with the methods and results 
of these studies, even though there are a number of good critiques already in the literature that 
are certainly worth developing. For example, you might wonder whether people can reliably and 
accurately report the timing of their urge to perform an action (e.g., Banks & Isham, 2009). On 
the other hand, you might wonder whether the earliest recorded neural activity is actually related 
to the action that participants will go on to perform (e.g., Miller, Shepherdson, & Trevena, 2011). 
In Chapter 3 I will just accept the general findings of these studies and will attempt to develop 
the strongest argument from the brain sciences against the existence of free actions. Ultimately, I 
will argue that the conclusion there are no free actions is false. However, there is nearby 
conclusion that is plausibly true: only a limited number of our actions are directly caused by 
freedom-conferring mechanisms, and the vast majority of our actions are in fact caused by sub-
personal level mechanisms. 
Some readers might be satisfied with the result that only a few of our actions are free; but 
I am less sanguine. That’s because if direct compatibilism is right and so only a few of our 
actions are free, then it’s entirely possible that we do not have free will. I will call this the 
discrepancy problem. Recall my earlier description of the relationship between our concepts of 
free action and free will; while our concept of free action refers to the aetiology of our actions, 
our concept of free will refers to the general capacity of an agent to act reliably in a free manner. 
If the only actions that get to count as free are those caused by freedom-conferring mechanisms, 
then while there might be a few free actions, as we do not act reliably in a free manner, so we do 
not have free will.  
However, I don’t think that free actions are only those directly caused by freedom-
conferring mechanisms. Instead, I think that some sub-personal level mechanisms cause free 
actions as well. But why should we think that? Here is a suggestive thought. I find it very striking 
that brain researchers ever thought that the simple, repetitive actions in these experiments were 
free. Yet they must, since otherwise, why would they think that their results speak to the issue of 
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free action? I do not think that the judgement these simple, repetitive actions are free is wrong; 
instead I think this judgment is right and reveals something interesting about our concept of free 
action. In these experiments people were asked to repeatedly perform a very simple action for 
hundreds of trials. Once people had freely decided to participate, most people probably 
automated their performance, so that their actions were not being caused by freedom-conferring 
mechanisms, but instead were being caused by a sub-personal level mechanism. Insofar as we 
think that we correctly judge that the actions performed during these experiments are free, then 
prima facie it seems as though some sub-personal level mechanisms cause free actions.   
Consider again the earlier case of Katie choosing between studying at the University of 
Sydney and the University of Auckland. Katie chose to study at the University of Sydney and as a 
result ‘performs the set of actions that will bring about her choice to study there’. The choice of 
language in the original case was intentional and what I am particularly interested in, in this 
thesis, is the status of the actions that bring about Katie’s choice to study at the University of 
Sydney. Once Katie has freely chosen the University of Sydney, she might automate most of her 
actions to bring about her choice to study there. That is, some of her future actions might be 
caused by a sub-personal level mechanism whose function it is to bring about her choice to study 
at the University of Sydney. In this thesis I will argue that even if only a few of our actions are 
directly caused by freedom-conferring mechanisms, most of our actions might still be free if they 
are caused by a certain kind of sub-personal level mechanism: those influenced by our freedom-
conferring mechanisms. 
In Chapter 3 I will develop the notion of an action procedure. An action procedure is a 
sub-personal level mechanism that causes actions, or influences other action procedures, in a 
contained and reliable fashion. So for example, we can imagine a simple hand-waving action 
procedure that causes a hand-waving action. The action procedure is contained in the sense that 
it will only cause actions of the hand-waving kind (contained) and will rarely fail to cause hand-
waving actions when activated (reliable). An action procedure that is influenced by a freedom-
conferring mechanism is a controlled action procedure. According to indirect compatibilism, 
the actions caused by controlled action procedures are free, albeit indirectly, because they are the 
result of a sub-personal level mechanism influenced by the agent’s freedom-conferring 
mechanisms. So for example, the reason we judge that the participants of these experiments act 
freely is because when they freely decided to participate in the experiment they might have 
created an action procedure that causes the appropriate actions in response to some 
experimental stimuli. Further, we can imagine that Katie’s free choice to study at the University 
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of Sydney might have resulted in a much more complex action procedure which causes some of 
the actions that bring about her choice to study there.  
In Chapter 4 I will go into detail about how people might influence action procedures. 
For example, one-way people might influence action procedures is by creating them. But this is 
not the only route to influencing action procedures. For example, people might have the capacity 
to destroy an action procedure that they possess. They might trigger an action procedure to 
come on. They might monitor an action procedure and turn it off, if they so choose. Further, 
people might update an action procedure they already have, to perform a different function. In 
each case, the resulting controlled action procedure causes free actions because it is influenced 
by the agent’s freedom-conferring mechanisms. In Chapter 4 I will also argue that indirect 
compatibilism is a better account of our concept of free action than is direct compatibilism 
because it is better aligned with our pre-theoretic free action judgments (our judgments about 
which actions are free and unfree) and vindicates the thought that we have free will.  
According to indirect compatibilism, then, an action is free only if it is directly caused by 
a freedom-conferring mechanism, or indirectly caused by a freedom-conferring mechanism via a 
controlled action procedure. In Chapter 5 I will address a number of interesting objections to my 
account of indirect compatibilism. For example, do controlled action procedures that we create 
but can no longer intercede on, cause free actions? Are indirectly free actions caused by 
controlled action procedures just as free as those directly caused by freedom-conferring 
mechanisms? I will also offer up one piece of evidence from my own investigations in cognitive 
neuroscience that I think shows people updating their action procedures, thus showing that a 
necessary condition of my account, indirect compatibilism is fulfilled.  
 
1.4. Indirect compatibilism and autonomy 
There is a class of theories in the autonomy literature that are often viewed as compatibilist 
accounts of our free action and free will. When they are seen in the free will literature they are 
broadly characterized as higher-order accounts of free will (e.g., Frankfurt, 1971; 1987). 
According to these accounts, an agent’s action is free if and only if the action is in accordance 
with the will the agent wants. For example, imagine Luca who desires a chocolate cookie and so 
goes and obtains a cookie. Luca acts freely, on such an account, if and only if she desires her 
desire for the cookie to be a part of her will. One the other hand, if Luca desires the chocolate 
cookie, but desires that she did not have her desire for a chocolate cookie, then she doesn’t act 
freely when she eats the cookie. For ease of explication I will just talk in terms of desires, but 
what kind of psychological states or processes people identify with for the purposes of acting 
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freely varies according to the account in question. Some other examples include identifying with 
what you love (e.g., Frankfurt, 1994; Shoemaker, 2003) your plans (e.g., Bratman, 1997; 2007) 
and your perceptions of the good (e.g., Watson, 1975; 1987). 
 The main reason I raise these accounts here is because there is a conflict in the 
judgements issued by these accounts, taken as an account of our concept of free action, and the 
account of free action that I will be offering in this thesis: indirect compatibilism. Consider again 
the case of Luca and the cookie. According to my account if Luca reports a standard desire for 
the chocolate cookie as what caused her to eat the chocolate cookie, then provided her desire is 
what caused her to eat the cookie, then she acted freely. That’s because insofar as our desires are 
one kind of freedom-conferring mechanism, provided Luca’s freedom-conferring mechanism 
caused her action, then she acts freely. However, this judgment would be wrong according to a 
higher-order account. Given that Luca also has the desire that her desire for the cookie is not a 
part of her will, then Luca’s act of eating the cookie is not free. That’s because Luca does not 
identify with the desire that causes her action in the right sort of way demanded by these 
accounts. 
 But what to say about the conflict between these two accounts? Here are two things you 
might say. First, higher-order accounts describe yet another necessary condition for free action. 
It is not enough for an action to be caused by a freedom-conferring mechanism; the freedom-
conferring mechanism must be one that we identify with in the right kind of way for it to cause 
free actions. Second, higher-order accounts of free action are best not thought of as account of 
free action but instead as an account of something over and above free action: autonomy. 
Thoughts about autonomy, while closely related to thoughts about free action, are nonetheless 
orthogonal. Actions can be either free or unfree as well as autonomous or non-autonomous. I 
think that my preference is for the second option, but I will not argue for this in the thesis. What 
is important going forward is that when I talk about free action I am referring to those actions 
caused directly and indirectly by freedom-conferring mechanisms and not those that we might 
think of as autonomous actions. 
 
1.5. The long free road ahead 
In summary then, here is the plan for the thesis. In Chapter 2 I face up to the classical problem 
of free will. In order successfully to defend the idea that actions are free when they are caused 
directly or indirectly by freedom-conferring mechanisms, some version of compatibilism must be 
an acceptable account of free action. In Chapter 2 I will argue that the orthodox view, according 
to which the folk concept of free will is incompatibilist, is mistaken. The folk concept of free will 
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is a unique kind of compatibilist concept: a conditional concept. What makes the conditional 
concept a compatibilist concept is that when you hold fixed whatever personal-level processes 
you think are necessary for free action, then there is no discovery that you could make with 
respect to determinism, which will lead you to conclude that you are unfree. I will support the 
claim that the folk concept of free will is a conditional concept and thus the folk are free will 
compatibilists, with some positive evidence from my own experimental philosophy 
investigations. 
In Chapter 3 I will address two challenges posed by the brain sciences to free actions and 
free will. The first challenge is the broad challenge: evidence from the brain sciences shows that 
our freedom-conferring mechanisms cause no actions, and so none of our actions are free. The 
second challenge is the narrow challenge: evidence from the brain sciences shows that our 
freedom-conferring mechanisms cause very few actions. I will argue that while the broad challenge 
is wrong, the narrow challenge is plausibly right and no less problematic. That is because if our 
freedom-conferring mechanisms cause very few of our actions, then far fewer actions than we 
initially supposed will be free. Further, if not enough of our actions are free, then we do not have 
free will: the discrepancy problem. I will argue that we can accommodate many of our free action 
judgments by acknowledging that most cases that we judge to be free are not free because they 
are caused directly by freedom conferring mechanisms, but because they are indirectly caused via 
action procedures which those freedom-conferring mechanisms influenced in some way. 
In Chapter 4 I will elaborate on what it means to be an indirectly free action. Remember 
that according to indirect compatibilism an action is free only if it is directly caused by freedom-
conferring mechanisms, or indirectly caused by freedom-conferring mechanisms via controlled 
action procedures. This means that any sub-personal level mechanism that was created, or can be 
destroyed, triggered, monitored, or updated by freedom-conferring mechanisms, cause free 
actions. In Chapter 4 I will also argue that indirect compatibilism is a better account of our 
concept of free action than straightforward compatibilism because it better accommodates 
people’s pre-theoretic judgments about which actions are free (and unfree), and vindicates the 
thought that we have free will.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 I work through what I think are some of the most interesting 
objections to indirect compatibilism. For example, this includes working through potential cases 
that my view says are free but prima facie look unfree. Further, some people might have the 
intuition that there are substantive differences between free actions caused by freedom-
conferring mechanisms and those caused by controlled action procedures: remember, a 
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controlled action procedure is a sub-personal level mechanism that is influenced by a freedom-
conferring mechanism.  
In Chapter 5 I will also highlight one finding from my own cognitive neuroscience 
investigations that I think is evidence of people updating an action procedure, and thus shows 
that an important empirical necessary condition is satisfied by my view. The full paper of this result 
can be found in Appendix A. The thesis now starts right at the beginning at the classical problem 
of free will. As I take my account to be folk and compatibilist friendly, it had better not be the 
case that the folk conceptually rule out compatibilism from the onset. Let’s begin. 
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Chapter 2 
Folk free will in two-dimensions10 
 
In this thesis I defend the idea that our actions are free when they are either directly caused by 
compatibilistically acceptable, (but possibly deterministic) processes - i.e. by a freedom-
conferring mechanism -  or indirectly caused by those same processes - i.e. by a controlled action 
procedure. However, in order for this is to be so, some version of compatibilism needs to be 
acceptable as a thesis about free will. In this chapter I will defend that possibility against the 
following pressing objection: that there is evidence, as a matter of descriptive fact, that our 
concept of free will is one which doesn’t allow deterministically caused actions to count as free. 
Is our concept of free will compatible with the thesis of determinism being true? That is, 
is our concept of free will a compatibilist concept? Recall that the thesis of determinism holds that 
the entirety of particular facts about the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature entails every 
truth about the future.11 Compatibilists answer affirmatively; they think that having free will is 
compatible with determinism being true. According to them, if determinism is true then 
provided agents have some preferred set of abilities, which vary according to the version of 
compatibilism at issue, then free actions are those produced by those abilities. For ease of 
explication I will refer to whatever the abilities are that when exercised in the production of an action makes 
that action free according to compatibilism: compatibilist powers. Conversely, incompatibilists take it 
to be a necessary condition for our having free will that indeterminism is true. That is, they think 
that having free will is incompatible with determinism being true. I will refer to whatever the abilities 
are that when exercised in the production of an action makes that action free according to libertarianism: 
libertarian powers. 
According to the new account of free action that I defend in this thesis – namely, indirect 
(conscious control) compatibilism - actions are free when they are either produced by a freedom-
conferring mechanism, or produced in an indirect way via action procedures that were 
influenced by freedom-conferring mechanisms. Of course, this account is in no way logically 
connected to compatibilism. We can easily imagine a version of this account that would be true if 
either our freedom-conferring mechanisms or controlled action procedures were of an 
incompatibilist kind. But as I develop the proposal in this thesis I will focus solely on 
                                                          
10Thanks and credit to David Braddon-Mitchell for his assistance with the arguments and empirical study contained 
in this chapter. 
11Of course, there are many different ways of formulating the thesis of determinism and this formulation is from 
van Inwagen (1983). Nothing I say in this chapter hinges on which formulation you choose. 
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compatibilist kinds of freedom-conferring mechanisms and controlled action procedures. Hence 
the name of my account: indirect compatibilism. 
A major challenge to developing an account of free action in a compatibilist fashion is 
that if the folk as a matter of fact don’t accept that free actions can exist in a deterministic 
universe, then it’s difficult to argue that any account supposedly of free will of a compatibilist 
kind deserves to be called ‘free will’. One common objection to compatibilist accounts of free 
will is the ‘changing the subject objection’. According to this objection, whenever the 
compatibilist proposes some account of the compatibilist powers they take to be sufficient for 
free will, while they are giving an account of something, it isn’t an account of free will. That’s 
because our concept of free will is an incompatibilist concept, thus indeterminism is a necessary 
condition for there to be free will. This objection gains strength from the fact that current 
orthodoxy within the free will literature is that the folk concept of free will is an incompatibilist 
concept.12 The task I have set for myself in this chapter will be to argue that this orthodox view 
of the folk concept of free will is wrong, and that the folk concept of free will is in fact a 
compatibilist concept, albeit of a unique kind. 
Once again it’s worthwhile to note that many compatibilist theorists are not especially 
concerned with the charge that they are changing the subject. That’s because the project they 
take to have set themselves is not to provide a descriptive account of the folk concept of free 
will, but rather, to prescribe what our concept of free will ought to be. They argue that the 
concept of free will we ought to possess is not an incompatibilist one, but instead a compatibilist 
one, irrespective of whatever concept we happen to possess already. As a matter of fact, I agree 
with them that the best account of free will is a compatibilist account. Further, if I took myself 
to be engaged in a conceptual engineering project, which I believe that most compatibilist 
theorists are engaged with, I too would try to show that a compatibilist account of free will best 
serves the functional role of a free will concept. But I don’t think such a project is necessary. 
That’s because I don’t think our concept of free will needs to be revised in order to be a 
                                                          
12Here are a couple of examples of philosophers explicitly describing the prevalence and tenacity of people’s 
incompatibilist intuitions. For example van Inwagen (1993) writes:  
“It has seemed obvious to most people who have not been exposed (perhaps “subjected would be a better 
word) to philosophy that free will and determinism are incompatible. It is almost impossible to get 
beginning students of philosophy to take seriously the idea that there could be such a thing as free will in a 
deterministic universe. Indeed, people who have not been exposed to philosophy usually understand the 
word “determinism” (if they know the word at all) to stand for the thesis that there is no free will. And you 
might think that the incompatibilist of free will and determinism deserves to be obvious – because it is 
obvious.” (pg. 187)  
Similar sentiments are shared by Ekstrom (2002), Kane (2005), O’Connor (2000), Perebloom (2001), Pink (2004), 
Strawson (1986) to name a few. Contra this some theorists such as Eddy Nahmias (2011) think the folk concept of 
concept is a compatibilist one and that incompatibilist judgments arise out of people misunderstanding the 
implications of determinism for free will.   
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compatibilist concept. I think that our concept of free will is already a compatibilist concept to 
begin with. 
One area of research that we might turn to in order to figure out whether or not the folk 
concept of free will is a compatibilist or incompatibilist concept is experimental philosophy. 
Existing empirical evidence from experimental philosophy appears to be equivocal. There is 
some excellent evidence that the majority of the general population have a compatibilist concept 
of free will, provided by seminal work by Nahmias and colleagues (2005; 2006). But there 
appears to be equally excellent evidence that the majority of the general population have an 
incompatibilist concept of free will from studies from Nicholls and colleagues (2007) amongst 
others. It is my goal in this chapter to explain this apparent inconsistency in the experimental 
philosophy literature. I will argue that all existing studies in the literature are consistent with the 
underlying nature of our free will concept being a compatibilist concept, albeit of a particular 
kind: a so-called ‘conditional concept’, which I will explain shortly. After I have done this I will 
then go on to present some of my own empirical data that goes beyond merely showing that the 
folk concept of free will is consistent with being a kind compatibilist concept, but is strongly 
suggestive of the fact that the folk concept of free will is such a kind of compatibilist concept. 
Here then is the plan for this chapter. First, in §2.1 I will give my account of the 
conditional concept of free will. I will explain what makes the conditional concept of free will a 
compatibilist concept and provide some prima facie reasons we should think that our concept of 
free will is a conditional one. After that, in §2.2 I will describe some evidence from experimental 
philosophy that has either been used to show that the folk concept of free will is a compatibilist 
concept, or to show that it is an incompatibilist concept. I will explain why the differences in 
these results are only superficial, and are due to differences in methodological set up, and why in 
fact they provide weak evidence that we have a conditional concept of free will. Then, in §2.3 I 
will present data from my own empirical research that provides strong evidence that our 
underlying concept of free will is a conditional one. In §2.4 I will reply to a series of possible 
objections. Then finally in §2.5 I will conclude. 
 
2.1. What is a conditional concept of free will? 
The major task I have set myself in this chapter is to show that the folk concept of free will is a 
compatibilist concept, albeit of a particular kind: a conditional one. My goal in this subsection is 
to articulate what a conditional concept of free will is and outline why we might think that the 
folk concept of free will is a conditional one. I will do this in three parts. I will begin by 
explaining what a conditional concept is and articulating my conditional analysis of our concept 
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of free will. Then, I will explain what makes the conditional concept of free will a compatibilist 
concept and how it can accommodate the tenacity of people’s libertarian intuitions. Finally, I will 
describe some prima facie reasons for thinking that the folk concept of free will is a conditional 
concept. Let’s begin. 
2.1.1 Conditional concepts and straightforward concepts of free will 
One route to grasping conditional concepts is as a development of David Lewis’s idea of a “best 
deserver”. In ‘Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia’ (Lewis, 1995) Lewis said that the answer 
was ‘yes and no’. The ‘best deserver’ of the idea of qualia was something that requires dualism to 
be true. Of course, as a materialist, Lewis thought dualism was false, but he thought that there 
was a ‘good enough’ deserver in the form of a physicalist substitute. Lewis’s claim was not that 
the physicalist substitute answers to our concept of qualia perfectly and that dualists were making 
a conceptual mistake. Rather, the dualist conception of qualia is indeed, in some sense, the 
paradigm concept; but the materialist’s conception is close enough to count, in some sense, as a 
concept of qualia. It’s easy to see how this thought might be applied to free will. The 
compatibilist is not claiming that their conception of free will is the uniquely correct conceptual 
account. Rather, it’s close enough to our idea of free will so that if actually libertarian properties 
are nowhere to be found, but there are things in the world that correspond to the compatibilist 
conception, they will be ‘close enough’ to count as free will.13 
David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) extends this idea using some of the ideas of two-
dimensional modal logic by suggesting that there is a single concept with a conditional structure. 
The idea is that certain concepts of qualia have an indexical component which fixes what is 
necessary for qualia, depending on what the actual world offers up. If the actual world contains 
certain ‘spooky’ dualist properties, we will judge not only that they are qualia, but also that they 
are necessary for it.14 We would therefore straightforwardly judge that in materialist worlds 
thought of not as ways actuality might be, but as counterfactual alternatives to it, there is no 
qualia. On the other hand, if the actual world contains only certain physical states, then they 
would be judged to be what qualia are actually, and counterfactual worlds containing either those 
certain physical states or spooky dualist properties would equally count as containing qualia. 
Once again, it’s easy to see how this idea can be extended to the case of free will, and we 
might propose a conditional analysis of free will, which proceeds like this: 
                                                          
13For those familiar with some of the more nuanced positions in the free will literature soft libertarianism (Mele, 1996) 
could be read as ‘best deserver’ account. According to soft libertarian the most desirable form of free will has 
indeterminism is a necessary condition. Whether or not indeterminism is a necessary condition for free will simpliciter 
though is an open question. To the best of my knowledge no one in the free will literature endorses this view.   
14See also Hawthorne (2002) and Stalnaker (2002). 
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If the actual world is indeterministic, and agents have libertarian powers, then these 
libertarian powers are what free will is and must be. 
Else, if the actual world is deterministic, and agents have their preferred 
compatibilist powers, then compatibilist powers are what free will is. 
Then if the first condition obtains, then counterfactually we would judge that all and only 
indeterministic worlds containing agents with libertarian powers contain agents with free will. By 
contrast, if the second condition obtains then counterfactually we will judge compatibilist powers 
to be sufficient for free will.15 
To make things even clearer, this conditional analysis of free will can be organized into a 
simple two-dimensional diagram as follows: 
 
  Possible World 
  I D 
Actual World 
I T F 
D T T 
  
‘Some agents have free will’ 
Figure 1. Two dimensional diagram showing the conditional analysis of free will, given the 
sentence ‘some agents have free will’. 
 
Here is how to read the two dimensional table: along the top of the table we see two classes of 
worlds, indeterministic worlds (I) and deterministic worlds (D). Let’s suppose for ease of 
explication that all indeterministic worlds contain agents with libertarian powers and all 
deterministic worlds contain agents with compatibilist powers (this assumption can easily be 
removed with a much more complex diagram). These are ‘worlds considered as counterfactual’ 
relative to each other. Down the left hand side, we see the same two classes of worlds, but here 
they are not thought of as counterfactual alternatives to each other, where one is actual and the 
other is an alternative. Instead, they are alternatives about how the actual world itself, for all we 
know a priori, might be. 
                                                          
15Roskies and Nichols (2008; though see also Björnsson, 2014) suggestively describe a similar conditional analysis of 
our concept of free will in order to accommodate the results of an experimental philosophy study. I will discuss the 
results of their study shortly in §2.3. Unfortunately, there results cannot be used to determine whether our free will 
concept is a conditional one or not. 
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What we are doing when we read this table, is considering our judgments about whether 
or not some agents have free will, relative to different contexts (ways things might be, for all we 
know, only one of which is actual), from the perspective of different indices (ways the actual 
world might turn out to be). Suppose, then, that the actual world turns out to be indeterministic. 
From the index of an indeterministic actual world, if we look at counterfactual worlds that are 
also indeterministic then we will judge that it is true that some agents have free will. This is 
reflected in the T value in the world at the top left cell of our table. That world is being evaluated 
from the perspective of an actual indeterministic world (specified on the left of the table). The 
top right cell contains an F. There, we evaluate what to say about the truth-value of ‘some agents 
have free will’ at a deterministic world, from the perspective of an indeterministic actual world. 
In that case, since we judge that those deterministic worlds do not contain agents with free will, 
that sentence comes out as false. 
On the other hand, suppose that the actual world turns out to be deterministic. Now 
consider our judgements about ‘some agents have free will’ at a deterministic counterfactual 
world (the cell on the bottom right). Since deterministic powers are sufficient for free will, we 
will judge that the sentence is true in that counterfactual world. Furthermore, since having either 
compatibilist or libertarian powers is sufficient for having free will conditional on the actual 
world being deterministic, it follows that we will judge that in any worlds with those powers, 
regardless of whether they are deterministic or not, agents have free will.16 Hence ‘some agents 
have free will’ will be true when evaluated in counterfactual indeterministic worlds, conditional 
on the actual world being deterministic. This is reflected in the bottom left cell of the table. 
2.1.1.1 Two dimensional diagrams for a straightforward libertarian concept and straightforward compatibilist 
concept of free will. We can also use these two-dimensional tables to get clear about other kinds of 
free will concepts. Before going on I will give a two dimensional reading of two other rival 
candidates of the folk concept of free will: the straightforward libertarian concept and the 
straightforward compatibilist concept. According to the straightforward libertarian concept of free 
will, libertarian powers are what free will is and must be. And, according to the straightforward 
compatibilist concept of free will, both libertarian and compatibilist powers are sufficient for free 
will. Unlike the conditional concept of free will, what free will is, and must be, according to the 
straightforward concepts is not indexed to the way the world is actually.  
The reason I am providing a two-dimensional reading of the straightforward libertarian 
concept and straightforward compatibilist concept of free will is so that I can flag where we 
should expect to observe differences in judgments between them and the conditional concept of 
                                                          
16One objection that I will discuss later in §2.4 is what to say if some compatibilists judge libertarian powers to be 
metaphysically impossible. 
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free will. Remember, these are differences in our judgments about whether or not some agents 
have free will, relative to different contexts, from the perspective of different indices. Where we 
should expect to find differences in our judgments, depending on which concept we deploy, will 
become an important matter shortly when discussing current approaches in experimental 
philosophy to examining our free will concept. Briefly, I don’t think that current approaches in 
experimental philosophy can tell us whether our free will concept is a conditional one or not. 
That’s because with respect to the free will judgments being evaluated by those studies we 
should not expect any differences between the conditional concept and the straightforward 
concepts. For now, though, I just want to describe the two dimensional table for the 
straightforward libertarian concept and straightforward compatibilist concept of free will. 
 
  Possible World 
  I D 
Actual World 
I T F 
D T F 
  
‘Some agents have free will’ 
Figure 2. Two dimensional diagram showing the straightforward libertarian analysis of free will, 
given the sentence ‘some agents have free will’. 
 
 
Let’s start with the two dimensional table for the straightforward libertarian concept of free will 
(see Figure 2). Once again, for ease of explication I will suppose that all indeterministic worlds 
contain agents with libertarian powers and all deterministic worlds contain agents with 
compatibilist powers. Imagine that the actual world turns out to be indeterministic (the top row 
of the table). If we then evaluate the indeterministic worlds (the indeterministic contexts) from 
the indeterministic world considered as actual (from the indeterministic index) then we will judge 
that those worlds contain agents with free will. This is reflected in the T value that we find in 
evaluating ‘some agents have free will’ in the top left cell. But if we look at deterministic worlds 
from the index of an indeterministic world, then we will judge that those worlds contain no 
agents with free will. This is reflected in the F value in the top right hand cell, where we 
evaluated ‘some agents have free will’ at a deterministic world, conditional on the actual world 
being indeterministic. 
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Now imagine that the actual world turns out to be deterministic (the bottom row of the 
table). According to the straightforward libertarian concept of free will, compatibilist powers are 
not sufficient for free will irrespective of what the actual world is like. Thus, no agents have free 
will actually, nor in any counterfactual worlds that are deterministic. This is reflected in the F 
value that we find in the bottom right hand cell, in which we evaluate ‘some agents have free will’ 
at a counterfactual deterministic world, conditional on the actual world being deterministic. But 
if we look at indeterministic worlds from the perspective of a deterministic actual world, then we 
will judge that those indeterministic worlds do contain agents with free will. This is reflected in 
the T value that we find in the bottom left hand cell, in which we evaluate ‘some agents have free 
will’ at a counterfactual deterministic world, conditional on the actual world being deterministic. 
It’s important to highlight that from the index of the indeterministic actual world there 
are no differences in free will judgments between the straightforward libertarian concept and the 
conditional concept of free will (compare Figure 1). Differences in free will judgments between 
the straightforward libertarian concept and conditional concept of free will are only found when 
considering people’s free will judgments indexed to a deterministic actual world. That’s because, 
according to the conditional concept of free will, compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will 
when determinism is true actually. Conversely, according to the straightforward libertarian 
concept of free will, compatibilist powers are never sufficient for free will, even from the 
perspective of a deterministic actual world. 
 
  Possible World 
  I D 
Actual World 
I T T 
D T T 
  
‘Some agents have free will’ 
Figure 3. Two dimensional diagram showing the straightforward libertarian analysis of free will, 
given the sentence ‘some agents have free will’. 
 
Now let’s move onto the two dimensional table for the straightforward compatibilist concept of 
free will (see Figure 3). This two-dimensional table is simple. No matter what the actual world 
turns out to be like, we judge of all other worlds, regardless of whether they are deterministic or 
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not, that, insofar as they contain agents with compatibilist or libertarian powers, they contain free 
agents. Hence ‘some agents have free will’ comes out as true in every cell of the table. 
Once again, it is important to highlight that from the index of a deterministic actual 
world there are no differences in free will judgments between the straightforward compatibilist 
concept and the conditional concept of free will (compare Figure 1). This means that differences 
in free will judgments between the straightforward compatibilist concept and conditional 
concept of free will are only found when considering people’s judgments indexed to an 
indeterministic actual world. That’s because, according to the conditional concept of free will, 
compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will only when determinism is true actually. 
Conversely, according to the straightforward compatibilist concept of free will, compatibilist 
powers are sufficient for free will even from the perspective of an indeterministic actual world. 
Keep these differences in the back of your mind for now as they will become important as we 
progress through this chapter. Next, I want to describe some important features of the 
conditional concept of free will and then provide some prima facie reasons for thinking that our 
free will concept is a conditional one. 
2.1.2 Exploring the conditional concept of free will 
So far I have described what a conditional concept is and provided my conditional analysis of 
our free will concept. Remember that the major task that I have set myself in this chapter is to 
argue that the folk concept of free will is a compatibilist concept. This is contrary to the current 
orthodoxy in the free will literature that thinks the folk concept is an incompatibilist one. Now I 
will explain what makes the conditional concept of free will a compatibilist concept. Then I will 
describe how the conditional concept of free will can accommodate the seeming prevalence and 
tenacity of people’s incompatibilist intuitions about free will. Finally, I will provide some prima 
facie reasons for thinking that our concept of free will has a conditional structure.  
2.1.2.1 What makes the conditional concept of free will a compatibilist one? The reason why the conditional 
concept is a compatibilist concept is because no matter how things turn out actually to be - with 
regard to the world being deterministic or not - to the extent that we possess this concept, we 
will judge that we possess free will. This is what people in two dimensional terms would call 
having a necessary A intension, as once you hold fixed the compatibilist powers and libertarian 
powers in all these worlds, all worlds considered as ways things might actually be contain agents 
with free will.17 In order to get clear on this let’s once look again at the two dimensional diagram 
for the conditional analysis of free will (see Figure 4).  
 
                                                          
17Using terminology developed by Jackson (1998). Chalmers (1996) uses the term ‘primary intension’. 
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  Possible World 
  I D 
Actual World 
I T F 
D T T 
  
‘Some agents have free will’ 
Figure 4. Two dimensional diagram showing the conditional analysis of free will, given the 
sentence ‘some agents have free will’. The counterfactual intension (C-intension)18  is highlighted 
green and the actual intension (A-intension) is highlighted red. 
 
We can read the A intension in the two dimensional diagram by reading top-to-bottom along the 
left-to-right diagonal (see Figure 4). So even if determinism is actually true, and we only possess 
compatibilist powers, we will judge that we are free. On the other hand, if indeterminism is 
actually true, and we possess libertarian powers, we will judge that we are free and that 
indeterminism and libertarian powers are necessary for free will. So there’s something we could 
discover, if the conditional story is correct, which would make us think that indeterminism and 
libertarian powers are necessary. But this doesn’t mean the conditional concept of free will is not 
a compatibilist one, because nothing we could discover about how things are actually that would 
make us judge that actually there’s no free will. (Remember, we’re holding fixed here that there 
are actually either compatibilist or libertarian powers. So my claim is just that nothing we could 
discover about determinism would lead us to judge that we are not free, given that we have one 
or other of those powers. If we don’t hold fixed that we have one or other of those powers, of 
course, then there might well be things we could discover, that world lead us to think that we are 
not free. Indeed, we can think of the problems raised by neuroscientists as being of exactly of 
this kind: as aiming to show that in fact we don’t even have compatibilist powers.) So with regard 
to the world being deterministic or not, free will is compatible with anything that we could discover 
about how things actually are. 
2.1.2.2 What explains the prevalence and tenacity of people’s incompatibilist intuitions about free will? One 
important issue for anyone who thinks the folk concept of free will is compatibilist is to explain 
how we ever became convinced in the first place that the folk concept was incompatibilist. The 
conditional analysis of free will offers up an explanation of why this might be. If people think 
                                                          
18Again, using Jackson’s (1998) terminology. Chalmers’ (1996) refers to this as a secondary intension. 
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that the actual world is indeterministic and contains agents with libertarian powers, then they will 
judge not only that we are free, but also that any deterministic possible worlds containing only 
agents with compatibilist powers have no one with free will in them. In which case, to the extent 
people are confident that actually the world is indeterministic and there are libertarian powers, 
they should be expected to deny that compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will.19 It is 
worthwhile to note that this is what, in two dimensional terms, is called having a contingent C 
intension: because from the perspective of a world where indeterminism is true, some, but not all 
counterfactual worlds will contain agents with free will (see Figure 4).  
Of course in most of the literature the distinction between judging of the actual world 
that it is deterministic and that indeterminism is still a necessary condition for free will, and 
judging of the actual world that is indeterministic, and that this indeterminism is a necessary 
condition for free will, is not made.20 What actual philosophers of free will, embedded and 
entrenched in their philosophical views, would judge when this distinction is drawn is not 
something we have tested. Nevertheless, I do think this distinction makes a difference to the 
judgments of ordinary agents as will become clearer as we progress. 
2.1.2.3 Why think the folk account of free will is a conditional account? Something I find striking about 
the free will literature is that there are very few philosophers who take libertarianism to be a 
conceptual truth, and who think that the actual world is deterministic and thus are error theorists 
about free will. There seems to me at least to be some connection between their take on what the 
actual world is like, and their view about the nature of free will. Equally though, there seem to be 
very few compatibilists who judge that, if at some world the libertarian powers are instantiated, 
then those worlds do not contain free actions. So unlike the libertarian, they do not take the 
presence of compatibilist powers to be necessary for free will. 
Some suggestive preliminary observations also come from observing the free will 
judgments of undergraduate philosophy students in metaphysics classes. Libertarians who 
become persuaded by arguments, not that compatibilism is prescriptively correct as an analysis 
of free will, but rather, simply that the actual world is in fact deterministic, swiftly seem to 
abandon their libertarianism and embrace compatibilism. With that said, they hanker after the 
                                                          
19As a descriptive matter of fact it does seem that the overwhelming majority of people think that the actual world is 
indeterministic. For example, Nichols and Knobe (2007) found over 90% of participants chose the vignette 
describing an indeterministic universe, not a deterministic universe, as being most like the actual world. Similarly, my 
own results (see §2.3) found 81.6% of participants selected the indeterministic universe as being most like the actual 
universe. I will return to these results shortly when I discuss results from experimental philosophy, including my 
own research. 
20Peter Van Inwagen (1983) is the only theorist I have come across who appears to identify this distinction and 
thinks that the actual world is indeterministic and that this indeterminism is necessary for free will. In the very last 
paragraph of his book An Essay on Free Will he writes:  
“…it is conceivable that science will one day present us with compelling reasons for believing in 
determinism. Then, and only then, I think should we become compatibilists.” (pg. 223)  
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libertarian view inasmuch as, should they start to give higher credence to the actual truth of 
indeterminism, they tend to shift back.21 The observation that there are relatively few error 
theorists about free will and that the substantive analysis of free will tends to shift with 
judgments about the metaphysics of the actual world is very suggestive. 
If these suggestive thoughts are correct, then there are a number of interesting upshots. 
One crucial upshot is one I have flagged already in this chapter. In order to empirically 
determine whether the folk have compatibilist or incompatibilist concepts of free will, it will be 
essential to determine what their views are about the actual truth of determinism, and to ensure 
that accidental cues in the vignettes provided to them are not determining the index at which 
they take themselves to be located in a way that experimenters did not intend, or did not 
recognise. In the next section I will show that this has three important consequences for the 
interpretation of existing work on the folk concept of free will. The first is that apparently 
differing judgments about whether the folk are compatibilists or incompatibilists may be 
artefacts of features of the experimental set up that have not hitherto been regarded as 
important. The second is that in fact all this data is consistent with a compatibilist reading of the 
concept of free will insofar as it is a conditional compatibilist account. The last is that the 
methodology so far deployed is unable to fully distinguish between conditional and 
straightforward accounts.  
2.1.3. Conclusion: What is a conditional account of our concept of free will? 
In summary, in this chapter I have set about the task of arguing that the folk concept of free will 
is compatibilist, albeit of a conditional kind. A conditional concept is a single concept that has an 
indexical component which fixes what is necessary for something depending on what the actual 
world offers up. Appling this thought to the case of free will I have proposed the following 
conditional analysis of free will: 
If the actual world is indeterministic, and agents have libertarian powers, then these 
libertarian powers are what free will is and must be. Else, if the actual world is 
deterministic, and agents have their preferred compatibilist powers, then compatibilist 
powers are what free will is. 
The conditional concept is a compatibilist concept, in some sense, because no matter how things 
turn out actually to be with respect to the world being deterministic or not, to the extent that we 
possess this concept, we will judge that we possess free will. Further, the conditional concept can 
accommodate the prevalence and tenacity of people’s incompatibilist intuitions, intuitions whose 
                                                          
21This observation come from an ongoing longitudinal study that I am currently conducting with David Braddon-
Mitchell that tracks undergraduate free will judgements and belief about whether determinism or indeterminism is 
actual over the course of the teaching semester. 
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presence resulted in the orthodox view that the folk concept of free will is incompatibilist. 
Insofar as people judge that the actual world is indeterministic and contains agents with 
libertarian powers, then not only will they judge that we are free, but also that any counterfactual 
deterministic possible worlds containing only agents with deterministic powers will not contain 
free will.  
Some observations of free will theorists and undergraduate students suggests that there 
might be a connection between what people think the actual world is like, and their view about 
the nature of free will. This has important consequences for the project of determining what our 
free will concept is like. From the index of the indeterministic actual world there are no 
differences in free will judgments between the straightforward libertarian concept and 
conditional concept of free will. Further, from the index of the deterministic actual world there 
are no differences in free will judgments between the straightforward compatibilist concept and 
conditional concept of free will. This means that it is essential to track people’s beliefs about the 
actual truth of determinism in order to know whether they have an incompatibilist concept of 
free will, or a compatibilist concept of free will of a straightforward or conditional kind.  
 
2.2. Experimental philosophy and the conditional concept of free will. 
Previously, I suggested that there is excellent evidence from experimental philosophy that the 
folk concept of free will is both a compatibilist concept (e.g. Nahmias et al., 2005; 2006) and an 
incompatibilist concept (e.g., Nichols and Knobe, 2007). In this subsection I will do three things. 
First, I will to explain why current results regarding our concept of free will in the experimental 
philosophy literature only superficially differ. Roughly, that’s because I think the differences in 
people’s responses in these studies are due to subtle methodological differences. Second, I will 
explain that these subtle methodological differences are correctly identified as being important 
with respect to people’s concept of free will once it has been identified that our concept of free 
will might be a conditional concept. Thus, I will explain why existing experimental results are 
consistent with our underlying concept of free will being a compatibilist concept albeit a 
conditional one. Finally, I will go on to show that current results regarding our concept of free 
will in the experimental philosophy literature can only go part of the way to determining whether 
the concept is a conditional concept or not (e.g., Roskies and Nichols, 2008). From this I will 
articulate what a strong data signal for conditionality in the folk concept of free will would look 
like. This hypothesized data signal for the conditional concept will serve as the basis of the next 
section (§2.3) where I will present evidence of this strong data signal from my own investigation. 
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If my results are right, then the folk concept of free will is a conditional concept and thus the 
folk are free will compatibilists. 
2.2.1 Experimental philosophy and the folk concept of free will. 
I will start by simply describing two sets of conflicting results. One set of results appears to 
support the idea that the folk conception of free will is compatibilist. The other appears to 
support the idea that the folk conception is incompatibilist. Prima facie, then, you might think that 
either one or both of the studies is badly flawed, or they have tested, by chance, very different 
populations. I will argue that neither of these is true. Both studies are fine as far as they go, but if 
we examine them closely we find subtle differences in the methodological set up that could 
explain the differences in the results. This difference in the results means that both studies are 
compatible with the underlying concept in the community being the conditional one. In addition, 
I will argue that the studies themselves, though they are not set up in a way which can decisively 
detect the conditional concept, nevertheless might provide weak evidence that it is indeed the 
conditional concept at work. 
2.2.1.1. The folk concept of free will is compatibilist. Perhaps the best evidence showing that the 
majority of the general population are compatibilists comes from seminal papers by Nahmias, 
Mossis, Nadelhoofer, and Turner (2005; 2006).22 Consider the following vignette of an agent’s 
action embedded within a description of our world being deterministic: 
“Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a 
supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current state 
of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time. 
It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it 
will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at 
the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25th, 2150 A.D., twenty years before 
Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of 
nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM on January 26th, 2195. As 
always, the super computer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM 
on January 26th, 2195.” 
When college students were presented with such a vignette, 76% of college-aged participants 
judged that the agent in the scenario acted using his own free will. Given some of the technical 
language involved in the description of determinism (i.e., laws of nature) the experiment was 
repeated using varying descriptions, either by describing the universe as re-started with the same 
initial conditions or by appealing to genetic and environmental influences. Each time, though, 
                                                          
22See also Murray & Nahmias (2014); Nahmias, Coates, & Kvaran (2007); and, Nahmias & Murray (2010). 
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the majority of the participants continued to respond that the agent in each scenario was acting 
using his own free will. Most people, then, appear to straightforwardly respond that an agent acts 
freely in an actual deterministic world and so it seems most people must be compatibilists. 
2.2.1.2. The folk concept of free will is incompatibilist. Now let’s move onto what I think is some of the 
best evidence that the general population are incompatibilists, which comes from the seminal 
paper by Nichols and Knobe (2007).23 They proposed a performance error model to explain 
Nahmias and colleagues results, according to which our actual concept of free will is 
incompatibilist, but we begin performing in error and responding as compatibilists when 
considering real life vignettes in which participants are invited to consider that determinism is 
true. To test this, college-aged participants were provided with descriptions of two hypothetical 
universes, Universe A, a deterministic universe in which everything including human decision 
making is completely caused by events tracking all the way back to the beginning of the universe, 
and Universe B, an indeterministic universe where everything with the exception of human 
decision making is completely caused by past events. When asked which universe was most like 
the actual universe over 90% responded that Universe B was the most like our universe: most 
people believe that the actual universe is indeterministic. Then when asked whether participants 
in Universe A were morally responsible (a proxy for free will), 86% of participants responded no, 
the incompatibilist response. Most people, then, straightforwardly respond that there is no free 
will in a counterfactual deterministic world and so most people must be incompatibilists. 
However, this study went further; people’s responses drastically changed when they were 
given an emotionally valenced real life scenario embedded in Universe A. Consider the following 
vignette: 
“In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he decides 
that the only way to be with her is to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that it is 
impossible to escape from his house in the event of a fire. Before he leaves on a business 
trip, he sets up a device in his basement that burns down the house and kills his family.” 
In this case 72% of participants gave a compatibilist response, suggesting that the agent was fully 
morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe put this down to a performance error on the part of the 
participants, suggesting that they were being psychologically swayed by the emotional valence of 
the scenario that was presented. While there is no doubt that emotional valence can impact our 
judgments, it cannot be the case that all compatibilist responses are the result of a performance 
error triggered by emotional processing. After all, Nahmias and colleagues also found a majority 
of participants reporting compatibilist intuitions in concrete but emotionally neutral vignettes 
                                                          
23See also Rose & Nichols (2013) and Nichols (2004). 
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(i.e., jogging). Instead, it seems that most people, when asked straightforwardly, respond that 
there is free will in real-life cases regardless of emotional valence. I will return to discuss the 
significance of this result shortly. 
2.2.1.2. Explaining away the apparently conflicting results in experimental philosophy. Let’s consider three 
major kinds of differences that we might point to in order to explain these differences in results. 
Once I have done this I will explain the significance of each of these factors in explaining what is 
going on.  
First there might be some systematic differences in the sampling populations that are 
being asked to give judgments in the various conditions. Perhaps Nahmias and colleagues just 
happened to sample, by chance, an in some repeated fashion, those people in the general 
population that possess a compatibilist concept of free will, and on the other hand, perhaps 
Nichols and Knobe have just happened to sample those people in the general population that 
possess an incompatibilist concept of free will. 
Second, perhaps one or the other samples of people in these studies are making some 
performance error of some kind. For example, perhaps Nichols and Knobe (2007; though see 
also Rose and Nichols, 2013) are right and people are making a performance error because of the 
emotional valence or the real-world setting. Or perhaps, the opposite is true, as Nahmias and 
Murray (2010; though see also Murray and Nahmias, 2014) have suggested, and people only give 
incompatibilist judgments because they don’t correctly understand the implications of 
determinism for their abilities to cause the actions that they do.  
Finally, perhaps it might be explained by the subtle difference in the way that people are 
questioned about whether agents have free will or not. So for example, the people in Nahmias’ 
and colleagues studies (as well as in Nichols’ and Knobe’s for that matter) respond that people in 
real-world deterministic scenario are free and that, conversely, people that are located in some 
other deterministic scenario are not free.  
For my purposes what is interesting is that after having identified the possibility that our 
concept of free will might be a conditional concept, there is really no reason to suspect that 
different research groups by chance have come across different populations of people who have 
different concepts of free will, or that some participants are responding in error. In fact, the 
observed pattern of responses is exactly what you would expect if people possess a conditional 
concept of free will. Recall from the previous section what the conditional concept of free will 
says. If the actual world is indeterministic, and agents have libertarian powers, then these 
libertarian powers are what free will is and must be. Counterfactually we would, in this condition, 
judge that all and only indeterministic worlds containing agents with libertarian powers contain 
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agents with free will. On the other hand, if the actual world is deterministic, and agents have 
their preferred compatibilist powers, then compatibilist powers are what free will is, and 
counterfactually we will judge compatibilist powers to be sufficient for free will. We can explain 
the current patterning of results perfectly with this conditional analysis of free will at hand. Let’s 
go back through the results again. 
First, why do Nahmias and colleagues find that the most people responding to vignettes 
situated in the actual deterministic world are free? Because given that we have a conditional 
concept of free will, if the actual world is deterministic then compatibilist powers are sufficient 
for free will. Conversely, why do Nichols and Knobe find that the majority of people responding 
judge that agents in some hypothetical deterministic vignette are unfree? Recall that their 
preliminary results showed that the vast majority of people think the actual world is 
indeterministic. Given that we have a conditional concept of free will, if the actual world is 
indeterministic, then counterfactually we only judge that indeterministic worlds contain agents 
with free will. Thus, as the overwhelming majority of people in their study think the actual world 
is indeterministic, if their concept is conditional they will judge that agents in counterfactual 
deterministic worlds are unfree. In both cases, what we would predict if our concept is 
conditional is exactly what we find in these experiments. 
There might even be a very weak data signal from Nichols and Knobe (2007) that the 
conditional concept is at work in these results. Why do Nichols and Knobe also find that the 
majority of people responding judge that agents in some real-life deterministic scenario are free? 
Because if people have a conditional concept of free will we will predict that if they think that 
the real-life scenario is occurring in the deterministic actual world, then they will judge that 
agents in the actual deterministic world are free.  
This is not to say that people’s judgments are not sensitive to factors such as emotional 
valence. If that’s the only factor that people are sensitive to then these results are no evidence for 
the conditional concept. Still, as we will discuss shortly, Roskies and Nichols (2008) do find 
people’s free will judgments are sensitive to the distinction between actual and counterfactual 
scenarios, so these results are consistent with people responding from a conditional concept of 
free will. 
Of course, it remains open that the people responding in each of these studies just happen 
to consistently respond as though they are free will compatibilists or as though they are free will 
incompatibilists. However, if that were true it would be a remarkable fluke. Instead, it seems to 
me far more likely that subtle differences in the probe questions that are being used to illicit 
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people’s judgments are causing people to respond from different indices, whilst deploying a 
conditional concept. 
Further, it remains open that perhaps one group of people in one or another of these 
studies is making some performance error of some kind. But why think that? Of course it is 
possible that people responding to the deterministic cases are making an error, just as it is 
possible that people in the indeterministic cases are making an error. But then the question turns 
into the question of which sets of responses we ought to think actually issue from people’s 
underlying concept of free will. It seems much better, and more plausible by my lights, if the data 
signal from both sets of studies is right, and what’s more both issue from the same underlying 
conditional concept of free will. Then people are sincerely responding in both cases, and that 
means that people’s judgments are sensitive not only to the vignette they are being asked to 
consider, but also to the way they are meant to consider the world as being actually. 
Up to this point the following things should be clear. There is a clear signal of people 
responding as though they possess a compatibilist concept of free will and as though they 
possess an incompatibilist concept of free will. Prima facie this suggests that the experimental 
results from experimental philosophy are inconsistent; but this inconsistency is merely surface 
level. Closer examination of the studies reveals subtle differences in the methodological set up. 
People straightforwardly respond as though they have a compatibilist concept of free will when 
they are being asked to consider the vignette in a real-world deterministic scenario, and 
straightforwardly as though they have an incompatibilist concept of free will when they are being 
asked to consider the vignette in a hypothetical (i.e., counterfactual) deterministic scenario. Both 
these results are consistent with, and predicted by, the thought that people have a conditional 
concept of free will.  
2.2.2 Bringing free will back down to earth. 
Roskies and Nichols (2008; though see also Björnsson, 2014) also noticed a slight, yet significant, 
difference in the experimental materials used in the experimental philosophy literature that could 
have generated conflicting findings. While Nahmias and colleagues situated some of their 
determinism scenarios within the actual world, Nichols and colleagues situated them in 
hypothetical worlds. In order to confirm their suspicion that participant’s free will judgements 
under determinism differed as a result of where they were being evaluated, participants were 
evenly split between considering the deterministic scenario as the actual world or as some other 
hypothetical world. Consistent with the author’s hypotheses, where the deterministic scenario 
was situated significantly impacted participant’s free will judgements. Participants who made free 
will judgements when the deterministic world being evaluated was our own were significantly 
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higher relative to participants who made free will judgments when the deterministic world being 
evaluated was not our own. 
Roskies and Nichols, following Braddon-Mitchell (2003), in passing suggest that these 
results might suggest that the folk concept of free will takes a conditional form. As described 
earlier, it should be easy to see why. When a vignette is taken to describe the actual world, we 
should expect, if people are deploying a conditional concept, that they will judge that agents act 
freely in the deterministic world considered as actual, and that people will judge that agents act 
unfreely in the counterfactual deterministic world. The reason they are inclined to judge people 
in the counterfactual deterministic world as being unfree is because people as a matter of fact 
believe that the actual world is indeterministic and so think, unless told otherwise, that 
indeterminism is a necessary condition for free will. So far so good; but this evidence is only 
consistent with the folk having a conditional concept of free will. The reason these results are 
only consistent with the conditional concept and do not show that people in fact possess a 
conditional concept of free will is because we do not have data and responses to all the 
conditions necessary to determine whether or not there is a conditional concept. 
2.2.2.1 Why are people unsure about free will? Let’s assume for the moment that the majority of 
people in this study think the actual world is indeterministic. If these same people also have a 
conditional concept of free will then when evaluating the deterministic vignette as actual they 
should straightforwardly respond that there is free will. On the other hand, when evaluating the 
deterministic vignette as a hypothetical they should straightforwardly respond there is no free 
will. It is important to note that Roskies’ and Nichols’ conditionality suggestion leans on the fact 
that people’s free will judgments for the deterministic actual world are higher than people’s free 
will judgments for the hypothetical deterministic world. However, as a descriptive matter of fact, 
the mean free will score for a deterministic actual world was 4.3 on a 7-point Likert scale. A 
score of 1 would indicate complete agreement that there is free will in that world, and a score of 
7 would indicate completely disagreement there is free will in that world. Prima facie, then, people 
aren’t straightforwardly responding as though there is free will in the deterministic actual world. 
Instead, while they straightforwardly judge that there is no free will in the hypothetical 
deterministic world, they are unsure about whether there is free will in the deterministic actual 
world. 
Here are two hypotheses about what might be going on. Unfortunately, I cannot get 
traction on exactly which hypotheses is most likely, in the Roskies and Nichols study, as there is 
no indication of how people’s responses are distributed across the 7-point Likert scale. One way 
to obtain middling mean judgements on a Likert scale is by people being evenly distributed 
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between thinking that there is, and is not, free will in the deterministic actual world condition. If 
that’s right, then these results might not be consistent with the folk concept of free will being a 
conditional one. That’s because you could generate their significant result with only a significant 
minority of people possessing the conditional concept of free will, and the majority of people 
possessing either the straightforward compatibilist or straightforward incompatibilist concept of 
free will. Provided there are at least some people who possess the conditional concept of free 
will, then the different judgments they offer up in the deterministic worlds taken as actual and 
counterfactual will be enough to generate a mean score of 4.3 (a score that is further towards 
taking the deterministic world to contain free will, than taking it not to).  
Secondly, perhaps people’s responses in the determinism as actual condition - the 
condition in which they take the deterministic world to be actual - are clustered around 4 because 
people are in fact genuinely unsure, in some sense, whether or not there is free will in that 
condition. As a matter of fact, I think this is the most likely hypothesis as it’s what I find in my 
own investigations, which I will describe in §2.3. I don’t think this result should be surprising, 
especially if what underlies people’s judgments is a conditional concept of free will. Here’s why. 
Imagine someone who genuinely believes the actual world is indeterministic and is asked to 
evaluate whether there is free will in an actual deterministic world. It’s extremely unlikely that in 
order to perform the evaluation they change their belief so that they now believe that the actual 
world is deterministic. Instead, what they will likely do is simulate in their mind how they would 
respond given a counterfactual belief that the actual world is deterministic. Importantly, this 
simulating does not mask what people actually believe, which is what explains why people are 
genuinely unsure how to respond. If people possess the conditional concept and believe the 
actual world is indeterministic then they should think that indeterminism and libertarian powers 
are necessary for free will. So according to their actual beliefs there is no free will in the actual 
deterministic world. But, if they possess the conditional concept and correctly simulate how they 
would respond given the counterfactual belief that the actual world is deterministic, then they 
should also think the compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will. So according to their 
simulated counterfactual belief there is free will in the actual deterministic world. Thus there is a 
conflict in response caused by one response generated in accordance with the actual belief, and 
one response generated in accordance with the simulated counterfactual belief. 
One thing that this suggestion highlights is the future need for longitudinal studies that 
track people’s free will judgements over time and across changes in belief about what the actual 
world is like. That’s because if I am right then when people’s beliefs about what the actual world 
is like change, they should no longer be unsure about how they should respond in certain 
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conditions. For example, imagine once again someone who believes indeterminism is true 
actually and is unsure whether or not there is free will in a deterministic actual world. If they 
possess a conditional concept of free will and come to believe that the actual world is 
deterministic, then at that point they should straightforwardly think that there is free will in the 
actual deterministic world. From pilot data that we have tracking undergraduate philosophy 
students in metaphysics classes this appears to be happening. However, these investigations are 
in the earliest stages and ongoing so I will not lean on them further in this thesis. 
2.2.2.2. The missing response link to detecting conditionality. I will call the prediction make by the 
conditional concept of free will that people who think the actual world is indeterministic will 
come to think that there is free will in an actual deterministic world the weak signal for 
conditionality. That’s because I think there is another plausible route to this same result. 
Specifically, someone with a straightforward incompatibilist concept of free will, upon learning 
that the actual world is deterministic, might simply revise their concept of free will so that they 
now have a straightforward compatibilist concept. Importantly, the conditional concept account 
that I have been advocating in this chapter makes an incredibly novel prediction that sets it apart 
from this revisionary explanation. According to the revisionary story, if someone then switches 
to believing that the actual world is indeterministic again, there is no guarantee they will re-revise 
their concept. However, the conditional account predicts that if someone believes the actual 
world is deterministic, then when they come to believe the actual world is indeterministic then 
they will begin responding like an incompatibilist. While this might also be explained by someone 
switching their concept back, I think this is a stronger signal as it predicts that people’s 
judgements will change not for the world considered as actual, but for counterfactual worlds 
from the perspective of the world now believed to be actual. 
Thus, it seems to be that the strongest signal of the conditional concept comes not from 
people who believe that the actual world is indeterministic, but rather those who believe the 
actual world is deterministic. These are people who when asked to consider the actual 
deterministic world and other counterfactual deterministic worlds will respond that there is free 
will in each of these cases. Importantly, when they are asked to consider the actual world as 
being indeterministic they will judge that agents in the indeterministic world considered actual 
would are free. Critically, though, from the point of view of the actual world considered as 
indeterministic, they will judge that agents in counterfactual deterministic worlds are unfree. I will 
call this prediction the strong signal for conditionality. In the next section I will present 
evidence for both the weak and strong signal for conditionality from my own investigation. 
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Of course, if my explanation of the middling result (i.e., the 4.3 mean response to the 
deterministic actual world) found in Roskies and Nichols (2008) is right, then people who 
genuinely believe the actual world is deterministic, when asked to imagine that the actual world is 
indeterministic, might not straightforwardly judge that there is no free will in a counterfactual 
deterministic world. Instead, they might respond in a manner that is consistent with them being 
unsure. That’s because given their actual belief that the world is deterministic, compatibilist 
powers are sufficient for free will and so there is free will in any deterministic world that contains 
compatibilist powers. But according to their simulated counterfactual belief that the actual world 
is indeterministic, there is no free will in any deterministic world. That’s because, according to 
the conditional concept of free will if the actual world is indeterministic then indeterminism and 
libertarian powers are necessary for free will.  
While the result of people being unsure is an overall weaker result than if people 
straightforwardly respond according to the conditional concept, provided people are only unsure 
in the conditions described by the weak and strong signal for conditionality then I still think this 
is relatively strong evidence of conditionality. What it does do is further motivate the need for 
future longitudinal studies tracking people’s free will judgments over time and across changing 
beliefs about what the actual world is like.  
2.2.3 Conclusion: Experimental philosophy and the folk concept of free will. 
In summary, in this section I have shown that there is a clear signal in experimental philosophy 
of people responding as though they possess a compatibilist concept of free will and as though 
they possess an incompatibilist concept of free will. However, any differences in results that 
purport to show the folk are compatibilists and those that purport to show that the folk are 
incompatibilists are superficial and due to differences in methodological set up. These 
differences in methodological set up are correctly seen as being important when it has been 
identified that the folk concept of free will might be a conditional one. People should be 
expected to straightforwardly respond as though they have a compatibilist concept of free will 
when they are being asked to consider a deterministic actual world. Further, they should be 
expected to straightforwardly respond as though they are an incompatibilist when they are being 
asked to consider counterfactual deterministic worlds. That’s because most people believe that 
the actual world is indeterministic and according to the conditional concept of free will, from the 
perspective of an indeterministic actual world no deterministic world has free will. 
Roskies and Nichols (2008) identified a weak signal for conditionality. In cases where 
people judge there was no free will that judgment was only certain when the deterministic world 
was considered as counterfactual and not as actual. Unfortunately, we do not have responses to 
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all the conditions necessary to determine whether or not there is a conditional concept. Further, 
we are missing some key measures of statistical variance that would allow us to at least go some 
way to ruling out competing hypotheses. Specifically, the mean free will response by participants 
to the deterministic actual world was 4.3, which is a middling response on a 7-point Likert scale. 
While I think this is consistent with an underlying conditional concept, with people unsure due 
to competing dispositions to respond according to what they actually believe versus what their 
response would be if the actually believed different, it is also consistent with people being evenly 
distributed between thinking that there is free will or not, in those conditions. 
The strongest data signal for conditionality comes not from people who believe that the 
actual world is indeterministic, but rather, those who believe the actual world is deterministic. 
Critically, from the point of view of the actual indeterministic world people who believe that the 
actual world is deterministic should be expected to judge that agents in the counterfactual 
deterministic worlds are unfree. As a matter of fact, I find evidence of both the weak and strong 
signal for conditionality, which I will present next. If I am right then this is strong evidence that 
the folk concept of free will is a conditional one, in which case the folk are free will 
compatibilists. 
 
2.3. Detecting conditionality in the folk concept of free will24 
According to the conditional concept of free will what people take to be necessary for free will is 
indexed to what they believe the actual world is like. This feature makes two key predictions 
regarding people’s free will judgments to various conditions, which I have called the weak and 
strong signals for conditionality. 
                                                          
24You might query why an experimental philosophy investigation is necessary at all. After all, Dunaway, Edmonds 
and Manley (2013) found that professional philosophers are remarkably good at predicting the results of 
experimental philosophy studies on examining folk judgements for a variety of topics, including: causation, moral 
responsibility and intentionality. Depending on the exact experimental study examined, the proportion of 
professional philosophers who could correctly predict the study’s results was between 77% and 95.8%. On the basis 
of this result Dunaway et al. offer a tentative conclusion. If the results of x-phi studies can be accurately predicted 
by professional philosophers, then when considered with other factors such as resource scarcity, professional 
philosophers may have ample reason not to conduct the relevant experimental philosophy research. Put another 
way, if the results of x-phi research assessing folk judgments are unsurprising and predictable then such research 
might be superfluous. 
 I’m less confident. There are two possible questions that Dunaway could have addressed using the data set 
they collected. First, how good collectively are philosophers at predicting folk judgments? Second, how good are 
individual philosophers at predicting folk judgments. The original analysis performed by Dunaway et al. only 
answered the first of these questions, and showed that professional philosophers as a collective are good at 
predicting folk judgements. A reanalysis performed by Liao (2016) answers the second question, and found that 
roughly half (51.9%) of all professional philosophers in Dunaway et al. got at least one prediction wrong. Some 
readers might point out that the fact that half of all professional philosophers are getting all their predictions right is 
still impressive, and they are right. However, we have no a priori way of knowing which professional philosophers 
will get which judgements right and wrong and for which cases. The only way to know this is by performing the 
relevant experimental philosophy. 
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The weak signal for conditionality is what Roskies and Nichols (2008) identified might be 
present in their data (and might also be present in Nichols & Knobe, 2007). If people who 
believe the actual world is indeterministic possess a conditional concept, and are asked to 
evaluate the actual deterministic world, they should be expected to respond that there is free will 
in such a world. That’s because according to the conditional concept, indeterminism and 
libertarian powers are only necessary for free will if they obtain actually. This weak signal for 
conditionality distinguishes the conditional concept from the straightforward libertarian concept 
that predicts people will respond that there is no free will in the actual deterministic world 
because indeterminism and libertarian powers are necessary for free will irrespective of what the 
actual world is like. 
 On the other hand, the strong signal for conditionality makes the following prediction. If 
people who believe the actual world is deterministic possess a conditional concept, then when 
they are asked to evaluate a counterfactual deterministic world from the perspective of an 
indeterministic actual world, they should be expected to respond that there is no free will in that 
world. That’s because according to the conditional concept, indeterminism and libertarian 
powers are necessary for free will if the actual world is indeterministic. The strong signal for 
conditionality distinguishes the conditional concept from the straightforward compatibilist 
concept because according to the straightforward compatibilist concept we should expect people 
to respond that there is free will in the counterfactual deterministic world because compatibilist 
powers are sufficient for free will irrespective of what the actual world is like. 
 Now I will present what I think is good evidence of both the weak and strong signals of 
conditionality in free will judgments. Unfortunately, most people do not straightforwardly 
respond in the manner predicted if they were deploying a conditional concept of free will. 
Instead, they appear unsure of how to respond, in a manner that is consistent with what was 
observed by Roskies and Nichols (2008). While this is weaker evidence than I would have liked, I 
will argue that it still gives us a strong reason to think that the folk concept of free will is a 
conditional one. That in turn also gives us a strong reason to think the folk are free will 
compatibilists. 
2.3.1. Empirical evidence of conditionality. 
I will report the results of my investigation in two parts. Here I will present just the evidence for 
the weak and strong signals of conditionality. For those that are interested I will present the 
methods and materials behind these results in §2.3.2. I will start by presenting evidence of the 
weak signal for conditionality in people who believe the actual work is indeterministic. Then, I 
will present evidence of the strong signal for conditionality in people who believe the actual 
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world is deterministic. After that I will interpret what these results mean for the conditional 
concept account. 
2.3.1.1 The weak signal for conditionality. Figure 5 below presents the mean free will responses of 
people who believe the actual world is indeterministic. A value of 7 indicates that people 
completely agree that there is free will in the world being evaluated, and a value of 1 indicates 
that they completely disagree that there is free will in the world being evaluated. People who in 
fact believe the actual world is indeterministic, straightforwardly respond that there is free will in 
an indeterministic actual world (M = 6.37, SD = 1.19) and in a counterfactual indeterministic 
world, from the perspective of a deterministic actual world (M = 6.01, SD = 1.63). Further, they 
straightforwardly respond there is no free will in a counterfactual deterministic world (M = 2.03, 
SD = 1.70). Of course, these judgments are all predicted by the straightforward libertarian 
concept of free will as well. According to the weak signal of conditionality we should expect 
people to respond that there is free will in a deterministic actual world. However, consistent with 
Roskies and Nichols (2008) I found that people who in fact believe the actual world is 
indeterministic are unsure whether or not there is free will in this condition (M = 3.98, SD = 
1.02). While there are some individuals who judge otherwise, most people’s judgements are 
clustered around 4. I will return to discuss this finding shortly. 
 
 
Figure 5. Levels of agreement with the statement “If these scientists are right, then the people in 
Universe A [/B] have free will” for those participants who believe the actual universe is 
indeterministic. Errors bars represent standard error. 
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2.3.1.2 The strong signal for conditionality. Figure 6 below presents the mean free will responses of 
people who in fact believe the actual world is deterministic. People who believe the actual world 
is deterministic straightforwardly respond that there is free will in a deterministic actual world (M 
= 5.94, SD = 1.06) and an indeterministic actual world (M = 5.91, SD = 1.18). In addition, they 
straightforward respond that there is free will in a counterfactual indeterministic world, from the 
perspective of a deterministic actual world (M = 5.67, SD = 1.14). Of course these judgments are 
predicted by the straightforward compatibilist concept of free will as well. According to the 
strong signal of conditionality, if people deploy the conditional concept we should expect them 
to respond that there is free will in a counterfactual deterministic world, from the perspective of 
an indeterministic actual world. While people don’t straightforwardly judge that there is no free 
will in this condition, as with the weak conditional signal, people are unsure whether or not there 
is free will in this condition (M = 4.06, SD = 1.26). While some individuals respond otherwise, 
most people’s judgements are clustered around 4.25 
 
 
                                                          
25I think that Figure 5 and Figure 6 with standard errors represented are sufficient to represent evidence of the weak 
and strong signal of conditionality. However, some readers might be interested whether the mean response for each 
condition significantly different between those who think the actual world is indeterministic and those who think the 
actual world is deterministic. Due to the severe discrepancy in numbers between those who think the actual world is 
indeterministic and deterministic the decision was made to compare conditions between groups using a series of 
between-groups t-tests with a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level. Significant differences were only observed in those 
conditions associated with the weak and strong signal for conditionality. That is, there was a significant difference in 
the determinism actual case t(96) = 7.3.64, p < .001. People who believe the actual world is deterministically 
straightforwardly responded there was free will, people who believe the actual world is indeterministic responded 
unsure. And, there was a significant difference in the counterfactual determinism case counterfactual determinism 
case t(96) = 4.777, p < .001. People who believe the actual world is indeterministic straightforwardly responded 
there was no free will, people who believed the actual world is deterministic responded unsure. There was no 
significant difference between people who believe the actual world is indeterministic and deterministic in the 
indeterminism actual case t(96) = 1.784, p = .078, and counterfactual indeterminism case t(96) = 1.456, p = .396. 
Regardless of what people believe the actual world is like, people in these cases straightforwardly respond there is 
free will. 
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Figure 6. Levels of agreement with the statement “If these scientists are right, then the people in 
Universe A [/B] have free will” for those participants who believe the actual universe is 
deterministic. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
2.3.1.3 Interpreting the conditionality data signal. In accordance with the conditional concept of free 
will, the weak signal of conditionality predicts that people who believe the actual world is 
indeterministic will respond that there is free will in the actual deterministic world. On the other 
hand, the strong signal of conditionality predicts that people who believe the actual world is 
deterministic will respond that there is no free will in a counterfactual deterministic world. While 
I didn’t observe people straightforwardly responding in the manner predicted by the conditional 
concept, they do respond in a manner that supports the idea that we possess a conditional 
concept of free will. That’s because I don’t think it is mere coincidence that people who believe 
the actual world is indeterministic are unsure how to respond to an actual deterministic world. 
Nor do I think it’s coincidence that people who believe the actual world is deterministic world 
are unsure how to respond to a counterfactual world from the perspective of an actual 
indeterministic world. Both these conditions are correctly identified as being important with 
respect to people’s concept of free will once it has been identified that our concept of free will 
might be a conditional concept. 
 Earlier, I gave an account of why I think people might find themselves unsure about how 
to respond in conditions associated with the weak and strong signal for conditionality. Let’s start 
with the weak signal for conditionality. Imagine someone who believes the actual world is 
indeterministic and is then asked to evaluate whether there is free will in the actual deterministic 
world. It’s extremely unlikely that people change their beliefs about the actual world in order to 
perform such evaluations. Instead, what people most likely do is simulate how they would 
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respond if they counterfactually believed the actual world is deterministic. Importantly, this 
cognitive process does not mask the effects of what people actually believe, which is what 
explains why people are unsure about how to respond. If someone has a conditional concept and 
believes the actual world is indeterministic then they should also think that indeterminism and 
libertarian powers are necessary for free will. So according to their actual belief there is no free 
will in the deterministic actual world. But if they succeed in simulating what they would think if 
they counterfactually believed the actual world is deterministic, then they should also think 
compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will. So according to their simulated counterfactual 
belief there is free will in the actual deterministic world. Thus, there is a response conflict 
between free will responses generated in accordance with their actual belief, and their simulated 
counterfactual belief. 
The very same explanation works for why we observe that people who believe the actual 
world is deterministic are unsure how to respond in the condition associated with the strong 
signal for conditionality. Imagine now someone who believes the actual world is deterministic 
and is asked to evaluate whether there is free will in a counterfactual deterministic world from 
the perspective of an indeterministic actual world. If that person has a conditional concept, then 
they should also think that compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will. So according to their 
actual belief there is free will in the counterfactual deterministic world. But if they succeed in 
simulating what they would think if they counterfactually believed the actual world is 
indeterministic, then they should no longer think that compatibilist powers are sufficient for free 
will. Instead they should think that indeterminism and libertarian powers are necessary for free 
will. So according to their simulated counterfactual belief there is no free will in the 
counterfactual deterministic world. As a result, there is once again a response conflict between 
free will responses that are generated in accordance with someone’s actual and simulated 
counterfactual beliefs. 
While the current results are weaker evidence for conditionality than I would have liked, 
I still think they give us a reason to think that what underlies people’s responses is a conditional 
concept of free will. Looking forward there is a need to run confirmatory longitudinal studies. 
My explanation of my data is that we are relying on agents simulating what they would judge if 
they came to change their beliefs. This allows for two effects: poor simulation, on the one hand, 
and a conflict between outputs of simulation and straightforward judgments given how they 
actually take things to be, on the other hand. In a longitudinal study I will have access to agents 
that have actually changed their minds, so we will not be relying on their imperfect simulations 
of what they would do if they changed their minds, and also there will be no conflict with 
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judgments based on how they take things to be actually. People who believe the actual world is 
indeterministic and so are unsure how to respond in the actual deterministic world condition 
should straightforwardly respond that there is free will if they come to genuinely belief the actual 
world is deterministic. Further, people who believe the actual world is deterministic and then 
come to believe the actual world is indeterministic should be expected to straightforwardly judge 
there is no free will in the counterfactual deterministic world from the perspective of the 
indeterministic world. As I alluded to earlier, these investigations have already begun and my 
collaborator and I have some evidence people are no longer unsure how to respond when they 
genuinely change their beliefs about what the actual world is like. However, these investigations 
are ongoing and we need many more cases of people genuinely changing their beliefs about what 
the actual world is before we can be confident in these results. Nevertheless, this suggestive 
evidence is enticing as it would constitute more definitive proof that the folk concept of free will 
is a conditional one and thus definitively show that the folk are free will compatibilists. 
2.3.2. Behind the empirical result: Methods of the experimental task.  
For those interested readers, here I will describe the methods and materials I used to obtain the 
results described in §2.3.2. 102 people participated in the study. Participants were U.S. residents, 
recruited and tested online using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Four participants had to be excluded 
for failing to follow task instructions. This means that they failed to answer all the questions, or 
failed an attentional check question. The remaining sample was composed of 98 participants 
(aged 23-69; 44 female). Mean age 37.12 (SD = 10.39). Ethics approval for this study was 
obtained from the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. Informed consent 
was obtained to all participants prior to testing. The study was conducted online using Qualtrics. 
At the beginning of the experimental, each participant was presented with two vignettes. 
One vignette described a deterministic universe the other vignette described an indeterministic 
universe. Participants had continued access to the vignettes throughout the experiment. They 
read as follows: 
Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely caused 
by whatever happened before it. For example, one day Katie decided she wanted to have 
a cup of coffee with her breakfast. Like everything else, this decision was completely 
caused by what ever happened before it. So if everything in this universe was exactly the 
same up until Katie made her decision, then it had to happen that Katie would decide to 
have a cup of coffee. Every decision Katie makes is completely caused by whatever 
happened before the decision – given the past, every decision has to happen exactly the 
way that it does. 
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Imagine a universe (Universe B) in which everything that happens is not completely 
caused by whatever happened before it. For example, one day Katie decided she wanted 
to have a cup of coffee with her breakfast. Like everything else, this decision is not 
completely caused by what happened before it. So if everything in the universe was 
exactly the same up until Katie made her decision, it did not have happen that Katie would 
decide to have a cup of coffee. Every decision Katie makes is not completely caused by 
whatever happened before the decision – given the past, every decision does not have to 
happen the way that it does. 
Participants were then asked: Which of these universes do you think is most like our own? 
Consistent with the results of Nichols and Knobe (2007), the overwhelming majority of people 
picked Universe B (81.6%), the indeterministic universe, and not Universe A (18.4%), the 
deterministic universe. 
 Each participant was then presented with four different conditions in random order. 
Each condition corresponds to one of the boxes in the two dimensional table. Participants were 
asked to evaluate whether there was free will in: (1) a deterministic actual world, (2) an 
indeterministic actual world, (3) counterfactual deterministic world from the perspective of an 
indeterministic actual world, and (4) counterfactual indeterministic world from the perspective of 
a deterministic actual world. 
Here’s how the setup in each condition worked. In condition (1) a deterministic actual 
world, participants were asked to: Imagine scientists discover that the actual universe (the one 
where you or I live) is exactly like Universe A. Similarly, in condition (2) an indeterministic actual 
world, participants were asked to: Imagine scientists discover that the actual universe (the one 
where you or I live) is exactly like Universe B. Meanwhile, in condition (3) a counterfactual 
deterministic world, participants were asked to: Imagine scientists discover that the actual 
universe (the one where you and I live) is exactly like Universe B. Now imagine scientists are 
suddenly able to observe a parallel universe. The parallel universe contains everything that the 
actual universe contains including duplicates of us. Unlike the actual universe, however, the 
parallel universe is exactly like Universe A. Finally, in condition (4) a counterfactual 
indeterministic world, participants were asked to: Imagine scientists discover that the actual 
universe (the one where you and I live) is exactly like Universe A. Now imagine scientists are 
suddenly able to observe a parallel universe. The parallel universe contains everything that the 
actual universe contains including duplicates of us. Unlike the actual universe, however, the 
parallel universe is exactly like Universe B. 
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Following this set up, participants were then asked how much they agreed, on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely disagree), with one of 
following randomly assigned statements: (1) If these scientists are right, then the people in 
Universe [A/B] have free will (2) If these scientists are right, then the people in Universe [A/B] 
do not have free will. Presenting the statement two different ways was to control for question 
effects on people’s response. No significant effect of question type was found so in order to 
amalgamate these results, levels of agreement for question (2) were reverse coded (i.e., a response 
of 1 was transformed into a response of 7; a response of 2 was transformed into a response of 6, 
and so on). After this reverse-coding the results are as if all participants had been asked their 
levels of agreement whether or not the people in the Universe being evaluated have free will. 
Thus, higher levels of agreement indicate participants’ collective response for there being free 
will as opposed to not being free will. These results are presented and discussed in §2.3.1. 
2.3.3 Conclusion: Detecting conditionality in the folk concept of free will 
In summary, in accordance with the conditional concept of free will I have presented some new 
evidence in support of both the weak and strong signal for conditionality. The weak signal for 
conditionality predicts that people who believe the actual world is indeterministic should 
straightforwardly respond that there is free will in the actual deterministic world. Consistent with 
Roskies and Nichols (2008) I found that people who believe that the actual world is 
indeterministic are unsure whether or not there is free will in this condition. The strong signal 
for conditionality predicts that people who believe the actual world is deterministic should 
straightforwardly respond that there is no free will in a counterfactual deterministic world from 
the perspective of an actual indeterministic world. This time I found that people who believe the 
actual world is deterministic were unsure how to respond.  
While people did not straightforwardly respond in the manner predicted by the 
conditional concept, I still think this result is evidence in its favour and thus is evidence in favour 
of the folk being free will compatibilists. That’s because I think it would be an amazing 
coincidence if people who believe the actual world is indeterministic just happen to be unsure 
how to respond to an actual deterministic world and that people who believe the actual world is 
deterministic world just happen to be unsure how to respond to a counterfactual world from the 
perspective of an actual indeterministic world. After all, both these conditions are correctly 
identified as being important with respect to people’s concept of free will, only after it has been 
identified that our concept of free will might be a conditional concept. Still it is slightly weaker 
evidence that I would have liked and future longitudinal studies are necessary to confirm that it is 
a conditional concept that underlies people’s responses in this task.  
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2.4. Objection: Two-dimensionalism and counterpossible judgments26 
Before I conclude this chapter I want to briefly address a few possible objections that you might 
have about the conditional analysis of our free will concept and the validity of people’s responses 
to certain experimental conditions. First, my conditional analysis of our concept of free will has 
leaned on two-dimensionalism, which is a purely intensional theory. However, any account of 
the content of our concept of free will has to be able to model hyperintensional distinctions. In 
response to this concern, I will very briefly outline a simple extension of two-dimensionalism 
that will allow us to do just that.  
Second, some might worry about the validity of some responses participants were asked 
to make in my investigation. In particular, you might think that some conditions described 
metaphysically impossible worlds. Participant responses to metaphysically impossible worlds are 
unreliable because our intuitions and judgments about free will are not at all concerned with 
these kinds of worlds. In response to this worry, I argue that even if some things are as a matter 
of fact metaphysically impossible, we can still imperfectly conceive of them in a way that is 
sufficient to fix our intuitions and judgments about free will.  
2.4.1 Technical issue: Two-Dimensionalism is an intensional theory 
Two-dimensionalism, in all its published forms,27 is a story about logically possible worlds which 
along one dimension are considered as actual, and along another are considered as 
counterfactual, but all of which are strictly possible. But any account that hopes to accurately 
map the content of our concept of free will needs to be able to model hyperintensional 
distinctions. These are distinctions which are more fine-grained than intensional ones. Thus 
there are distinctions between worlds that are impossible, and between those that are necessary. 
Why is this? It’s because for all we know the space of accounts of free will is a space in which 
many accounts are impossible and only the correct one is possible (and indeed necessary). So for 
all we know (and as some compatibilists suspect) libertarian powers are incoherent and thus 
logically impossible; perhaps even compatibilism is thought of as impossible by the lights of 
some libertarians. So for all we know some of the worlds in the simple two-dimensional tables I 
have presented are impossible. Thus my account is inadequate. 
There is a relatively simple fix to this issue: the complete account of someone’s free will 
concept requires multiple two-dimensional table-stacks in the manner of Braddon-Mitchell 
                                                          
26Credit and thanks to both David Braddon-Mitchell and Lok Chi-Chan for raising this objection and assisting in 
developing the reply.  
27Major accounts of two-dimensionalism include Jackson’s generalized account (1998), Chalmers’s epistemic account 
(2004) and Stalnaker’s metasemantic account (1978). 
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(manuscript).28 The two-dimensional table you should be familiar from this chapter is the 
contingency table where there are both possible indeterminist worlds with libertarian powers and 
possible deterministic worlds with compatibilist powers. But on the supposition libertarian 
powers are metaphysically impossible we will need an additional table. One might think of each 
table as representing alternative hypotheses about which worlds are possible. There might be a 
table containing only indeterministic worlds (representing the implausible view that 
indeterminism is necessary), another table containing deterministic and indeterministic worlds, 
but not worlds with libertarian powers (representing the view that libertarian powers are 
incoherent) and yet another table which contains deterministic worlds and indeterministic 
worlds, some of which contain libertarian powers, and so on. Indexing then is a slightly more 
complex thing: rather than a particular world being the only index, we need to index to a world 
and a table. The world tells us how the agent takes the actual world to be, the table tells us how 
they take the domain of what is possible to be. Actuality simpliciter, then, is a world-table pair (or 
just a world if we don’t identify worlds across tables). The world is the actual world and the table 
tells us what is as a matter of fact logically possible. 
Of course no such apparatus is required for logically omniscient agents whose a priori 
knowledge will locate them in the correct table. But philosophers are not logically omniscient, 
much less the folk whose judgments we are testing in our experimental work, which is why when 
we are forming judgments about different metaphysical positions we need to adapt intensional 
theories in a hyperintensional direction. We would not, of course, have to do this if metaphysical 
contingentism were true (the view that different views in metaphysics are logically possible, 
rather than competing accounts of what is necessary) but this is a minority view: and of course 
the difference between that view and the orthodoxy is itself hyperintensional!  
So a complete account of our concept of free will requires considering people’s 
judgements not just on the supposition that things are the way they are contingently, but also on 
the supposition that things are the way they are necessarily as well. This is not a problem for me, 
and it can be accommodated by simply extending the analysis and methods I developed in this 
chapter. 
2.4.2. Response issue: Counterpossible judgments  
Let’s suppose for the moment that libertarian powers are metaphysically impossible, which I 
suspect many compatibilist theorists do think. Even if it turns out that libertarian powers are 
metaphysically impossible, there is no reason to think that people cannot form intuitions or 
render judgments about them, of the sort that we observe in experimental philosophy, and, for 
                                                          
28This view has been called three-dimensionalism (Braddon-Mitchell, personal communication; though see Braddon-
Mitchell, 2009). 
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that matter, philosophical debate. For, it seems to me, even if the worlds that we are considering 
with libertarian powers are metaphysically impossible, they are still conceivable, albeit in an 
imperfect matter. All that matters, though, is that what we are imperfectly conceiving of is 
sufficient to play a role in fixing our libertarian intuitions and judgments regarding free will.  
But why think that this is right? Well, for one, different conceptions regarding what 
powers are necessary for free will, including libertarian powers, must be conceivable because 
philosophers and the folk are divided over the metaphysical status of the powers that are 
necessary for free will. Further, for each candidate theory about those powers, whether it’s 
libertarian or compatibilist, there are sincere and thoughtful people who believe that’s what our 
free will is like actually. In order to be able to sincerely and thoughtfully think something is 
actual, entails, in my mind at least, conceivability of a strong enough sense to explain free will 
intuitions and judgments. What’s more there is no reason to think that what is going on in the 
case of theorists is not also occurring in the folk and so can explain people’s intuitions and 
judgments in those experimental conditions that may have originally concerned us. 
 You might still wonder how we can mentally conceive of things like libertarian powers if 
they are metaphysically impossible. I won’t spend long on this issue, as it’s tangential to the 
current thesis, but will make one suggestion. When we conceive of things like libertarian powers 
we form a mental model that is not constrained by our explicitly held philosophical views. For 
example, my intuitions and judgments regarding libertarian powers in a world might be driven by 
a mental model that contains people with the apparent power to control indeterministic 
outcomes. What’s important is that the inputs to this process are not a bunch of explicitly held 
philosophical theories and that is why even philosophers who think libertarian powers are 
metaphysically impossible can in some imperfect sense still conceive of them. To be more 
precise, we might imagine a world that contains elements like those libertarians say the actual 
world contains, even while still taking the official view that such things are metaphysically 
impossible. And in a world like that, the libertarian powers we would possess make it possible to 
exert control over indeterministic outcomes. 
2.4.3. Conclusion: Two-dimensionalism and counterpossible judgments 
In summary, here I have briefly addressed a few possible objections that you might have about 
the conditional analysis of our free will concept and the validity of people’s responses to certain 
experimental conditions. First, the conditional analysis of our concept of free will leans heavily 
on two-dimensionalism, which is a purely intensional theory. But any complete account of our 
concept of free will needs to be able model hyperintensional distinctions, thus my account is 
inadequate. However, this is simply not an issue for me as these hyperintensional distinctions can 
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be modelled by extending the analysis and methods developed in this chapter to include more 
tables. 
Second, some people might think that people’s responses to metaphysically impossible 
worlds are unreliable because they think our intuitions and judgments about free will are not at 
all concerned with these kinds of worlds. In response to this worry, I argued that even if some 
things are as a matter of fact metaphysically impossible is seems as though we can still 
imperfectly conceive of them in a way that is sufficient to fix our intuitions and judgments about 
free will. Furthermore, something like this must be the case as there are sincere and thoughtful 
people on both sides arguing over the metaphysical status and necessity of various powers for 
free will.  
 
2.5. Conclusion: Folk free will in two-dimensions 
In summary, in this chapter I have set about the task of arguing that the folk concept of free will 
is compatibilist, albeit of a conditional kind. A conditional concept is a single concept that has an 
indexical component which fixes what is necessary for something depending on what the actual 
world offers up. Applying this thought to the case of free will I have proposed the following 
conditional analysis of free will: 
If the actual world is indeterministic, and agents have libertarian powers, then these 
libertarian powers are what free will is and must be. Else, if the actual world is 
deterministic, and agents have their preferred compatibilist powers, then compatibilist 
powers are what free will is. 
The conditional concept is a compatibilist concept because no matter how things turn out 
actually to be, to the extent that we possess this concept we will judge that we possess free will. 
Further, the conditional concept can accommodate the prevalence and tenacity of people’s 
incompatibilist intuitions, which resulted in the orthodox view that the folk concept of free will 
is incompatibilist. Some observations of free will theorists and undergraduate students suggests 
that there might be a connection between what people think the actual world is like, and their 
view about the nature of free will. This means that it is essential to track people’s beliefs about 
the actual truth of determinism in order to know whether they have an incompatibilist concept 
of free will, or a compatibilist concept of free will of a straightforward or conditional kind.  
There is a clear data signal in experimental philosophy of people responding as though 
they possess a compatibilist concept of free will and as though they possess an incompatibilist 
concept of free will. However, any differences in results that purport to show the folk are 
compatibilists and those that purport to show that the folk are incompatibilists are superficial 
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and due to differences in methodological set up. These differences in methodological set up are 
correctly viewed as being important when the possibility of the folk concept of free will being a 
conditional one is identified. 
In accordance with the conditional concept of free will I have presented new evidence in 
support of both the weak and strong signal for conditionality. The weak signal for conditionality 
predicts that people who believe the actual world is indeterministic should straightforwardly 
respond that there is free will in the actual deterministic world. Consistent with Roskies and 
Nichols (2008) I found that people who believe that the actual world is indeterministic are 
unsure whether or not there is free will in this condition. The strong signal for conditionality 
predicts that people who believe the actual world is deterministic should straightforwardly 
respond that there is no free will in a counterfactual deterministic world from the perspective of 
an actual indeterministic world. I found that people who believe the actual world is deterministic 
are unsure how to respond. While people do not straightforwardly respond in the manner 
predicted, I still think that the fact that people are unsure how to respond in the exact conditions 
predicted by the conditional concept is sufficiently strong evidence to think that the folk concept 
is in fact a conditional one. If this is right, and I think it is, then the folk are free will 
compatibilists. 
Finally, I rounded off this chapter by briefly addressing a couple of objections you might 
have about the conditional analysis of our free will concept and the validity of people’s responses 
to certain experimental conditions. Specifically, I outlined how the analysis and methods 
developed here can be extended to accommodate hyperintensional distinctions in people’s 
concepts, and why we should think that people can imperfectly conceive of metaphysically 
impossible things in a manner that is sufficient to fix their intuitions and judgments. In the next 
chapter I address a pertinent issue that faces any account of free action centred on conscious 
control. That is, evidence from the brain sciences shows us that conscious brain processes might 
not be causally efficacious with respect to our actions at all. If this is right then by the lights of 
my account there are no free actions, and so by extension no one has free will.  
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Chapter 3  
The challenge of the brain sciences 
 
In this thesis I defend the idea that our actions are free when they are either directly caused by 
compatibilistically acceptable conscious psychological processes - freedom-conferring 
mechanisms - or indirectly caused by those same processes via controlled action procedures. So 
far, I have established that the folk are compatibilists with respect to free will, albeit of a unique 
kind. If the actual world is deterministic and contains freedom-conferring mechanisms 
(henceforth FCMs), then the conditional compatibilist folk concept of free will (see Chapter 2) 
then this is consistent with there being free actions. However, in order for there to be free 
actions (and hence free will) these FCMs must be causally efficacious. In this chapter I defend 
this possibility against the following charge: that there is evidence, as a descriptive matter of fact, 
that our FCMs cause no actions and so none of our actions are free, and no one has free will. 
Hence, according to which objection, even if our concept of free will is a compatibilist one, 
nothing actually answers to that concept because our actions are not caused in the right sorts of 
ways.  
There is a growing, but contentious, body of evidence that purports to show that FCMs 
do not cause actions. Consider the following simple experiment. Participants are asked to watch 
a clock and report the time shown when they first feel the urge to perform a simple action. 
Shortly after they have performed the simple action, the timer on the clock stops and the 
experiment is reset. The key finding is that the onset of neural activity associated with the action 
occurs well before the time participant’s first report having an urge to perform the action (e.g., 
Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Bode, He, Soon, Trampel, Turner, & Haynes, 2011). 
Based on these results, many brain scientists conclude that FCMs cannot be the cause of our 
actions (e.g., Gazzaniga, 2011; Greene & Cohen, 2004; Libet, 1999). After all, if FCMs cause 
actions, then the time participant’s report their urge to perform an action should occur before 
(or roughly in line with) the onset of neural activity associated with the action. 
The target of these brain scientists is the default conscious control account of free action 
which I introduced in chapter 1. I have called the compatibilistically acceptable version of this 
default conscious control account: direct (conscious control) compatibilism. According to direct 
compatibilism, an action is free only if it is directly caused by an FCM. As I see it there are two 
distinct challenges that arise out of the empirical evidence from the brain sciences: the broad 
challenge and narrow challenge. According to the broad challenge, evidence from the brain sciences 
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shows that FCMs cause no actions. In this chapter I will argue that the empirical evidence does 
not show this at all, and so the broad challenge is wrong.  
However, according to the narrow challenge, evidence from the brain sciences shows 
that FCMs cause only very few of our actions. I think that the narrow challenge is plausibly right 
and is no less problematic than the broad challenge for direct compatibilism. That’s because 
there appears to be a large discrepancy between the few free actions countenanced by the brain 
sciences, and the number of free actions that we judge there to be in the world (the discrepancy 
problem). If not enough of our actions are free, then we do not have free will. I will argue that we 
can avoid the discrepancy problem and accommodate many of our free action judgments by 
acknowledging that most cases that we judge actions to be free, the actions are not free because 
they are directly caused by FCMs, but free indirectly via sub-personal level mechanisms, which 
those FCMs have influenced in some way: controlled action procedures. Hence the name of my 
account: indirect (conscious control) compatibilism. 
Here, then, is the plan for this chapter. To begin, in §3.1, I will present the broad 
challenge. According to the broad challenge, evidence from the brain sciences shows that FCMs 
cause no actions and so none of our actions are free. I will argue that the broad challenge is 
wrong. These arguments occur over the course of §3.2 - §3.5. Specifically, in §3.2 and §3.4, I will 
address some important empirical evidence from electroencephalography (henceforth EEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (henceforth fMRI) research that purports to show that 
FCMs do not cause actions, and I will argue that they don’t show this at all. In §3.3 I will discuss 
the manner in which participants might be performing these experiments and will suggest we 
have good reason to think that actions might be being caused by action procedures: a special 
kind of sub-personal level mechanism which I will explain shortly. In §3.5, I will reinterpret the 
role played by neural activity in the prefrontal cortex in a manner that is consistent with FCMs 
causing actions in these studies. In §3.6 I will present the narrow challenge and discrepancy 
problem, and will show that the discrepancy problem vanishes if can we accept that actions 
indirectly caused by FCMs via controlled action procedures are free. In §3.7 I will conclude. 
 
3.1. The broad challenge 
Let’s begin; here is the broad challenge presented as an argument: 
 Broad Challenge 
1) [Direct compatibilism] An action is free only if it is directly caused by an FCM. 
2) [Empirical premise] Evidence from the brain sciences shows that FCMs do not cause 
actions. 
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3) [Conclusion] Therefore, there are no free actions (from 1 and 2). 
The argument is valid. Let me briefly describe each premise and how they fit together. [Direct 
compatibilism] is straightforward, as according to direct compatibilism an action is free only if it 
is caused by an FCM. If compatibilistically acceptable conscious psychological processes do not 
cause actions, then according to direct compatibilism (and indirect compatibilism for that matter) 
none of our actions are free.  
[Empirical premise] requires substantial unpacking and is the main focus of this chapter. 
How do researchers in the brain sciences substantiate the claim that FCMs do not cause actions? 
Before examining any one study in particular, here is the general schema of how current 
experimental paradigms and their evidence are taken to support [Empirical premise]. In any 
given experiment, people perform some simple task while a concurrent recording of neural 
activity is taken. Researchers then compare the timing of the earliest recorded signs of neural 
activity associated with an action, with people’s self-reports of when they were first aware of the 
action that they will perform (for example, see Libet, 1985; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 
2008; Fried, Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011). The general finding is that the earliest signs of neural 
activity associated with an action occurs well before people report being aware of that action. 
According to these researchers, if FCMs caused actions, then the time people report being aware 
of the action should occur before (or at least roughly in line with) the onset time of neural 
activity associated with that action. As this is not the case, FCMs cannot be what caused the 
action, and so the action is not free. 
I will return shortly to describe some of this empirical evidence in more detail, and begin 
applying some pressure to [Empirical premise]. My concern, briefly for now, is that while it’s 
plausible that this line of evidence successfully generalizes to many of our actions, there is no 
reason to suspect that it generalizes to all of our actions. As a result, Broad Challenge will need 
to be amended if it is to successfully challenge free action and free will, but much more on that 
later on in this chapter.  
 Finally, consider [Conclusion] for a moment. If FCMs do not cause actions, how was it 
that we ever came to believe they caused actions in the first place? Many brain researchers (such 
as those cited earlier) at this point follow Daniel Wegner, who in the The Illusion of Conscious Will 
(2002) famously argued that all cases of our sense of agency are cases of illusory agency.29 On 
Wegner’s account illusory agency is created and maintained by our own causal detection 
mechanism which misclassifies the correlation between FCMs and actions as a causal 
relationship. Instead, the real reason FCMs and action production are correlated is because they 
                                                          
29See also Nahmias (2002) who has described in detail, but not endorsed, Wegner’s position. 
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share an unconscious common cause. Although FCMs and action production occur close 
together in time, they are in fact entirely independent from one another, which means that none 
of our actions are free. As it so happens, I do not believe that the current state of the evidence is 
able to support the conclusion that FCMs never cause actions. For now, though, let’s examine 
some of the purported evidence for the [Empirical premise] of the broad challenge. 
 
3.2. The [EEG premise] of the broad challenge of the brain sciences 
Perhaps the most well known investigations into the relevance of FCMs for actions have been 
those performed by Benjamin Libet and colleagues (1983; 1985; though see also 2004). For now, 
I focus my attention on some broad findings around Libet-style paradigms, especially those with 
a concurrent EEG recording. In §3.4 I will address some more recent experimental work using 
Libet-style paradigms with fMRI. Although Libet’s original paradigm and analyses are now dated, 
it’s still the basis of, and principle motivator for, many contemporary scientific investigations into 
free will. However, while contemporary results still appear to show that FCMs play no role in 
many of our actions, I will argue over the next few sections that there is very little reason to 
suspect that these results generalize to all our actions. 
3.2.1. The Libet paradigm and its results 
Here is the basic Libet paradigm. During a standard experimental trial participants watch a clock 
face that has a spot revolving around it. The participant’s task is to report where the spot was 
located on the clock face when they first felt the urge to flex their wrist. Shortly after they have 
flexed, the clock stops, and the experiment is reset. The task is performed while a concurrent 
EEG recording is taken, with specific interest in an electrocortical component of neural activity 
known as the readiness potential (henceforth RP; for example, see Deecke, Grözinger, & 
Kornhuber, 1976). The RP is a highly robust electrocortical component of general preparatory 
neural activity which appears to precede voluntary action.30 The RP begins up to, and around ~2 
s prior to action and neural activity continues to accumulate until the intended action is either 
performed or abandoned. Libet and colleagues’ most notable finding was that participants’ 
reports of when they were first aware of the action they would perform, occurred just prior to 
action, but after the onset of the RP. That is, they observed the onset of preparatory neural 
activity for action well before the participants’ reported being aware of their action. On the basis 
of these results, the experimenters concluded that FCMs are not causing our actions. After all, to 
                                                          
30The exact functional significance of the RP is contentious, and has been described as reflecting neural activity in 
the supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-SMA, cingulate motor area and anterior cingulate cortex (for example, see 
Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke, & Moser, 2002; 2003; Praamstra, Stegeman, Horstink, & Cools, 1996; for 
review, see Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). In this thesis, I make no attempt to settle this matter. 
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these experimenters, at least, if FCMs are causing actions, then participants’ should have 
reported an awareness of their action before (or at least in line with) the onset of neural activity 
for that action. 
While the general pattern of results remains the same, it is worth mentioning that EEG 
researchers have also taken interest in a special form of the RP, the lateralized readiness potential 
(henceforth LRP; for example, see Eimer, 1998; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Vaughan, Costa, & 
Ritter, 1968). Unlike the RP, the LRP is a purely motoric component that presents as greater 
neural activity over the motor cortex contralateral to the side of the action. Further the LRP only 
begins up to, and around ~800 ms prior to action. Of course, there are numerous other, 
plausibly important, electrocortical components as well. For some examples, you can see the 
components extracted out of my own investigations in Appendix A. 
3.2.2. Basic critiques of the Libet-style paradigms and EEG results 
It is important to acknowledge that there are plenty of good general critiques of Libet-style 
methods, and the appropriate functional interpretation of electrocortical components such as the 
RP.31 For example, you might be concerned about whether it is even possible for participants to 
reliably and accurately report timings of their sense of agency (for example, see Banks, & 
Isham, 2009; Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2007). By sense of agency, I don’t mean anything 
technical, it’s simply a useful piece of terminology used by these researchers to refer to 
someone’s self-reported awareness of the action that they will go on to perform. Alternatively, 
you might wonder whether the RP in the Libet-style paradigm is associated with the action that 
will go on to be performed at all (for example, see Miller, Shepherdson, & Trevena, 2011; 
Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012). For argumentative purposes, I will set aside some of these 
more general critiques. That is, I will simply assume people can make reliable and accurate 
introspective reports, and that the RP, and related electrocortical components, are in fact 
representative of some form of preparatory neural activity for action production. Although these 
critiques might be right, it is far from clear that they are, so it is worth seeing how far we can get 
assuming that they are not. 
Another common response to this evidence is to do something similar to what I will be 
doing, and challenge the generalizability of these findings on the grounds that they involve a very 
special kind of action (for example, see Tallis, 2011; Mylopoulos & Lau, 2014). It is not hard to 
motivate this response, especially once you see the kinds of task instructions that Libet and 
colleagues (and many experimenters to come) presented to participants:  
                                                          
31For some more recent general critiques, see Roskies (2010), Smith (2011), and Mele (2014). 
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“[…] let the urge to act appear on its own at any time without any preplanning or 
concentration on when to act” (1983; pg., 625).  
For many, this instruction is utterly mysterious and it remains unclear how a participant would 
go about implementing such an instruction. Furthermore, if this kind of instruction could be 
followed accurately, then it would rule out the relevance of these experiments for determining 
whether or not FCMs cause actions. After all, the experimental instruction I just quoted appears 
to be an instruction to not use FCMs at all in the experiment! At best these results would show 
that some of our actions are not free, but that’s hardly an interesting result as no one ever 
thought that all our actions were free. 
If this is what I thought was occurring in these tasks, then I might conclude that there is 
already enough reason to think these results fail to generalize. However, while I don’t think these 
results generalize, it’s not because I think they reflect some rare or special form of action. In fact, 
as I will suggest in the next section, I think they probably reflect a perfectly mundane and 
common kind of action: actions caused by action procedures. I will explain what I mean by this 
shortly; but briefly an action procedure is a sub-personal level mechanism that causes actions. 
Action procedures will become important soon as I think that the actions caused by a certain 
kind of action procedure, those influenced by FCMs, (i.e., controlled actions procedures) are 
free. 
3.2.3. Conclusion: The [EEG premise] of the broad challenge of the brain sciences 
Let’s do a quick recap of what I have discussed so far. During a Libet-style paradigm participants 
report the time at which they first experience a sense of agency for some basic action. The results 
of these experiments show that the neural activity for the action occurs well before participants’ 
earliest reported sense of agency. On the basis of these results some researchers have concluded 
that FCMs cannot be what are causing our actions. They further conclude that there are no free 
actions, because they assume that the results of these experiments generalize to all our actions. If 
FCMs never cause actions, then of course there are no free actions (or free will for that matter). 
There are many general critiques of the methods and results of these kinds of studies; for 
example, what exactly does the RP realise in the context of action preparation and performance? 
Further, many people think that these results don’t generalize because the kinds of actions being 
examined are rare or unique. While I agree that the results of these experiments fail to generalize 
to all our actions, unlike others I think the actions performed in Libet-style paradigms might 
reflect the vast majority of our actions: namely, actions caused by sub-personal level 
mechanisms, or what I have called action procedures.  
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3.3. Participant performance in a Libet-style paradigm 
So, what are participants doing during a Libet-style paradigm? Consider Alfred Mele’s (2014) 
description of his experience and approach when performing a Libet-style experiment: 
“At first, I waited for conscious urges to flex to pop up in me so I’d have something to 
report when it was time to make the consciousness report. I waited until I was pretty sure 
the urges weren’t just going to pop up on their own. I wondered what to do, and I hit on 
a strategy. I decided that I would just say “now” to myself silently, flex my wrist in 
response to the silently uttered cue, and then, a little later, try to report where the hand 
was on the Libet clock when I said “now”. (pg. 14) 
While Mele’s experience is of course his own, and different people will report different 
experiences, there are two important points to take away from his report. First, actions simply do 
not appear out of nowhere. For example, it is hard to imagine how participants could bring 
about wrist flexes in the experiment without any thought for the requirements of the experiment 
they are participating in. Second, actions that apparently appear out of nowhere are in fact 
caused by some action procedure of the agent. I will expand on this shortly. 
But first, what is an action procedure exactly? At the beginning of the thesis I introduced 
the idea that an action procedure is a sub-personal level mechanism that causes actions, or 
influences other action procedures, both in a contained and reliable fashion. So imagine for the 
moment a simple fist-bumping action procedure that produces a fist-bumping action. The action 
procedure is contained in the sense that it will only produce actions of the fist-bumping kind 
(contained) and will rarely fail to produce hand-waving actions whenever it is activated (reliable). 
If an action procedure is completely independent of FCMs, then the actions it causes are unfree. 
However, I think that many actions procedures are influenced by FCMs, and, what’s more, I 
think that action procedures that have been influenced by an FCM cause free actions, albeit 
indirectly. 
I have called an action procedure that has been influenced by a FCM: a controlled 
action procedure. The simplest kind of influence an FCM can have on an action procedure is 
creation. For example, an agent might create a waving action procedure that causes them to 
wave whenever someone waves at them. Alternatively, an agent might create an action procedure 
to automate their actions while performing a Libet-style paradigm. This controlled action 
procedure (henceforth CAP) would reliably cause them to flex their wrist in a timely manner 
some time after the start of an experimental trial has been cued. Exactly, what sorts of 
connections between an FCM and an action procedure count as influence will be discussed in 
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detail in Chapter 4 (§4.1). For now, I will stick with creation as a paradigm case in which an FCM 
influences an action procedure.  
It’s worthwhile to note that I don’t think that action procedures and CAPs are natural 
kinds which are identifiable by the low-level brain sciences. That is, I do not think that action 
procedures and CAPs are some special kind or patterning of neural activity. Instead, action 
procedures are sub-personal level mechanisms that are defined functionally as whatever those 
things are that cause actions in a contained and reliable fashion, and when they have been 
influenced by a FCM - CAPs - cause actions which are indirectly free according to indirect 
compatibilism. 
If this general thought is correct then the reason Libet-style results fail to generalize is 
not because they target some special or rare kind of action. The opposite is true. It’s because 
they in fact fail to generalize to a special and relatively rare kind of action: the act of an FCM 
creating (influencing) some action procedure. For, I will suggest, it is the fact that FCMs are 
involved, in an appropriate manner, in the creation (influencing) of action procedures, which is 
responsible for many of our free actions, and hence for vindicating the thought that we have free 
will. So while I also think there are some cases where FCMs directly cause actions, the focus of my 
discussion will be on the act of creating (influencing) action procedures.  
3.3.1. Unpacking participant performance 
Let’s start elaborating. First, as Mele describes, simply waiting for urges to flex one’s wrist seems 
a non-starter in order to successfully complete a Libet-style experiment. For one, there is no 
guarantee that the required urge would ever arise over the course of the experiment - if at all - if 
there were no CAP in place to cause the action. This issue is compounded by the fact that these 
experiments rely on there being numerous successfully completed trials. At the very least, 
successful experimental completion requires some CAP to cause some wrist flex at some time 
during each experimental trial. As far as I am aware, there has never been a reported case of 
some poor participant spending an experiment simply sitting and waiting, with no success, for 
the urge to flex their wrist to arise on its own!  
 Of course, I do not think that creation (influencing) requires that people make the 
conscious decision to create a specific CAP, or bring it about that one CAP, as opposed to 
another, activates and causes actions. Instead, I think that the participant’s conscious decision to 
participate in the experiment is realized by the creation (influencing) of an action procedure, 
which automates and causes the participant’s actions for the duration of the experiment. There 
will be some relatively rare cases where someone does create (influence) a very specific action 
procedure via conscious control. For example, expert musicians might create (influence) an 
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action procedure to cause a very precise and specific set of actions via conscious control. I recall 
performing finger dexterity exercises on the piano which began by consciously controlling 
individual finger movements in a precise manner over and over again until such time as these 
precise finger movements became entirely automated. Expert sportspeople very likely do 
something similar in their training.  
Second, while Mele describes the CAP he adopted to perform the experiment, there are 
many kinds of CAPs participants might adopt. This is especially true of Libet-style paradigms for 
a number of reasons. For example, performance is not assessed in such a manner that it makes 
sense to judge the actions caused by one CAP as being better, or worse, than those caused by 
another CAP. There are never any incentives for performance, so there is no motivation to 
adopt one kind of CAP as opposed to another. Finally, there was no feedback provided for 
performance. Aside from the internal motivation a participant might have, perhaps curious to try 
out different CAPs, once an action procedure had been created (influenced) there was no reason 
for a participant to adjust it on account of the actions that were being caused. Of course, not all 
contexts will be like this. Different CAPs might result in differential performance that can 
accurately be assessed as better, or worse, on account of the actions they cause. Further, our 
CAPs will often be adjusted and improved according to the feedback we receive for the actions 
we perform.  
3.3.2. Controlled action procedures and our sense of agency 
So our main question is whether the actions caused by our CAPs are free. While, ‘yes’ will be my 
answer shortly in this thesis, the direct compatibilist has to answer ‘no’. As already described, 
Libet and many other researchers have presented evidence that our sense of agency for an action 
caused by a CAP only occurs after the onset of preparatory neural activity for that action. 
However, it also appears that our sense of agency for these kinds of actions is not even 
associated with the preparatory neural activity (for example, see Haggard & Eimer, 1999; 
Schlegel, Alexander, Sinnott-Armstrong, Roskies, Tse, & Wheatley, 2013). Neuropsychology has 
provided valuable information about the neural source of our sense of agency for these kinds of 
actions. For example, Sirigu and colleagues found that patients who suffered parietal lesions due 
to stroke, while able to report the onset time of their physical movements, were not able to 
report the onset time for sense of agency (Sirigu et al., 2004)32. Meanwhile, Desmurget and 
colleagues (Desmurget, Reilly, Richard, Szathmari, Mottolese, & Sirigu, 2009) applied direct 
electrical stimulation to seven patients undergoing awake brain surgery. When direct simulation 
was applied to premotor regions, it triggered overt movements in patients. Despite this, patients 
                                                          
32However, this result was not replicated by Larfargue and Duffau (2008). They examined patients undergoing 
surgical resection of their inferior parietal lobule due to slowly developing brain tumours. 
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firmly denied they had made a movement. In contrast, when direct stimulation was applied to 
parietal regions, patients reported believing they had moved, even though no movement was 
recorded. Our sense of agency for these kinds of actions appears to be associated with some 
completely different processes, apart from action production. 
 Still, it’s important to remember these results only appear to reflect one kind of action we 
might have thought was free - actions caused by our CAPs. And while, I think this kind of action 
does not count as being free according to direct compatibilism, this result alone is not enough to 
show there are no free actions and no free will. In order to show that, we would also require 
evidence showing that creating (influencing) action procedures is associated with the same 
patterning of neuroimaging results as the actions they cause. After all, if these neuroimaging 
results generalize to the creation (influencing) of action procedures, then, by my lights, they will 
have generalized to all our actions! 
In the next section we are going to consider some research carried out using fMRI. 
These researchers have claimed the distance in time between the onset of preparatory neural 
activity and our sense of agency might be as much as 10 s (for example, see Bode, He, Soon, 
Trampel, Turner, & Haynes, 2011; Soon et al. 2008; Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 2013; though 
see also Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). If they are correct, it could be suggestive evidence that our 
sense of agency for the creation (influencing) of our action procedures, which plausibly operates 
over a much bigger time-scale, faces the same issues as our sense of agency for the actions they 
cause. If so, this would undermine my contention that we can freely create (influence) action 
procedures. 
3.3.3. Conclusion: Participant performance in a Libet-style paradigm 
In summary, it’s very unlikely that participants performing Libet-style paradigms are performing 
the experiment in the manner researchers think they are. There is simply no guarantee that the 
urge required by the task would ever arise on its own during an experimental trial, let alone 
repeatedly over the course of the experiment. Instead, it’s plausible that participants are creating 
(influencing) an action procedure. The CAP in this case would be a remarkably simple sub-
personal level mechanism that would unconsciously cause a simple wrist flex whenever the onset 
of an experimental trial was cued. Actions caused in this manner are still associated with our 
sense of agency, but this sense of agency is not associated with causing the action itself. Further, 
while actions caused by CAPs are not free, according to direct compatibilism, they are free, albeit 
indirectly, according to my own account of free action: indirect compatibilism. Indirect 
compatibilism will be the major focus of Chapter 4. 
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3.4. The [fMRI premise] of the broad challenge of the brain sciences 
So far in this chapter I have been discussing the [Empirical premise] of the broad challenge. The 
premise states that the current results of investigations in the brain sciences have shown that 
FCMs do not cause actions. Up to this point I have primarily focused on results obtained from 
research using EEG; now I will shift my focus to results obtained from research using fMRI. 
Looking forward, my judgement will remain unchanged; these results fail to generalize to all our 
actions. This means that they cannot rule out there being some free actions in the world. 
Further, it is possible to interpret some fMRI results as consistent with FCMs causing actions. I 
will not argue that this is the correct way to interpret these results, only that it’s one option. 
Researchers employing fMRI have employed experimental methods similar to those 
developed by Benjamin Libet. For example, Soon, et al. (2008; though see also Bode, et al. 2011) 
instructed participants to fixate on a stream of letters, and press a button with either their left-or-
right hand when they first felt the urge to do so. Once they had pressed a button, participants 
then selected the letter that was present on the screen when they first felt the urge to perform 
that action. These researchers were interested in how much predictive information for a 
participant’s action was present in various brain regions before a participant’s reported sense of 
agency for that action.33 What they observed was quite remarkable; patterns of neural activity in 
brain regions such as the frontopolar cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and substantial areas of 
the parietal cortex, were predictive above chance (~60%) of the action a participant would 
perform. Further, this was up to 10 s before participants first reported their sense of agency. 
Similar to Libet and others, it was concluded that FCMs could not be causing our actions, as the 
onset of preparatory neural activity for the action occurs well before our reported sense of 
agency for that action. 
3.4.1. Contemporary advancements in the Libet-style paradigm 
Before I describe some other plausible explanations of what might be occurring in these studies, 
I want to draw attention to two important advancements brought about by this kind of research. 
First, it is natural to see these results as a natural extension of some of the original findings using 
the RP and LRP. As you advance closer to the time participants report a sense of agency for the 
action they will perform, predictive neural activity can be observed in various other brain regions 
as well. This includes the supplementary motor area and primary motor cortex, important source 
                                                          
33While studies conducted using fMRI will be the focus here, the analysis technique being employed, multivariate 
pattern classification has been applied to other kinds of neuroimaging data as well. For example, see Bode, Sewell, 
Lilburn, Forte, Smith, & Stahl, 2012, for the analysis as applied to EEG data. I will be assuming for the purposes of 
discussion that preparatory activity observed using fMRI actually represents neural activity in those regions. There is 
some evidence this is not the case (for example, see Sirotin & Das, 2009). 
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locations for electrocortical components such as the RP and LRP (for review, see Shibasaki & 
Hallett, 2006). However, these regions only became predictive, at best, just prior to participants’ 
reports. This suggests that the amount of time between the onset of neural activity and the sense 
of agency for some actions is greater than we originally thought. Second, these researchers have 
begun moving on from investigating simple motor movements, and have begun investigating 
(relatively) more complex actions as well. For example, Soon, et al. (2013), using a method like 
the one described previously, required participants to perform simple addition or subtraction, 
rather than simply pressing a button. While there was the additional observation of neural 
activity in a brain region associated with arithmetic, there were no differences in the predictive 
brain regions observed in this study.34 This suggests these regions are not just important for 
voluntary motor actions, but voluntary actions more generally.  
3.4.2. My preliminary assessment 
Ultimately, my own thoughts about what is occurring in these kinds of studies remain unchanged 
from what I have said previously. This should come as no surprise, as the most substantive 
changes between these studies and those described earlier regard the neuroimaging and analysis 
techniques employed. The experimental task itself is essentially unchanged. As a consequence, 
there should be no substantive changes to participant performance. Even if participants are 
unconsciously causing actions in these tasks, it does not follow that all actions are caused in this 
manner. No matter how accurately these results might reflect the actions caused by our CAPs, 
there is simply no reason to suspect they generalize to reflect the act of creating and influencing 
the action procedures themselves. 
If participants are using a CAP, then the earliest signs of neural activity in these studies 
might realise the creation (influencing) of that action procedure. Prima facie this suggestion is also 
consistent with the patterns of neural activity observed; as neural activity in the frontopolar 
cortex has been associated with plan implementation (for example, see Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, 
Miller, & Wagner, 2003; Sakai & Passingham, 2003; 2006), meanwhile the medial prefrontal 
cortex, in conjunction with the parietal cortex, is an important part of a fronto-parietal network 
associated with stable and novel task control (for example, see Braver & Barch, 2006; Cole, 
Reynolds, Power, Repovs, Anticevic, & Braver, 2013; Dosenbach et al. 2007). However, as with 
most frontal regions, there is no clear consensus on the common functional roles they fulfil for 
task performance. In §3.5 I will go on to describe some further roles neural activity in these 
regions have been associated with. 
                                                          
34In this case, the angular gyrus (for example, see Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003; Grabner et al. 2009; 
Stabescu-Cosson et al., 2000; for contra evidence, see Van Harskamp, Rudge, & Cipolotti, 2002). 
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Still, if we assume participants’ performance in a Libet-style experimental protocol is the 
result of a simple CAP, I believe we can make good sense of these researchers’ original claim. 
That is, it seems plausible to think participants who are using a CAP might be unconscious of 
the process by which actions are caused by that CAP. The obvious cost of this explanation is it 
means these results cannot generalize to all our actions, as it remains open that FCMs might still 
play a role in creating (influencing) the action procedure itself. It is then a further empirical 
question whether the creation (influencing) of action procedures is associated with the same 
patterning of neuroimaging results we observe for actions caused by CAPs. While I think this is 
the right explanation, it’s not what these researchers had in mind. For now, I will set my own 
thoughts aside and address two ways they might have interpreted these results. 
3.4.3. Conclusion: The [fMRI premise] of the broad challenge of the brain sciences 
To summarise to this point, many contemporary researchers using Libet-style paradigms have 
begun to utilize fMRI. These researchers have also made two major advances. First, EEG 
researchers were principally interested in electrocortical components around the time the action 
was about to be performed (i.e., RP and LRP). fMRI researchers, on the other hand, have begun 
identifying predictive neural activity in diverse regions well before the action occurs. The amount 
of time between the onset of neural activity for an action and our sense of agency for that action 
appears to be far greater than was suggested by the earlier EEG studies. Second, the shift away 
from overt motor actions has allowed researchers to generalize and find similar patterns of 
predictive neural activity for a diverse range of actions such as performing basic arithmetic. 
However, the core of these tasks remains unchanged, which means that participants might still 
be performing these tasks by creating (influencing) a simple action procedure. If participants are 
using a CAP, then participants might very well be unconscious of the process by which actions 
are caused in these experiments. What’s missing is evidence that participants are also completely 
unconscious of the creation (influencing) of their action procedures. 
 
3.5. Reinterpreting the role of the prefrontal cortex 
Here are two ways these results could be interpreted so as to be consistent with the conclusion 
that participants are unconscious of the process by which actions are caused in these 
experiments. First, patterns of neural activity observed in these brain regions might represent the 
onset and ongoing preparatory neural activity for an action, and this neural activity is not 
associated with any FCM. Second, patterns of observed neural activity represent the action to be 
caused. While participants think their FCMs cause their action, they are mistaken. The action 
they will perform is completely determined by the predictive neural activity or that predictive 
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neural activity in conjunction with some further unconscious neural activity. In what follows, I 
will discuss each possibility and suggest that, even if they are consistent with the data, there is 
nothing in the current results which commits us to believing either case is actual. The upshot of 
this is that there’s no reason to accept the [Empirical premise] of the broad challenge. FCMs 
plausibly do cause some actions and so some of our actions are free.  
3.5.1. Interpretation one: No FCMs? 
Let’s assume for the moment these researchers are correct: that the onset and ongoing 
preparatory neural activity observed in brain regions is not actually associated with FCMs. What 
are participants thinking and doing in the 10 s between the onset of the predictive neural activity 
and the earliest reported sense of agency for that action? Before, I suggested one way to make 
sense of this; the observed neural activity is associated with an action procedure being created 
(influenced) to cause actions in the experiment. This leaves open what else these participants 
might be doing. Perhaps they are ruminating on what to do in the evening, the episode they are 
up to on their favourite Netflix series, and so on. However, these researchers believe their results 
generalize to all our actions, so this cannot be how they interpret their results. In order to figure 
out what participants could be thinking and doing in any given experimental trial, let’s see what 
other activities prefrontal regions are associated with. For readers that are interested, §3.5.1.1 
contains some empirical evidence to support my proposal. I will return to discuss parietal regions 
in Chapter 4 (§4.2). Reflecting on just prefrontal regions is enough for my purposes here.  
 Earlier I stated that there is no consensus on what common functional role prefrontal 
brain regions play in task performance. This is important as it means there is no reason to think 
the neural activity observed here must realise unconscious preparatory neural activity. Instead, it’s 
just as plausible to think that the neural activity observed in the frontopolar and medial 
prefrontal cortex is a candidate realiser of some FCMs. I have already described one task which 
has been associated with neural activity found in the prefrontal cortex: plan implementation. 
Further examples will be provided shortly, §3.5.1.1, for those who are interested. While this 
neural activity is not associated with the sense of agency for the action performed, it could still 
be associated with our sense of agency for the creation (influencing) of action procedures. Let’s 
call this subpart of our sense of agency, our sense of deliberative agency. Provided our sense 
of deliberative agency is correct, which is to say it’s associated with our FCMs creating 
(influencing) action procedures, then we appear to have all that is required to vindicate the 
existence of some free actions. At the very least, there is nothing which means the current 
empirical evidence must be interpreted as threatening this view. 
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3.5.1.1. No FCMs: Evidence. In what follows I will very briefly describe some empirical evidence 
to support my proposal that neural activity in the frontopolar cortex and medial prefrontal 
cortex is a candidate realiser of some FCM. This is important as it means that the neural activity 
in these regions in Libet-style paradigms might sometimes realise an FCM causing a free action. 
In the context of these kinds of experiments, I think the most plausible candidate is the creation 
(influencing) of an action procedure to automate participants’ performance. 
In addition to plan implementation, neural activity in the frontopolar cortex has been 
associated with our capacity for autobiographical and prospective memory (for example, see 
Reynolds, McDermott, & Braver, 2006; Okuda et al. 2003; Burgess, Gonen-Yaacovi, & Volle, 
2011), as well as counterfactual, relational and abstract reasoning (for example, see Boorman, 
Behrens, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2009; Bunge, Helskog, & Wendelken, 2009). Meanwhile, 
neural activity in the medial prefrontal cortex has been repeatedly associated with decision 
making, particularly involving risk and reward (for example, see Bechara & Damasio, 2005; 
Fellows, 2007). This list is far from exhaustive.35  
Once again, what’s important for my purposes is the fact that neural activity in these 
prefrontal brain regions is closely associated with our capacity for future planning, complex 
reasoning, and sensitivity for risk and reward: cognitive processes which closely reflect the FCMs 
described by compatibilists. 
3.5.2. Interpretation two: Causally inefficacious FCMs? 
Of course, researchers interested in free will acknowledge the proposal I outlined, and the variety 
of task roles these brain regions are associated with. Yet, they still conclude that the onset and 
progression of predictive neural activity through various brain regions are associated with 
unconscious processes. For example, Soon, et al. (2013) when discussing the roles of the medial 
frontopolar cortex, posterior cingulate/precuneus say: 
“Both regions that encoded the content of the decision ahead of time have also been 
implicated in tasks involving both prospective memory, and imagining both the past and 
future. A possible interpretation of the current results is that these regions were involved 
in unconscious preparation for actions in the near future.” (pg. 6220) 
I have already suggested that these results are consistent with the conscious preparation of our 
actions. However, this quote makes clear another way our actions could be unconsciously 
                                                          
35Other important functional roles for the frontopolar cortex includes integrating together the results of disparate 
cognitive mechanisms (for example, see Ramnani, & Owen, 2004) and the resolution of cognitive uncertainty and 
conflict (for example, see Badre & Wagner, 2004; Koechlin, Corrado, Pietrini, & Grafman, 2000; Yoshida & Ishii, 
2006). Other important functional roles for the medial prefrontal cortex includes, error detection and conflict 
monitoring (for example, see Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Holroyd, Coles, & Nieuwenhuis, 2002), as well as 
incentivise-based learning (for example, see Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011). There are 
still more examples that might be listed. 
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caused. While there are some FCMs, those FCMs do not contribute to the action. Nor do any 
other FCMs contribute to the action. Instead, the action is completely determined by the 
predictive neural activity. Or, if the action is not completely determined by the predictive neural 
activity, what determines the action is not an FCM but further unconscious neural activity. As I 
said earlier, there is no reason to think additional preparatory neural activity must only represent 
unconscious preparatory neural activity. But, insofar as our future action can be predicted from 
patterns of neural activity in prefrontal brain regions, it’s highly unlikely that this prediction is 
being performed by decoding a completely determined action. I will come to this point shortly. 
Moreover, the success of our predictive capabilities does not require there be a completely 
determined action encoded at the onset of predictive neural activity. 
First, predictive success in these studies does not require a completely determinable 
action be encoded from the onset. Nor does it require the action that will be performed be 
encoded at all. When participants are asked to generate a ‘random’ sequence of binary responses, 
as they were in these studies (i.e., perform an action-or-not, left-or-right hand button press, 
addition-or-subtraction) they switch between responses with probability of 0.6 (for example, see 
Lopes, 1982; Treisman & Faulkner, 1987; Falk & Konold, 1997). The fact that people’s 
behaviour is not random, but instead can be modelled using a switching-rule, means it’s not only 
possible to predict, above chance, people’s actions using the neuroimaging data in these studies, 
but using the behavioural data as well (Lages, Boyle, & Jaworska, 2013). This means it’s plausible 
that what is being decoded from this earliest predictive neural activity is some abstracted task-
rule, or CAP. This would not only explain the predictive nature of this neural activity, but also its 
substantive failure rate. After all, even if a CAP is causing actions, there are a number of different 
ways different CAPs might do this. 
Second, the most prominent neurobiological model for voluntary action ascribes 
different functional significance for action depending on its location along an anterior-posterior 
gradient, that runs from the prefrontal cortex toward the supplementary motor area (for 
example, see Jahanshahi, 1998; Brass & Haggard; 2008; Zapparoli, Seghezzi, & Paulesu, 2017). 
Neural activity in anterior regions represents actions in only their most abstracted form, such as 
in the form of some overall goal or intention. As neural activity progresses posteriorly over time 
toward motor regions, it is completed in detail. For example, Brass and Haggard (2008) describe 
the function of the anterior-posterior gradient in terms of the what, when, and whether, of 
voluntary action. On this account, anterior neural activity is associated with whether to perform 
an action or not, and posterior neural activity is associated with when to perform the action. In-
between the two ends of the gradient what action to perform is represented in varying levels of 
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detail. For my purposes, all that is required to note is that our actions are not completely 
determined by predictive neural activity, but instead, appear to be caused iteratively. This leaves 
plenty of room for FCMs to contribute to and determine what action is caused. (Or whether, for 
that matter, an action is caused at all). 
It should be obvious at this stage that the [Empirical premise] of the broad challenge is 
mistaken. There is nothing in the current empirical literature that must be interpreted as 
undermining the existence of some free actions of the kind posited by direct compatibilism. On 
the other hand, the proposals outlined according to which even these simple tasks might be 
directly produced by FCMs seem implausible. There is no reason to suspect that FCMs would 
ever be engaged in the kinds of experimental tasks these participants performed. That’s because 
they are deliberately impoverished of the kinds of things people think matter for free action. For 
example, there is no need to deliberate, there are no incentives for performance, and there is no 
reason to shift performance once it has begun. However, just because these kinds of tasks do not 
rely on FCMs does not mean FCMs don’t play a role when in fact they might be required. I have 
noted throughout this section that I think performance in these experiments reflects the creation 
(influencing) of an action procedure. And it’s still an open question whether the creation 
(influencing) of action procedures is subject to the same interpretation as actions caused by 
CAPs. No matter which path you choose, we are left in the position of concluding that the 
[Empirical premise] of the broad challenge is false. It’s very likely FCMs do create (influence) 
action procedures and so it’s very likely FCMs do on occasion cause actions. 
3.5.3. Conclusion: Reinterpreting the role of the prefrontal cortex 
In this section, I discussed two interpretations of researchers’ claims that participants are 
unconscious of their task-relevant preparatory neural activity. First is the claim that predictive 
neural activity observed in the prefrontal cortex in these tasks only realises unconscious 
preparatory neural activity. Second is the claim that predictive neural activity in the prefrontal 
cortex, even if it realises our sense of deliberative agency, might be causally inefficacious with 
respect to the action that we perform. In response, I have provided evidence that neural activity 
in the frontopolar and medial prefrontal cortex is a candidate realiser of some FCMs including: 
future planning, complex reasoning, and sensitivity to risk and reward. Moreover, I have argued 
that actions are not completely determined by predictive neural activity in prefrontal brain 
regions but are completed as they project back to motor regions for execution. This leaves plenty 
of room for FCMs to shape and cause our actions. It should be clear at this stage that the 
[Empirical premise] of the broad challenge from the brain sciences for free will is not true. With 
that said, I think these researchers are correct that participants are unconscious of the vast 
79 
majority of task-relevant neural activity in these experiments. The best way to make sense of this 
claim is by appealing to CAPs. Once a participant has created (influence) an action procedure to 
automate performance there is no need to think about the experiment anymore! In doing so they 
free themselves up to bring to mind, ruminate on, and plan something else. 
 
3.6. The narrow challenge 
So far, I have shown there is no reason to think, based on current empirical results, that FCMs 
never cause actions. However, as I have stressed, although these results might fail to generalize, 
they still might describe most instances of action production (i.e., the actions caused by our 
CAPs). They only fail to represent select instances of action production where FCMs could 
matter, (i.e., a few of our actions and the creation (influencing) of the action procedure to cause 
our actions). With this in mind, here is the narrow challenge: 
 Narrow Challenge 
1) [Direct compatibilism] An action is free only if it is directly caused by an FCM. 
2) [Empirical premise] Evidence from the brain sciences show that FCMs cause very few 
actions. 
3) [Conclusion] Therefore, there are very few free actions (from 1 and 2). 
The argument is valid. The difference between the broad and narrow challenges of the brain 
sciences is the strength of Premise (2). While Premise (2) of the broad challenge claimed that 
current empirical results show that FCMs cause no actions, in the narrow challenge it claims they 
cause very few actions. So it is compatible with the success of the Narrow Challenge that at least 
a few of our actions are free. Nevertheless, as I will now argue, this is cold comfort to the 
compatibilist. 
3.6.1. The discrepancy puzzle 
Prima facie if the narrow challenge is the strongest challenge the brain sciences offers to free 
action, then the result is good for the direct compatibilist. Further, it might be difficult to see 
why we should continue to see the narrow challenge as problematic at all. The reason we should 
is because there is something problematic about the thought that the number of free actions 
countenanced by the brain sciences is far fewer than the number free actions that we judge there 
to be in the world. This is what I have called the Discrepancy Puzzle: 
 Discrepancy Puzzle 
1) [From conclusion of narrow challenge] According to the brain sciences there are very 
few free actions. 
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2) [A priori premise] We only have free will if most of our actions which seem to us to be 
free are free. 
3) [Plausible empirical premise] There are very many actions which seem to us to be free. 
4) [Lemma] There are very many actions which seem to be free, but are not (from 1 and 3). 
5) [Conclusion] Therefore, we do not have free will (from 2 and 4). 
Once again, the argument is valid. The first premise of Discrepancy Puzzle is just the conclusion 
of Narrow Challenge. Since (4) follows from (1) and (3), and (5) follows from (4) and (2), I only 
need to defend (2) and (3). I’ll start by defending (3). Of course, this is an empirical premise. In 
the end, a full defence of the premise would require a good deal of experimental work. Still, I 
think the premise is plausible. Reflection on my own intuitions, and those of others, suggests to 
me that people do not just have a sense of agency when their FCMs are causing actions. Instead, 
our sense of agency is the default, and in the absence of any defeaters to our free will, we believe 
we are acting freely. (Where standard defeaters to free action include instances of physical 
restraint, psychological coercion and manipulation, and being the victim of a nefarious 
neurosurgeon who feels the need to tamper with your brain). Here’s the idea. I might deliberate 
in the morning over where to purchase my coffee in the morning prior to meeting with my PhD 
supervisor. However, I don’t just feel free during my time spent deliberating. Instead, I felt free 
as I opened the door, stepped outside, closed and locked the door behind me, walked up the 
road, petted a cat on the side of the road that I have affectionately named McSnoots, and so on. 
Without evidence to the contrary, I just have the sense I am free. I think most of us are like this, 
and hence, I think that we suppose a wide variety of our actions to be free. 
 Moreover, this supposition would explain why Libet and other brain scientists have 
thought that the actions they have investigated would be considered free according to the folk 
concept of free action. If acting freely is as prevalent as it seems, then starting scientific 
investigations with the simplest actions that would be judged free makes good sense for the 
purposes of experimental control. To be clear, just how prevalent our feeling of being free is, and 
whether or not it’s more prevalent than the number of free actions countenanced by the brain 
sciences is a matter for future empirical research. For now, I hope to have said enough to 
motivate it as a plausible hypothesis, and apt target of future research.  
Now let’s consider (2). Recall that on my view, free will refers to the general capacity of 
an agent to reliably act freely. I think it plausible that our sense of agency is a reliable guide to 
when we act freely. If most of the time we spend feeling as though we have free will is mistaken, 
then we are not reliably acting freely, and hence do not have free will. This is true even if there 
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are select few instances when our FCMs do cause actions. These actions will be free, but because 
we don’t reliably act freely there is no free will itself. 
In conclusion then, I think both (2) and (3) are plausible, and hence that if the Narrow 
Challenge succeeds then we lack free will, even if we perform some free actions. If that is right, 
then the Narrow Challenge is a significant problem for the direct compatibilist. In what follows I 
will say something about how I think we ought to respond to the discrepancy problem.  
3.6.2. Determining what free will is 
In order to respond to the discrepancy problem, we need an explanation of why the number of 
free actions that are vindicated by the brain sciences, appears to be smaller than the number of 
actions we judge to be free in the world. Once we have explained this, we will see that in fact, in 
the extended indirect sense that I will defend, that the number of actions that we judge to be free 
is in fact far closer to the number of actions that are in fact free than first appeared. That is 
because the free actions vindicated by the brain sciences may pass their vindication indirectly 
onto many other actions. 
There are two ways we can think about how the folk concept of free action determines 
what free action is. The first way, which I will call theory-centred approach, says free action 
just is whatever is described by our folk theory. I exemplified this approach in Chapter 2 of the 
thesis. One important reason to perform experimental philosophy investigations is to collect folk 
judgments in order to reverse engineer the theory they are responding from. It was on the basis 
of this rationale that I was able to establish that the folk theory of free will is a compatibilist one. 
While the theory-centred approach tells us that the folk reliably respond according to their 
theory, there is an open empirical question whether or not there are any free actions in the world. 
After all, even if the folk judge certain FCMs are necessary for free action, it’s a matter of 
empirical discovery whether or not we are in possession of such mechanisms and whether or not 
such mechanisms cause actions.36  
The second way, which I will call the case-based approach, says that free action just is, 
roughly, whatever it is that’s in common between all the cases where the folk judge free action is 
instantiated. Provided there is something that is in common between the cases, the case-based 
approach virtually guarantees there is free action in the world. Empirically, what’s up for grabs is 
the exact nature of free action. In this part of the thesis I will be adopting the case-based 
approach in order to answer the discrepancy puzzle, and develop my new account of free action, 
                                                          
36The theory-centred approach is helpful even if what you are doing is conceptual engineering as it predicts whether 
the folk with accept the results of said engineering. 
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indirect compatibilism. Further, as my empirical focus is on the brain sciences, the nature of free 
will is described in terms of cognitive and neural systems.  
Of course it’s possible that the theory-based and case-based approaches not only provide 
different, but incompatible, analyses of free action. For example, the theory-centred approach 
might tell us that a free action is an action caused by our FCMs, and we might empirically 
discover we do not possess these mechanisms. However, the case-based approach could still 
identify some commonality between all the cases the folk judge to be free. If this turns out to be 
the case, then two moves are available. If we think the free action analysis provided by the 
theory-centred approach is the correct one, then we might be moved to become free action (and 
by extension free will) eliminativists. After all, our theory told us what the viable candidates were 
for free action, and we discovered there were no such candidates in the world. Conversely, if we 
think the free action analysis provided by the case-based approach is correct, then we might be 
moved to radically revise our concept of free action in line with whatever we discover is in 
common between all the actions in the world we judge to free. I find neither move particularly 
appealing.  
3.6.2.1. The combined theory-centred and case-based approach to determining what free will is. Instead, I 
advocate an alternative approach – we combine the theory-centred approach and case-based 
approach. According to the combined approach, there is free action just in case the following 
two conditions are both satisfied: 
a) [Case-based approach] There is some phenomenon in common between all the cases the 
folk judge to be free. 
b) [Theory-centred approach] The phenomenon uncovered in (a) satisfies the conditions 
discovered by experimental philosophy, or else, is something the folk would make 
principled revisions towards in order to make sure certain cases continue to remain 
correctly judged as free. 
On the combined approach analyses offered up by either the case-based approach, or the theory-
centred approach describe the necessary, but not sufficient conditions, for free action. They are 
only sufficient for free action when jointly satisfied. Each approach has a unique role to play in 
uncovering what satisfies our concept of free action. The role of the case-based approach is to 
identify whether or not there are any candidate phenomena to be free actions in the world. And 
the role of the theory-based approach is to examine whether or not the candidates identified by 
the case-based approach are good enough deservers to count as being free actions. What I have 
identified as being in common between all the cases we judge to be free are FCMs. 
Unfortunately, I have not yet tested whether FCMs are freedom-conferring when they cause an 
83 
action indirectly. Indirect compatibilism, as its name would suggest, requires this to be true of 
our free action theory. Prima facie, as indirect compatibilism is a close relative to direct 
compatibilism, we have some reason to think that indirect compatibilism should also deserve to 
satisfy our concept of free action. But I do not have the exact answer at this time. I will have 
much more to say about meta-level issues, such as the status of indirect compatibilism as a 
theory, the relationship between our theories and judgments about cases of free will and so on, 
in Chapter 5. Once I have finished presenting my account indirect compatibilism. 
3.6.3. Conclusion: The Narrow Challenge of the Brain Sciences for Free Will 
In summary, even if the broad challenge of the brain sciences for free will fails, there is a nearby 
successor in the form of the narrow challenge of the brain sciences. Unlike the broad challenge, 
the narrow challenge is consistent with FCMs sometimes causing actions. While this might 
appear good for the direct compatibilist, it’s a hollow victory. Even if FCMs do sometimes cause 
our actions, the number of the instances in which they do so is very likely far fewer than the 
number of instances where we judge ourselves to have acted freely. This difference in the 
number of cases in the world that are free, and the number of cases in the world we judge to be 
free, is what I call the discrepancy problem. If the vast majority of cases we judge are ones in 
which the action was free, are cases in which the action was not free at all, then, I argued, we do 
not have free will.  
In order to determine what free action is, I advocate an investigative approach that 
combines both case-based and theory-centred approaches. First, we identify what’s in common 
between all the instances in the world that we judge to be free. Second, we submit the 
phenomena in common between the cases to the folk in order to see whether or not they are 
important for our free action, or whether the folk could come to accept that the phenomena are 
sufficient to ground there being free action, in order to secure certain cases in the world as being 
free. My own account of free action, indirect compatibilism, requires that the folk judge 
instances where our FCMs indirectly cause our actions count as free. While I have not performed 
this research yet, in the next chapter I will give some reasons to think this is true. 
 
3.7. Conclusion: The challenge of the brain sciences 
Let’s conclude. The brain sciences have offered up the challenge that our sense of agency for our 
actions is an illusory phenomenon. What actually determines our actions is unconscious neural 
activity, which occurs well before, and apart, in the brain, from the neural activity that realises 
our sense of agency. In this chapter I have shown that while all this might be true for actions 
caused in service of our CAPs, there is no reason to suspect that it generalizes to the creation 
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(influencing) of those action procedures as well. This response makes use of a common response 
in the literature, namely that the instances of free action being studied are special in some way, 
but does so with a twist. I don’t think these instances of free action being targeted by these 
studies are rare. In fact, I think they might reflect the majority of our free actions. If evidence of 
our free will is restricted to just a few actions and the creation (influencing) of our action 
procedures, then there is a natural tension with the prevalence of our sense of being free. While 
it’s an empirical question how big a tension this is, it’s plausible to think that our free action 
judgments were never just for a few special actions, such as the creation (influencing) of our 
action procedures, but always included the actions caused by those CAPs as well. From now on 
we will begin to roll out the machinery for indirect compatibilism, and in doing so begin to make 
sense of a different kind of freedom, indirect freedom.  
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Chapter 4  
Indirect freedom 
 
So far I have established that there is no reason, arising from the brain sciences, to think that our 
freedom-conferring mechanisms (henceforth FCMs) cause none of our actions. Unfortunately, it 
remains very plausible that FCMs cause very few our actions. If only a few actions get to count 
as free, then there will likely be a large discrepancy between the number of instances in the world 
we judge to be free, and the number of instances in the world where we are in fact free. I have 
called this the discrepancy problem (see §3.6.). Given this problem, if direct (conscious control) 
compatibilism is true of our concept of free action then, quite likely, it will turn out we don’t 
have free will. As I noted earlier (see §3.6.), that’s because it is plausible that we only have free 
will if enough of the cases we judge to be instances of free action are in fact free. If our sense of 
being free is as common as it seems to us to be, then according to direct compatibilism our sense 
of being free would be mistaken more often than not. In fact, the majority of the instances in the 
world we judge ourselves to have acted freely would instead be instances where our freedom was 
not exercised at all.  
My proposed solution to the discrepancy puzzle takes the form of a new account of free 
action: indirect (conscious control) compatibilism. Recall that according to indirect 
compatibilism, we are not, as direct compatibilism tells us, only free when we perform an action 
that was directly caused by FCMs. We are also free when we perform an action that was 
indirectly influenced by FCMs. Put another way, an action can be free provided it can be traced 
back to an earlier instance of direct freedom. Unoriginally, I will call this latter kind of freedom, 
indirect freedom. While I will provide a precise definition of indirect freedom very shortly, here 
is a rough characterization to carry you over for now. An action is indirectly free if it’s caused by 
an action procedure that was either created by the agent, could be destroyed by the agent, can be 
triggered on by the agent, can be monitored and turned off by the agent, or can be updated by 
the agent. Remember that an action procedure is a sub-personal level mechanism that causes 
actions, or influences other action procedures, both in a contained and reliable fashion. 
A major upshot of my account is that when we report a sense of agency, even for an 
action as simple as a wrist flex, a left-or-right button press, or even basic addition-or-subtraction, 
and so on, we are correctly reporting an action performed with agency (as long as (as is typically 
the case) the action is the product of an action procedure which is influenced by an FCM). More 
than that, though, we are correct in thinking we perform such an action freely.  
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Here, then, is the plan for this chapter, divided into four sections. Firstly, in §4.1, I will 
provide a definition of indirect freedom, and describe in detail the conditions for an action to be 
indirectly free. Put loosely for the moment, an action is indirectly free provided it’s caused by a 
controlled action procedure. A controlled action procedure (henceforth CAP) is an action 
procedure that was influenced by a FCM. For example, the act of flexing one’s wrist during a 
Libet-style paradigm is indirectly free, if the action procedure which caused the wrist flex was 
created (influenced) by the agent. Then, in §4.2, I will continue addressing some evidence from 
the brain sciences that prima facie appears inconsistent with our having indirect freedom. 
Specifically, I will address in detail the contribution of various parietal regions, which I set aside 
in §3.5. After establishing that indirect freedom is not straightforwardly ruled out by current 
empirical evidence in the brain sciences, I will argue, in §4.3, that my new account of free action, 
indirect compatibilism is a better account of our concept of free action than is direct 
compatibilism. Finally, in §4.4, I will conclude.  
 
4.1. Defining indirect freedom 
Let’s begin with my definition of indirect freedom. An action A is indirectly free, if and only if all 
of the following conditions are met: 
1) [Controlled action procedure] A is caused by a CAP. 
2) [No defeaters] There exist no defeaters to our free action.  
Before continuing, let’s also define what I mean by CAP in (1). I will define this in terms of five 
conditions I will call direct control conditions. It is sufficient for an action procedure to be a 
CAP if at least one of these conditions is met. It is also necessary for an action procedure to be a 
CAP that at least one of them is met. It’s thus both necessary and sufficient that at least one of 
the direct control conditions is met for an action procedure to be a CAP, though of course more 
of the conditions might be met. 
The direct control conditions are: 
2a) [Creation] The action procedure was created by a directly free act of the agent. 
2b) [Destruction] The action procedure could be destroyed by a directly free act of the agent. 
2c) [Triggering] The action procedure was triggered on by a directly free act of the agent. 
2d) [Monitoring] The action procedure is monitored by an FCM and could be turned off by a 
directly free act of the agent so chooses. 
2e) [Update] The action procedure was updated by a directly free act of the agent. 
I have called these conditions direct control conditions because they describe the various ways 
an agent can directly influence the function of an action procedure with an FCM, and so bring it 
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about that they cause indirectly free actions. In what follows I will unpack each of these direct 
control conditions and the definition of indirect freedom in much more detail.  
4.1.1. Unpacking the definition of indirect freedom  
The easiest way to unpack the definition of indirect freedom is by using an example. For ease 
and consistency, I will continue to use the example of participants’ performance during Libet-
style paradigms. However, it’s important to realize that my definition of indirect freedom extends 
beyond the experimental context.  
When someone successfully performs in a Libet-style paradigm, they repeatedly perform 
some simple action, or basic cognitive operation such as simple arithmetic, for an extended 
period of time. In Chapter 3, I established that while participants might consciously select 
amongst, cause, and guide, their actions over the course of the experiment, this is incredibly 
unlikely. Not only do the instructions in these experiments explicitly ask participants not to 
perform in this manner, participants’ self-reports suggest they are complying with the 
instructions as best they can. Instead, participants might be performing Libet-style paradigms 
with a CAP: an action procedure created (influenced) by an FCM to unconsciously cause actions.   
In the case of a Libet-style paradigm, participants might adopt a CAP in order to 
successfully perform the experiment with minimal cognitive effort. The created (influenced) 
action procedure would be a simple sub-personal level mechanism that would cause a simple 
wrist flex, a left-or-right button press, perform simple addition and subtraction, and so on, 
whenever the onset of an experimental trial was cued. Even if participants are unconscious of 
the process by which their actions are caused, simple actions such as flexing one’s wrist can be 
indirectly free, provided they are caused by a CAP. Of course, for indirect freedom it’s not 
enough for an action to be caused by any sub-personal level mechanism, the action procedure 
must have been influenced by an FCM. I have collectively called the different ways agents can 
influence their action procedures with an FCM: direct control conditions. With this example in 
hand, let’s begin working through the different direct control conditions and my definition of 
indirect freedom. An action is indirectly free, if and only if: 
4.1.1.1. [Controlled action procedure]: A is caused by a CAP. Previously, I spelt out what it takes for an 
action procedure to be a CAP in terms of the following direct control conditions: [Creation], 
[Destruction], [Triggering], [Monitoring], and [Update], each of which I unpack shortly. 
However, before continuing I want to flag a few things. I will call the cases where all 5 direct 
control conditions are met paradigmatic controlled action procedures. Further, I will call 
cases where the subsets of direct control conditions are met non-paradigmatic controlled 
action procedures. This distinction will become important in Chapter 5 when discussing certain 
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non-paradigmatic controlled action procedures that might motivate arguments against indirect 
compatibilism, but much more on that later. For now, let’s get clear on each of the different 
direct control conditions: [Creation], [Destruction], [Triggering], [Monitoring], and [Update]. An 
action procedure is a CAP, if:   
4.1.1.2. [Creation]: The action procedure was created by a directly free act of the agent. Once again, let’s 
return to the example of participants’ performance during a Libet-style paradigm. There, a 
participant repeatedly performs a simple action (e.g., wrist-flex, left-or-right button press, simple 
addition or subtraction, and so on) in a timely manner, following some task cue, for the duration 
of the experiment. It’s plausible to think that the simple action in question is being caused by a 
CAP, because the action procedure was one that was created by the participant. Upon being told 
the instructions for the Libet-style paradigm, the participant created, and implemented, an action 
procedure to unconsciously cause actions required by the task. That CAP makes it so that when 
a task cue is presented, the necessary actions are unconsciously caused in a timely manner. The 
actions caused by the CAP are indirectly free precisely because that action procedure that caused 
them was itself caused by a directly free action. 
4.1.1.3. [Destruction] The action procedure could be destroyed by a directly free act of the agent. As well as 
creating action procedures, we should also expect that agents will be able to destroy their action 
procedures, should they freely want to do so. Destroying an action procedure, then, reflects an 
agent’s capacity to erase an action procedure they possess. Having such a capacity would be 
valuable for whenever an action procedure is no longer required, or has become detrimental to 
the agent because of changes in the environment. For example, it’s easy to imagine ourselves 
creating, and implementing, an action procedure that automatically causes a simple action that is 
consistently rewarded whenever it is cued in the environment. But imagine the environment 
changes so that the unconsciously caused action, which was consistently rewarded, is now 
consistently punished. It’s now easy to imagine ourselves being motivated to destroy that CAP as 
soon as possible!  
But how exactly do you destroy an action procedure? Unfortunately, this is not a matter I 
can settle in this thesis. Still, I think we must possess some mechanism that can allow us to 
destroy an action procedure in some way or another. While speculation about the nature of the 
mechanism or mechanisms that allow us to destroy action procedures is interesting (assuming 
they exist), I think my view is much more interesting if I am able to suggest some plausible 
mechanisms that might actually do this kind of work. As a result, before continuing on with my 
explication of indirect freedom, I will briefly suggest two mechanisms that might underpin our 
capacity to destroy action procedures, one direct, and one indirect.  
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4.1.1.3.1. Destroying action procedures directly. Let’s start with a direct mechanism. It’s possible 
we can destroy an action procedure simply by intentionally forgetting it. Such a capacity might 
reflect the same mechanism, or kind of mechanism, that has been implicated in cases of 
intentionally forgetting memories. There is suggestive, and accumulating, evidence that we have 
the capacity to intentionally forget learned word-pair associations (for example, see, Anderson, & 
Green, 2001; Fischer, Diekelmann, & Born, 2011; for review, see, Anderson, & Huddleston, 
2012), and perhaps more impressively, certain autobiographical memories as well (Noreen, & 
MacLeod, 2013; Ryckman, Addis, Latham, & Lambert; 2018; Ryckman, Addis, Latham, & 
Lambert, manuscript). While the capacity to intentionally forget memories is undoubtedly 
controversial, much of this controversy is over the capacity to intentionally forget particularly 
traumatic or highly valenced memories.37 It’s perhaps less controversial to think some prosaic 
process might exist that allows for the targeted forgetting of certain memories, such as word-pair 
associations in laboratory tasks, and perhaps similarly, certain action procedures as well. 
However, just as some memories might be impervious to intentional forgetting, some action 
procedures might be too. In Chapter 5, I will explore non-paradigmatic controlled action 
procedures where destruction of the action procedure is not possible. 
4.1.1.3.2. Destroying action procedures indirectly. It’s possible that we don’t, strictly speaking, 
destroy action procedures, rather we ‘effectively’ destroy them by modifying them in various 
ways. Although ‘destruction’ here is not being used in the same sense as with intentional 
forgetting, this fact shouldn’t bother us, as terminating performance of the targeted action 
procedure is the goal in both cases. To illustrate, consider once again a simple action procedure 
created and implemented to perform a Libet-style paradigm. The CAP causes a simple action, or 
performs a simple cognitive operation, some small time after the presentation of a task cue. 
Instead of intentionally forgetting the action procedure, we might destroy the action procedure 
by altering it in ways that prevent it from performing. For example, we might remove the cue 
component so the action procedure no longer causes an action, or we might remove the 
response component, so the action procedure no longer has an action to cause. Alternatively, we 
might set a long time-delay between the cue and action production, such that there would be no 
reasonable expectation an action would be caused even when the action procedure is 
implemented. I will have a few more things to say about altering action procedures when I come 
to describe the direct control condition [Update] for [Controlled action procedure].  
                                                          
37For example, see Bulevich, Roediger, Balota, and Butler, (2006), Erdelyi (2006), Hayne, Garry, and Loftus (2006), 
and Kihlstrom (2002). 
90 
Now that I have finished describing two kinds of mechanisms that might underpin our 
capacity to destroy action procedures it’s time to return to unpacking the direct control 
conditions for [Controlled action procedure] by looking at the next condition - [Triggering]. 
4.1.1.4. [Triggering]: The action procedure was triggered on by a directly free act of the agent. While perhaps 
not immediately apparent, I already touched on the direct control condition [Triggering] in my 
discussion of the condition [Creation]. When an agent is faced with an environment where they 
are able to automate some, or all, of their actions, they may create an action procedure to 
automate and control their actions. However, merely creating an action procedure is not enough. 
In addition to creating an action procedure, the agent must press also the action procedure into 
service. This further step is what the condition [Triggering] refers to - pressing an action 
procedure into service.  
To illustrate, consider a participant who had previously created and implemented an 
action procedure capable of automating actions during a Libet-style paradigm. Now imagine they 
are bought back into the laboratory at a later date to perform the exact same experimental task. 
So long as the original action procedure has not been destroyed, they already possess a CAP 
capable of automating their performance the second-time through the task. As a result, the agent 
doesn’t have to create another action procedure; instead they can simply choose to trigger the 
original action procedure on once again to automate and control their task-relevant actions. The 
actions caused by the CAP are indirectly free because the action procedure that caused them was 
triggered on to perform by a directly free act.38 
4.1.1.5. [Monitoring]: The action procedure is monitored by the FCM and could be turned off by a directly free 
act of the agent so chooses. When an agent is faced with an environment where they are able to 
automate some, or all, of their actions, they might create and trigger on an action procedure. 
However, sometimes we can find ourselves performing the wrong kinds of actions, or simply 
wanting to change the kinds of actions we perform and so want to turn off the current action 
procedure. This latter step is what the condition [Monitoring] refers to – the turning off an 
action procedure if we so choose. 
To illustrate, consider a participant who during a Libet-style paradigm develops an itch. 
Imagine possessing an action procedure that functions by relieving itches as they occur on your 
body. Now let’s imagine you develop an itch and the action procedure automatically causes a 
scratching action to occur at the site of the itch. It’s not hard to imagine that we possess such an 
                                                          
38Strictly speaking the action caused in this example was also indirectly free because it was caused by an action 
procedure freely created by the agent. In Chapter 5 I will discuss cases where the conditions [Creation], 
[Destruction], [Monitoring], and [Update] are restricted or absent. There, it will become apparent that [Triggering] 
alone is sufficient for an act to count as indirectly free. 
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action procedure, nor is it hard to imagine that we possess such an action procedure despite 
never actually creating it ourselves. Perhaps some of us did in the past create, trigger on, or 
update an action procedure for scratching, through a directly free action, but let’s imagine you 
didn’t do any of these. Perhaps you might be able to destroy the action procedure, but again let’s 
imagine you can’t and that the scratching action procedure is effectively hardwired into us.  
 Despite all this, when you performed the action of scratching yourself you acted freely; 
after all it still seems that had you wanted to, you could have intervened and prevented yourself 
from scratching at the site of the itch by turning off the scratching action procedure. When an 
agent is faced with an environment where some, or all, of their actions are being caused by an 
action procedure, they may monitor their action procedures and, if they so choose, intercede to 
turn off action procedures that are producing the wrong actions, or, if they want, to perform 
actions of a different kind than what they are currently performing. Having now described 
[Monitoring], I can move onto [Update], the final direct control condition for [Controlled action 
procedure]. 
4.1.1.6. [Update]: The action procedure was updated by a directly free act of the agent. I touched on the 
direct control condition [Update] while previously discussing the condition [Destruction]. There, 
I suggested that one way an agent might destroy an action procedure they possess is by altering it 
so it no longer performs. However, just as an agent should be able to update an action procedure 
to prevent its performance so too should they be able to update an action procedure to change 
or improve its performance.  
To further illustrate the direct control condition [Update], once again imagine a 
participant who possesses a CAP capable of performing in a Libet-style paradigm. Now imagine 
the participant is bought back to the laboratory to perform a slightly modified version of the 
task. While they are still required to perform some action, sometime after a cue is presented their 
body is now hooked up to an accelerometer. Each time they perform an action, feedback is 
presented about the speed of their action. The feedback indicates whether or not the action was 
performed at the correct speed, and when it indicates the action was performed at the incorrect 
speed, whether they should speed-up or slow-down their action. Instead of creating a new action 
procedure, the participant in this example might simply trigger on the original action procedure 
and update it, so the caused action comes to be performed at the required speed. Of course, the 
process of updating an action procedure might go through numerous iterations as the agent 
adjusts their action speed, and then looks to the feedback in order to see whether their update 
was successful. Still, once the correct speed has been identified, the updated action procedure 
will be able to automate performance in the exact same manner as the original action procedure. 
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The action caused by the updated portion of the action procedure is indirectly free because the 
updates to the action procedure were brought about by directly free actions.39 With my 
description of the direct control condition [Update] complete, I have now finished describing the 
direct control conditions for [Controlled action procedure]. This leaves just the final condition 
for indirect freedom to describe: [Defeater]. 
4.1.1.7. [Defeater] There exist no defeaters to our free action. While there are numerous positive 
conditions for free action, there are also numerous negative conditions that, for the most part, 
we agree count against us acting freely. For example, most people think agents subject to 
physical restraint cannot act freely. On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction, some 
people will think that agents who lack autonomy cannot act freely either. Whatever conditions 
stand as defeaters to acting freely will also stand as defeaters to acting indirectly freely. 
4.1.2. Conclusion: Defining indirect freedom. 
In summary, an action is indirectly free, if and only if, (1) it is caused by a CAP, and (2) there 
exist no defeaters to our free action. In order for an action procedure to be a CAP, 1 of 5 direct 
control conditions must be satisfied. Direct control conditions describe the various ways an 
agent can directly influence the function of an action procedure with an FCM, and so bring it 
about that they cause indirectly free actions. Either (a) the action procedure is one that was 
created by a directly free act of the agent or (b) the action procedure could be destroyed by a 
directly free act of the agent or, (c) the action procedure is triggered on to perform by directly 
free act of the agent or (d) the action procedure is monitored and could be turned off by a 
directly free act of the agent, if they so choose or, (e) the action procedure has been updated by 
directly free act of the agent. I have called cases in the world where all 5 direct control conditions 
are met – paradigmatic controlled action procedures. 
According to indirect compatibilism, an agent not only acts freely in a few special cases 
(such as creating, destroying, triggering, monitoring, and updating action procedures), they also 
act freely when they perform an action caused by a CAP. For this reason, indirect compatibilism 
judges many more actions to be free than direct compatibilism. I think this result is correct, 
because it’s faithful to our sense that when we act, we do so freely more often than not. With my 
explication of indirect freedom now complete, I will now (§4.2) make a detour back through 
brain sciences and describe some evidence that is prima facie inconsistent with us having indirect 
freedom. Primarily my focus will be on describing the contribution of neural activity observed in 
                                                          
39Strictly speaking the action caused in this example was also indirectly free because it was caused by an action 
procedure freely triggered by the agent. In Chapter 5 I will discuss cases where the condition [Creation], 
[Destruction], [Triggering], [Monitoring] are restricted or absent. There it will become apparent that [Update] alone 
is sufficient for an act to count as indirectly free. 
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parietal regions to Libet-style paradigms, findings I set aside in Chapter 3. In §4.3, I will argue 
that indirect compatibilism is a better account of our concept of free action than is direct 
compatibilism. 
 
4.2. The challenge of the brain sciences: Parietal redux 
To this point I have done two things. I’ve proposed a definition of indirect freedom, and 
described each of its conditions in detail. Before I can link indirect freedom (and indirect 
compatibilism for that matter) to the brain sciences, I need to take a step back and finish 
discussing some neuroscientific findings set aside in Chapter 3. These are findings which appear 
to show that neural activity for an action occurs well before the neural activity for FCMs. If this 
is true, then FCMs cannot have been what caused the action in the first place, and, as a result, 
the action is not free. Remember that FCMs are those conscious psychological processes (along 
with their neural correlates) that cause free actions, and hence are crucial for indirect freedom as 
well. In this section I will discuss these findings and offer up an alternative explanation for these 
results that is consistent with indirect freedom. 
The findings I will be discussing concern the role of neural activity in parietal brain 
regions, specifically the precuneus and posterior cingulate, in the performance of Libet-style 
paradigms. Soon and colleagues (2008; 2013) suggest that activity in the precuneus could reflect 
the unconscious storage of a chosen action for future performance. Meanwhile, the posterior 
cingulate in conjunction with the other predictive regions might reflect activation of the brain’s 
resting network, and provide a further reason to believe participants are unconscious of their 
task-relevant neural activity. After describing each of these suggestions, I will propose an 
alternative explanation of the data that is consistent with participants deploying FCMs, just as I 
did with prefrontal neural activity in Chapter 3. Not only is it plausible that action procedures 
might be triggered on by FCMs; parietal activity, inter alia, might also contribute to creating 
action procedures (and select actions), monitoring, and updating them as well. 
4.2.1. Parietal neural activity and free action 
The empirical data that I will be reinterpreting in this section once again comes from Libet-style 
experiments, so it will be helpful, before starting, to briefly describe the methodology and their 
major findings again. In perhaps the simplest Libet-style paradigm performed with concurrent 
fMRI, participants pressed a button with either their left or right hand whenever they first felt 
the urge to do so (Soon et al., 2008; though see also Bode et al., 2011; Soon et al., 2013). At the 
same time, participants fixated on a stream of letters presented in the centre of a screen. Once 
the participant had pressed either button, they selected the letter that was present on the screen 
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when they first felt the urge to press the button. Researchers found patterns of neural activity in 
certain brain regions predicted, above chance, the actions participants would perform. This 
predictive neural activity began up to 10 seconds before participants first reported their sense of 
agency for the action they performed. As a result, the researchers concluded that FCMs could 
not be causing our actions, as the onset of neural activity for the action occurred well before any 
reported sense of agency for that action. The brain regions identified as being the earliest 
predictors of actions were prefrontal brain regions of the frontopolar cortex and medial 
prefrontal cortex, and parietal brain regions of the precuneus and posterior cingulate. Here our 
focus will be on the possible roles of the precuneus and posterior cingulate. 
In what follows, I will first discuss the role suggested by the experimenters. After that, I 
will then go on to describe some of the other possible roles that this neural activity might play. 
Once again, as with my previous discussion in Chapter 3, it should be noted there is no 
consensus yet regarding what common functional role parietal brain regions play in the 
performance of Libet-style tasks. 
4.2.1.1. The precuneus. Let’s start with the precuneus. Soon et al. (2008; 2013) suggest that the 
precuneus might store the unconsciously chosen action before it is triggered. In addition to their 
primary study, Soon, et al. (2008) ran a control task to distinguish the contributions of prefrontal 
neural activity and parietal neural activity. Rather than have participants perform their chosen 
action whenever they wanted, participants were asked to perform their chosen action only when 
cued by the experimenter. They found that while neural activity in the frontopolar cortex was 
predictive while selecting which action to perform, the precuneus was predictive while waiting 
for the experimenter to cue action performance. This result suggests that the precuneus is 
holding onto the chosen action prior to it being performed. Further, following from other 
literature, once performance has been cued, the greater posterior parietal cortex is capable of 
causing and guiding the action (for example, see Connolly, Anderson, & Goodale, 2003; Tosoni, 
Galati, Romani, & Corbetta, 2008; Karl, & Whishaw, 2013). 
4.2.1.2. The posterior cingulate. Now onto the posterior cingulate, Soon, et al. (2013) observed a 
significant overlap between the posterior cingulate and other predictive brain regions, and the 
brain’s ‘default mode network’. The default mode network is a task network in the brain that 
appears active whenever there is no demanding, externally directed task being performed (e.g., a 
difficult perceptual task). Colloquially, this network has been associated with ‘mind wandering’, 
and related cognitive abilities such as self-referential thought, remembering the past, simulating 
the future, and perspective taking (for example, see Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard, 
& Shulman, 2001; Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003; for review, see Snyder, & Raichle, 
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2012). Soon, et al. noted that the levels of neural activity in the default mode network in the early 
stages of an experimental trial were the same as those observed during rest-periods in other 
experimental tasks. If participants are mind wandering, then they might not be thinking about 
experimental performance. As a result, we have another reason to think that participants are not 
conscious of the predictive neural activity for task performance in Libet-style tasks. 
4.2.1.3. My initial assessment. Consistent with my discussion in Chapter 3, I think these researchers 
are generally right regarding the functional role of these brain regions in the vast majority of 
experimental trials. However, the fact that participants are unconscious of the production of 
their actions doesn’t mean they are not free. Rather, participants are unconscious of the 
production of their actions in Libet-style paradigms because they are being caused by a CAP. 
This means the actions are indirectly free and is evidence for our free will according to indirect 
compatibilism. What I am interested in here is getting clear on what this unconscious neural 
activity might reflect, and whether it’s plausible, on occasion, to think it might reflect FCMs 
causing actions. After all, for an action to be indirectly free, it’s not enough that it be caused by 
an action procedure. The action procedure must be one that was created, could be destroyed, 
triggered, monitored, or updated by the agent. 
4.2.2. Reinterpreting the role of the precuneus 
Here is my proposal of what neural activity in the precuneus might reflect in a Libet-style task. 
Neural activity here might be, on occasion, a candidate realiser of FCMs performing a role in 
causing an action, or in influencing an action procedure. For readers that are interested, §4.2.2.1 
contains some empirical evidence to support my proposal. Instead of realising the unconscious 
storage and cause of an action, neural activity in the precuneus might realise a participant holding 
some actions in mind, simulating their performance, and then choosing one of them to be caused. 
As long as you think it’s plausible that more than one action might be stored prior to 
performance, the predictive neural activity observed in these studies might simply realise the 
agent’s own preferences or biases towards a particular action for any given experimental trial. 
After all, there is nothing about this process that requires all stored actions be equally favoured 
to be chosen. Furthermore, even if this occurs unconsciously, it gives us a reason to doubt the 
earliest signs of predictive activity reflect some chosen action. 
Of course, I don’t think this alternative account is representative of performance during 
a typical experimental trial. After all, it makes little sense to commit so many cognitive resources 
to continuously hold in mind, simulate, and cause, individual actions, especially when the 
performance is not incentivized in any manner. Still, this alternative account might capture 
performance at the beginning of the experiment when the participant is still creating an action 
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procedure to automate performance during the task, or if they already possess a suitable action 
procedure, updating and triggering it on back into service. 
4.2.2.1. Reinterpreting the role of the precuneus: evidence. In what follows, I will describe some empirical 
evidence in support of my proposal regarding the role the precuneus might play in Libet-style 
tasks. If I am right, then there’s a reading of the results of these experiments that is consistent 
with the participants in these experiments continuously acting in a directly free manner. More 
plausibly, though, there is a reading that is consistent with the participants in these experiments 
continuously acting in an indirectly free manner; provided they performed at least one directly 
free action, either to create, or trigger on, an action procedure to automate their performance in 
the task. 
I have divided my presentation of the evidence into two parts. First, in §4.2.2.1.1 I will 
present evidence in support of my claim that neural activity in the precuneus might at times 
realise the storage of a number of different possible actions. This is important as it means the 
predictive neural activity observed in the precuneus in Libet-style tasks might not reflect a single 
action, but instead the agent’s own preferences or biases towards a particular action in an 
experimental trial. 
Then in §4.2.2.1.2 I will present evidence to support my assertion that neural activity in 
the precuneus might at times be a candidate realiser of an FCM. For example, as well as simply 
storing a number of different possible actions, neural activity in the precuneus might also realise 
the agent consciously holding these different possible actions in mind and simulating them. This 
is important as it means that the neural activity in the precuneus in Libet-style tasks might, on 
occasion, play a role in causing actions which are directly free. This includes the act of creating, 
destroying, triggering, monitoring and updating actions procedures that automate participants’ 
performance. Any action procedures which are influenced by these directly free actions will in 
turn cause indirectly free actions. This is true even if these researchers are correct about 
participants being reliably unconscious of the processes that lead to the actions being caused in 
these tasks. 
4.2.2.1.1. Evidence for the precuneus storing multiple actions. Let’s begin with some evidence that 
neural activity in the precuneus might not just be for the unconscious storage of a single action. 
Assume for the moment that neural activity in the precuneus does reflect the unconscious 
storage and cause of actions. I see no reason to think it reflects the storage of a single chosen 
action, rather than some number of possible actions that could be used to perform the task. For 
example, in the Libet-style paradigm described earlier, why think that it’s just the action to press 
the button with your left hand, or press the button with your right hand, that is unconsciously 
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stored up to 10 s prior to actual performance. Both simple actions could easily be stored. In 
addition, storing both actions secures some level of behavioural flexibility, especially if one of the 
actions turns out to be unviable prior to being caused. 
Evidence from both behavioural and transcranial magnetic stimulation studies suggest 
that multiple motor actions might be stored and caused from the precuneus (for example, see 
Oliveira, Diedrichsen, Verstynen, Duque, & Ivry, 2010; though see also Johnson, 2000). In 
speeded reaching tasks participants perform the worst when the ‘reach target’ is placed 
equidistant from both hands. This might appear strange, but it makes sense if the reaching action 
for both hands is being stored, ready to be performed. As neither the left nor right hand is 
favoured, a conflict occurs in action selection that must be resolved in order for an action to be 
performed. Second, the application of transcranial magnetic stimulation over the surface of the 
left posterior parietal cortex results in participants making many more reaching responses with 
the left hand. As a reminder, motor control is contralateral in the brain, which means the left 
hemisphere stores and guides right handed actions. Presumably this result reflects the active 
disruption of the right hand action in some way. If the predictive neural activity present in the 
precuneus doesn’t reflect the unconscious storage of a single action, it’s plausible that it might 
instead reflect the agent’s own preferences or biases towards a particular action in an 
experimental trial. 
4.2.2.1.2. Evidence of the precuneus as a candidate realiser of FCMs. Now, let’s move onto some 
evidence that neural activity in the precuneus might be a candidate realiser of an FCM. 
Important for my purposes is evidence that suggests that neural activity in the precuneus might 
contribute to actions which are directly free. This includes the act of creation, destruction, 
triggering, monitoring, and updating action procedures that automate participants’ performance. 
Remember that if an action procedure is created, could be destroyed, triggered, monitored, or 
updated by a directly free act of the agent, then the actions it causes are indirectly free. This is 
true even if these researchers are correct about participants being reliably unconscious of the 
processes that bring about their performance on these tasks. 
Once more, I see no reason to think that neural activity observed in the precuneus must 
realise the unconscious storage and cause of an action. Due to its extensive projections to other 
cortical and subcortical regions the precuneus serves as a vital hub integrating our own internal 
thoughts with information coming from the environment (for review, see Cavanna, & Trimble, 
2006).40 Cognitive capacities relevant for free action associated with neural activity in the 
                                                          
40Other important functional roles for the precuneus include autobiographical memory (for example, see Fletcher, 
Frith, Baker, Shallice, Frackowiak, & Dolan, 1995; Gilboa, Winocur, Grady, Hevenor, & Moscovitch, 2004), music 
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precuneus include: endogenous control of visual attention (for example, see, Culham, Brandt, 
Cavanagh, Kanwisher, Dale, & Tootell, 1998; Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Bihan, Dehaene, 2002; 
Nagahama et al., 1999), and mental imagery during motor simulation and mental navigation (for 
example, see Ghaem et al. 1997; Malouin, Richards, Jackson, Dumas, & Doyon, 2003; Ogiso, 
Kobayashi, Sugishita, 2000), deductive reasoning (Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 
2003), empathy and forgiveness (Farrow et al., 2001; Ochsner et al., 2004). Further to this, 
activity in the precuneus has been associated with self-referential processing (Kircher et al., 2000; 
Kircher, Brammer, Bullmore, Simmons, Bartels, & David, 2002), including self-awareness (Kjaer, 
Nowak, Kjaer, Lou, & Lou, 2001), and perhaps most importantly our experience of agency 
(Farrer, & Frith, 2002). Importantly then, neural activity in the precuneus appears to be closely 
associated with our capacity to simulate, plan and reason: paradigm examples of FCMs. 
4.2.3. Reinterpreting the role of the posterior cingulate 
So far I have discussed the role of the precuneus in Libet-style paradigms. More often than not 
neural activity in the precuneus might realise the unconscious storage and cause of participants’ 
actions. Importantly though, it might on occasion be a candidate realiser of an FCM, such as 
holding in mind and simulating various actions. I will now turn to discuss one final finding that 
suggests participants are unconscious of task related neural activity during Libet-style paradigms. 
Recall, Soon et al. (2013) noted that levels of neural activity in the predictive brain regions, 
including the posterior cingulate cortex, overlaps with a task network in the brain known as the 
default mode network (for review, see Snyder, & Raichle, 2012).41 Further, they noted that neural 
activity in the default mode network at the time the earliest predictive activity was observed was 
what you would expect if the participant was at rest (i.e., not performing the experimental task). 
As I described earlier in §4.2.1.2., the default mode network is commonly associated with 
participant’s minds wandering; varieties of self-referential thought, including remembering the 
past, simulating the future, and perspective taking. Prima facie, this result rules out the alternative 
account I suggested previously in §4.2.2. If neural activity in default mode network reflects 
participant’s minds wandering, then we have some reason to think they are unconscious of any 
task-relevant neural activity. 
I will make two proposals in response. Once again these proposals are meant to show 
that this evidence is compatible with FCMs causing actions, or perhaps, more likely, influencing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
perception (Satoh, Takeda, Nagata, Hatazawa, & Kuzuhara, 2001), and mental rotation (Suchan et al., 2002). There 
are still more examples that might be listed. 
41I will mainly restrict my discussion on the posterior cingulate cortex to networks of brain regions. This is not a 
reflection on its importance. The posterior cingulate appears to be associated with directing attention either inward 
on one’s own thoughts, or outward into the environment. It also appears to be important for the transmission of 
information across different brain networks (for review, see, Leech, & Sharp, 2014). 
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action procedures. Interested readers can find some empirical evidence in support of my 
proposal in §4.2.3.1. First, it matters what people are doing when they are mind wandering. Sure 
people might not be conscious of task-relevant neural activity for the experimental task, but if 
experimental performance is automated they might be conscious of some other task-relevant 
neural activity. For example, planning what they want to do when the experiment is over, spend 
their participation payment on, cook for dinner, and so on. Put another way, while these results 
might not be evidence of directly free actions in the experiment, this might have been the wrong 
place to look. The real test is whether the neural activity people are conscious of is causally 
relevant for actions caused after the experiment.  
Second, according to indirect compatibilism it’s not necessary for free action that the 
agent be conscious of the neural activity that caused it. Every action in the experiment can be 
free, provided the action procedure that caused them was created, could be destroyed, triggered, 
monitored, or updated by the agent. If you think it’s plausible the activity observed here might 
reflect, inter alia, planning future actions, then it’s plausible it might reflect the creation, 
destruction, triggering, monitoring, or updating of an action procedure to control and automate 
performance in the experiment. This might have occurred in a very early experimental trial, or 
perhaps even before the experiment commenced. 
4.2.3.1. Evidence of the posterior cingulate as a candidate realiser of FCMs. I think the kinds of capacities 
associated with neural activity in the default mode network make it a candidate realiser of some 
FCMs. These capacities include self-referential thought, remembering the past, simulating the 
future and perspective taking. Important for my purposes is evidence that suggests that neural 
activity in the default mode network contributes to actions which are directly free. Recall, this 
includes the act of creating, destroying, triggering, monitoring, and updating action procedures 
that automate the participants’ performance. Provided that an action procedure is created, could 
be destroyed, triggered, monitored, or updated by a directly free action of the agent, then the 
action it causes will be indirectly free. This is true even if participants are unconsciously 
performing actions for the majority of the time they spend on these tasks. 
If I am right that the default mode network contributes to actions which are directly free, 
then once again I think there’s a possible reading of these experimental results that is consistent 
with the participants in these experiments continuously acting in a directly free manner. More 
plausibly though, the participants in these experiments continuously act in an indirectly free 
manner provided they performed at least one directly free action, either to create, trigger, or 
update an action procedure to automate their performance in the task.  
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I see no reason to think that neural activity in the default mode network does not 
contribute to directly free actions, or that participants were not conscious of task-relevant 
activity at any stage in these experiments. First, there is a significant overlap between the default 
mode network and the fronto-parietal control network, a network we observe to be active when 
people are engaged in cognitive control (for example, see Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle, & 
Buckner, 2008; Margulies et al, 2009; Leech, Kamourieh, Beckmann, & Sharp, 2011). Second, 
there’s not just a significant overlap between the default mode network and cognitive control 
network, but significant interaction between them as well (for example, see Smallwood, Brown, 
Baird, & Schooler, 2012; Cocchi, Zalesky, Fornito, & Mattingley, 2013; Beaty, Benedek, 
Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015). While the default mode network holds various internal trains of 
thought in mind, the cognitive control network is able act upon them in a targeted manner (e.g. 
Smallwood, et al., 2012). Importantly, for my purposes, if that’s right then participants are not 
just conscious of this neural activity, this neural activity is a candidate realiser of FCMs. 
For example, perhaps a participant wonders what they want to do after the experiment 
and so recalls some activities they have done in the past. With these in mind said participant goes 
about choosing the one they desire the most, or else have the most powerful reasons to favour. 
However, maybe they also want to include their partner in their plans, so simulate and hold in 
mind their partner’s preferences while preparing to make their choice. One thing a participant 
can do is create, trigger, or update, an action procedure to automate experimental task 
performance while they consciously deliberate over more important matters. If that’s right, then 
it’s plausible that this neural activity could sometimes reflect the creation, triggering, or updating 
an action procedure for simple experimental task performance as well.   
4.2.4. Action procedure [Update] and the brain sciences 
Before concluding, I want to make a very brief note about error detection, unconscious learning, 
and, most importantly, consciously updating our action procedures. One important direct 
control condition is the capacity to alter and update the function of an action procedure with an 
FCM. Unfortunately, there’s no evidence in Libet-style paradigms that speaks directly to this 
condition. That’s because performance in these kinds of experiments is never incentivized in any 
manner, nor are there any expectations about performance, aside from that some action is 
caused in a timely manner. Much later, in §5.5 and Appendix A, I will return to provide some 
evidence from my own investigations for this condition. For now, though, we can imagine slight 
variations of these Libet-style paradigms where performance is incentivised in some manner, or 
is classed as either right or wrong. For example, earlier I described using an accelerometer so that 
an action might be performed at a correct or incorrect speed. But there are numerous other 
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possibilities you could imagine that would have the same effect. Here, I will restrict myself to 
outlining two brain regions that are important for updating action procedures, whose activity is 
commonly indexed by the electrocortical components: the error-related negativity (erN) and 
error related positivity (erP). 
4.2.4.1. Error-related negativity. Firstly, the erN originates in the anterior cingulate cortex and 
appears when people have made an error (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Gehring, Goss, Coles, & 
Meyer, 1993). Importantly, the magnitude of the erN is not tied to the conscious awareness of 
the error. Rather, it’s tied to the degree to which a participant learns after an error has occurred 
(Frank, Woroch, &, Curran, 2005). This means it’s possible for someone to make a mistake, 
adjust for their performance and carry on, without ever being aware of the error or the 
adjustment. For the direct compatibilist these unconscious alterations would not be free as they 
are not the result of FCMs. On the other hand, for the indirect compatibilist, provided the action 
procedure that caused the action was influenced by an FCM, these unconscious updates would 
be judged to have occurred freely. 
4.2.4.2. Error-related positivity. The erP is thought to originate in the posterior cingulate cortex, 
which I have discussed already in the context of the default mode network and cognitive control 
network (Vocat, Poutois, & Vuilleumier, 2008). Unlike the erN, the erP does appear to reflect 
conscious awareness an error has occurred (Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010). 
Interestingly, while the magnitude of the erP appears to reflect the strength of evidence that an 
error has occurred, the strength of this evidence does not guarantee that someone will make any 
changes to their performance (Steinhauser, & Yeung, 2010; though see also Orr, & Carrasco, 
2011). This might appear strange at first. But, when deciding what to do when an action 
procedure makes errors, the evidence that errors are occurring might be only one of the things 
we take into consideration. For example, imagine a speeded-response task where you are 
required to make as quick a response as possible when cued, with either your left or right hand. 
Due to the task requirement to respond as quickly as possible, you might acquire plenty of 
evidence for errors (i.e., responding too early, with the wrong hand, and so on). Still, you might 
refrain from updating the action procedure and persist with it in its current form, as it’s plausible 
that improving performance accuracy could result in you responding slower than you are able to. 
The evidence reflected by the erP might act as a source of evidence for some FCM to update an 
action procedure. Alternatively, in some cases it may provide the impetus to create an entirely 
new action procedure. 
4.2.5. Conclusion: The challenge of the brain sciences: Parietal redux 
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In summary, according to Soon, et al. (2008; 2013) the neural activity we observe in the 
precuneus might reflect the participant unconsciously storing and causing an action. Further, the 
network of predictive brain regions, including the posterior cingulate cortex, might reflect the 
participant’s mind wandering, unaware of any task-relevant neural activity. In this section I have 
shown that it’s plausible that this neural activity might also reflect participants’ FCMs causing 
actions or influencing action procedures. These results are consistent with their being at least 
some free actions according to direct compatibilism and numerous free actions according to indirect 
compatibilism. In the next section, I will argue that we should favour indirect compatibilism over 
direct compatibilism, not just as an account of this empirical evidence, but of our concept of free 
action as well. 
 
4.3. Why indirect compatibilism? 
Over the course of my discussion of some of the most important empirical studies into free will 
(e.g., Libet et al., 1983; 1985; Bode et al. 2011; Fried et al., 2011; Soon et al. 2008; 2013) I 
established two things. First, current evidence from the brain sciences fails to show there are no 
free actions according to direct compatibilism. Second, that same evidence does appear to show 
that there might be far fewer free actions, according to direct compatibilism than we might have 
supposed given the number of cases we judge to be free. Thus, while the evidence might fail to 
show there are no free actions, it might still show that there is no free will. That’s because, as I 
have repeatedly said, free will as a general capacity requires more than there being some free 
actions; it requires that we act freely in a reliable fashion.  
Of course, I have continually suggested there are possible readings of the current 
evidence that are consistent with participants’ FCMs causing their actions in these experiments. 
Participants might have, inter alia, consciously deliberated, chosen an action, observed the 
consequences of their action and then consciously adjusted their performance accordingly. 
However, despite such a reading being possible, we have good reasons to believe people are not 
performing these experiments in this manner. Thus, while it’s plausible there might be some free 
actions of the kind suggested by direct compatibilism, there are likely to be far fewer than the 
number of cases in the world we judge to be free. 
In this section I argue that my new account of free action, indirect compatibilism, not 
only makes better sense of our judgments regarding cases of free action, but we have good 
reason to prefer it to direct compatibilism. The structure of this section will follow the structure 
of an argument for this conclusion. 
4.3.1. One argument for indirect compatibilism 
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Here is my argument for indirect compatibilism:  
 Argument for indirect compatibilism 
1) [Plausible empirical claim] Indirect compatibilism vindicates as many, or more, of our pre-
theoretic judgments regarding which actions are free (and which actions are unfree) than 
does direct compatibilism.  
2) [Principle of theory selection] If two accounts are equally virtuous in other respects, but 
one makes judgments better aligned with out pre-theoretic judgments, we should prefer 
the account that is better aligned with our pre-theoretic judgments. 
3) [Theoretical virtues] Indirect compatibilism and direct compatibilism are equally virtuous 
in other respects. 
4) [Conclusion] Therefore, indirect compatibilism is a better account of our concept of free 
action than is direct compatibilism (from 1, 2, and 3). 
The argument for indirect compatibilism is valid. The majority of my discussion here will be 
dedicated to motivating Premise (1). That is, I will establish there are excellent reasons to think 
that indirect compatibilism vindicates more of our pre-theoretic judgments regarding which 
actions are free than does direct compatibilism. Later on, I will say a little bit to motivate Premise 
(2) and (3), but I think it should be relatively uncontroversial that it’s theoretically virtuous for an 
account of free action to align with our pre-theoretic judgements on cases of free action. 
Similarly, provided rival theories are equally virtuous with respect to other theoretical 
considerations, we are warranted in choosing the theory that best aligns with our pre-theoretic 
judgments.42 
4.3.1.1. Motivating Premise (1). Here’s my plan to motivate Premise (1). First, it’s important to 
remember what we want our account of free action to do with respect to our judgments on cases 
of free action. We are seeking an account that can make sense of as many of judgments on cases 
of free action as possible. By articulating a broader set of conditions under which actions are free 
(including both directly and indirectly free actions), indirect compatibilism is able to account for 
many more of our free action judgments than does direct compatibilism. Of course, there is a 
theoretical cost that must be paid for the inclusion of these further conditions, but, as I will 
show, we have reasons to think that indirectly free actions might already be part of the folk 
concept. 
Second, I will address some concerns about indirect compatibilism as a viable account of 
our concept of free action. It’s not enough that an account of free action makes sense of our free 
                                                          
42Some common theoretical virtues include empirical accuracy, causal adequacy, explanatory depth, internal 
consistency and coherence, universal coherence and unification, fruitfulness, parsimony, and applicability (for recent 
discussion see Keas, 2018). 
104 
action judgments, the account itself must also be one that is deemed appropriate by the folk. At 
this time, I don’t possess the data that shows the folk accept the conditions associated with 
indirect freedom as part of our concept of free action. It’s possible that upon further empirical 
testing I discover that people reject the additional conditions required for an action to be 
indirectly free. Prima facie this would indicate that indirect compatibilism is not as good as direct 
compatibilism conceptually for the folk. However, in that case I will argue that it is nearly as 
good conceptually, despite the cost that would be incurred to make principled revisions to our 
concept of free action. That’s because if we can’t successfully account for those cases that would 
have been picked out as indirectly free, we not only risk discarding most of our free actions, but 
the fact that we have free will at all. 
4.3.1.2. Indirect freedom as part of the folk concept? In Chapter 2 of this thesis I used people’s 
judgments for cases of free will as datum that any prospective account of free will is required to 
explain. Unfortunately, it’s not enough to simply uncover our ‘raw’ judgments and construct an 
account from them. Our raw judgements are liable to be noisy, conflicting and even false. In 
addition, in some cases there might be a lack of consensus for the correct judgment, and some 
cases might not be considered as important as others to the prospective account. For these 
reasons, before an account of free action can be constructed, people’s raw judgments for cases 
must be systematized in some manner. In Chapter 2 of the thesis I subjected people’s raw 
judgments to empirical scrutiny; but that’s not the only kind of methodology we might employ 
(though it is my preference). We can also idealize from these raw judgments in order to identify 
which judgements need be explained by the prospective account, which judgments need to be 
discarded, which judgments reflect closely related concepts that happen to share the same 
reference term, and so on. As I have not yet performed the necessary empirical studies required 
to test whether indirect freedom is satisfactory for the folk, for now I’ll be idealizing from some 
of our raw judgments on cases of free action. If you find this problematic, treat what I have to 
say as a series of plausible hypotheses about what I expect to observe once the necessary 
empirical studies have been performed. 
The simplest reason I think indirect compatibilism is better, conceptually, than direct 
compatibilism is because it gets many more of our free action judgments correct. Throughout 
this part of the thesis, I have used the case of actions performed in Libet-style paradigms, for 
good reason. It’s highly plausible that these actions are not free according to direct 
compatibilism, and are free according to indirect compatibilism. It might be countered that no 
one ever really believed that these kinds of simple actions were the kind of actions that we 
considered to be free to begin with. However, I think this is incorrect. Scientists looking to 
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investigate free will must have thought that these simple actions were the sort of actions that we 
would judge to be free. Further, there is at least some evidence that what guided them to these 
actions was reflection on the folk concept of free action. While not discussed much in the 
empirical literature, Libet (1985) offers some justification of why we should consider the actions 
in these experiments as free. The most important reason he writes is [emphasis his own]: 
“...subjects feel introspectively that they are performing the act on their own initiative and 
that they are free to start or not to start the act as they wish.” (pg. 529) 
For the most part, I assume the same rationale (or something sufficiently similar) permeates 
through the brain sciences and other empirical investigations into free will. The reason these 
kinds of actions are relevant for free will is because they are kinds of actions that we judge, upon 
reflection, to be free. 
Many brain scientists have claimed their empirical research shows there is no free will 
because the candidate realisers of FCMs could not be what are causing our actions in these 
experiments. However, there is an assumption driving this conclusion which I have been at pains 
to suggest is mistaken. The conclusion that there is no free will tacitly assumes that the reason we 
judged these cases to be free was because they were cases of directly free actions. In the 
cognitive sciences our conclusions are directly informed by our experimental task designs. If I’m 
interested in a specific cognitive capacity, then I will design an experiment so that only the 
cognitive capacity of interest is impacted (or perhaps differentially impacted) by the task design. 
Of course I might not succeed in my design. Perhaps a number of different capacities are 
impacted, or there are individual differences in the way people perform the task. Each of these 
factors can give rise to a number of confounding explanations for the observed result. Assuming 
for the moment that participants did perform Libet-style paradigms by repeatedly performing 
directly free actions, then the evidence might suggest we don’t act freely in these cases, and thus 
don’t have free will. But there is no reason to think participants perform these experiments in 
this manner, nor is any reason to suggest people think they perform these experiments in this 
fashion either. 
4.3.1.3. Indirect freedom and principled revisions to the folk concept. Indirect compatibilism is entirely 
consistent with our judgment that some simple actions, such as those performed in Libet-style 
paradigms, are free. Unfortunately, at this time there’s an open empirical question whether the 
sufficient conditions introduced to pick out indirectly free actions are acceptable to the folk. I 
still need to test whether the folk judge indirectly free actions to be free, or whether they would 
accept indirect freedom in order to secure certain cases in the world as being free. 
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At the end of Chapter 3 (§3.6) I described my approach to the construction of the folk 
theory as a combination of theory-based and case-based approaches. This means the 
construction of the folk theory occurs alongside the systematization of people’s judgments. To 
some degree, this combined approach shares some key similarities to Rawls’ (1971) influential 
methodology of reflective equilibrium, as we go back and forth between our prospective theory 
and our judgments on cases, until equilibrium is reached. In my case, the relevant back and forth 
concerns a prospective account of the concept of free action and our judgments for cases of free 
action in the world. Still, you might wonder why a notion such as indirectly free action, or 
something sufficiently similar, would make it into the final theory. One reason I have continued 
to draw upon comes from simple reflection upon one’s experience as an agent: we feel as though 
when we act we do so freely more often than not. If you are tempted by that thought, then direct 
compatibilism is entirely incapable of accommodating the number of cases we judge to be free. 
Indirect compatibilism can supply many more cases in a principled manner, as FCMs cause 
actions that are both directly and indirectly free. 
There is a possibility that upon empirical testing I might discover that the folk reject the 
conditions required for indirectly free actions, and as a result reject my new account of free 
action, indirect compatibilism. Instead they might respond in a manner that is consistent with 
direct compatibilism being the correct account of the concept of free action. I think this result is 
pretty unlikely, as there is a natural tension between the costs associated with revising the folk 
theory to include the conditions required to judge actions as indirectly free, and having to discard 
the majority of cases in the world that we judge to be free. Further, I think this tension tips us 
towards accepting the costs associated with revising the folk theory of free action when we 
consider the consequences of discarding the majority of purported cases of free action in the 
world. As I have repeatedly noted, I think our general capacity for free will requires that we act 
freely in a reliable fashion. Discarding the vast majority of cases we judge to be free is 
tantamount to us accepting we don’t have free will. Faced with such a decision, I think we would 
revise our concept of free action, as the alternative is to accept there might be some free actions, 
but no free will. A consequence of all this would be that indirect compatibilism is not better, 
conceptually, than direct compatibilism due to the costs associated with the need to revise our 
concept. With that said, I think indirect compatibilism would be at least as good as direct 
compatibilism conceptually. After all, it still covers all the cases that direct compatibilism covers 
and allows us to maintain that we have free will.  
Still, it’s once again an open empirical question whether the folk would ‘save’ free will by 
revising their concept of free action to include the conditions required for indirect freedom. 
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Maybe I am wrong and the majority of folk will happily give up free will entirely, rather than 
revise their concept of free action. Even if that’s true I still think my notion of indirect freedom 
might turn out to be important to the folk for other reasons. For example, many people think 
being free is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. But if the only actions that are free 
are the directly free ones (those caused by the agent’s FCMs) then the number of cases of 
genuine moral responsibility could also turn out to be far fewer than we had supposed. Here, 
perhaps acting indirectly freely is evidence that the agent acted freely for the purposes of moral 
responsibility, despite not being evidence of an agent’s general capacity of free will. Is the folk 
notion of free action sufficiently nuanced to distinguish between two different senses of free 
action for two different purposes: directly free actions that count as evidence for our general 
capacity of free will and moral responsibility, and indirectly free actions that only count as 
evidence for our responsibility? I don’t know. But perhaps it is. Alternatively, maybe it will turn 
out that what I have called indirect freedom is not a theory of free action at all, but a theory of 
the conditions under which agents are morally responsible - and it turns out these things come 
apart. Perhaps that is right, but these are questions I can’t answer at this time. 
4.3.1.4. Premise (2), (3), and conclusion. Now onto Premises (2), (3) and the Conclusion: 
2) [Principle of theory selection] If two accounts are equally virtuous in other respects, but 
one makes judgments better aligned with out pre-theoretic judgments, we should prefer 
the account that is better aligned with our pre-theoretic judgments. 
3) [Theoretical virtues] Indirect compatibilism and straightforward compatibilism are 
equally virtuous in other respects. 
4) [Conclusion] Therefore, indirect compatibilism is an equally good or better account of 
our concept of free action than is straightforward compatibilism (from 1, 2, and 3). 
[Principle of theory selection], I think should be uncontroversial, especially for my project of 
providing a new account of our concept of free action. With that said, even conceptual engineers 
might give some weighting to their theory better aligning with our judgments on cases, as the 
overlap between the engineered content of the concept and content held as part of the folk 
concept, plausibly makes it more likely the engineered concept will be taken up by the folk.  
Similarly, [Theoretical virtues] seems a perfectly plausible claim. You might wonder 
whether indirect compatibilism and direct compatibilism are relatively alike with respect to other 
theoretical considerations. For one, direct compatibilism appears to be simpler than indirect 
compatibilism. However, the upshot of including the conditions required to account for 
indirectly free actions is not only better alignment with our judgments for cases of free action in 
the world, but greater explanatory depth to explain why those judgments are free and do so in a 
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unified fashion. After all, the conditions required for indirectly free actions are not dissimilar 
from those found in direct compatibilism, for they are still dependent on FCMs. For the 
purposes of this argument, all I require is for indirect compatibilism to turn out relatively like 
direct compatibilism with respect to other theoretical virtues and this seems entirely plausible. 
4.3.2. Conclusion: Why indirect compatibilism? 
Thus, indirect compatibilism is a better (or at worst, as good an) account of our concept of free 
action than is direct compatibilism. That’s because indirect compatibilism provides a better 
account of our free action judgments than does direct compatibilism. Without the conditions 
required to successfully account for cases of indirectly free actions, direct compatibilism fails to 
account for the majority of our free action judgments. Further, even if the conditions required to 
pick out indirectly free actions are not currently part of our concept of free action, we should 
expect people to make a principled revision towards including those conditions. After all, the 
alternative is to discard the majority of cases we might judge to be free in the world and in doing 
so discard any opportunity that we might possess free will as well. 
 
4.4. Conclusion: Indirect freedom 
According to indirect compatibilism an agent doesn’t just act freely when they perform an action 
caused by their FCMs, nor, just when they are creating, destroying, triggering, monitoring, and 
updating action procedures. They also act freely when they perform an action caused by a CAP. 
The evidence from the brain sciences that I have discussed in this chapter, and previously in 
Chapter 3, appears to be entirely consistent with this account. More specifically, while there are 
quite likely some directly free actions there are many more indirectly free actions. In virtue of 
this, indirect compatibilism is better than direct compatibilism as an account of concept of free 
action. That’s because indirect compatibilism provides a much better account of our free action 
judgments. Even if the conditions required to pick out indirectly free actions are rejected by the 
folk, we should nevertheless expect the folk to revise their concept so as to include these 
conditions. The alternative is to discard the majority of cases we judge to be free and in doing so 
discard the possibility that we might possess free will. In the next chapter I will discuss some 
interesting objections to indirect compatibilism. Further, I will provide one piece of evidence 
from my own cognitive neuroscience investigations that I think shows people updating their 
action procedures.  
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Chapter 5 
Objections and replies to indirect compatibilism 
 
In Chapter 4 I described in detail, and argued for, my new account of free action: indirect 
compatibilism. In this chapter I will describe and respond to what I think are some of the most 
interesting objections to my account. Before I begin doing this, though, I think it will be helpful 
to remind ourselves of some key definitions of terms relevant to indirect compatibilism and 
briefly recap how they all fit together on my view. As you may recall, according to indirect 
compatibilism actions are free simpliciter if and only if they are caused by a freedom-conferring 
mechanism or a controlled action procedure. In particular, they are directly free if they are caused by a 
freedom-conferring mechanism, and indirectly free if they are caused by a controlled action 
procedure. 
Let’s remind ourselves of some of definitions of some of these components.  
An action procedure is a sub-personal mechanism that causes action or influences other 
action procedures in a contained and reliable fashion. 
For example, consider a simple action procedure that causes a patting action. The action 
procedure will only cause actions of the patting kind (contained) and will rarely fail to cause pats 
when activated (reliable). 
Something is a controlled action procedure iff it’s an action procedure that’s at least in 
part under our direct control. This means it was either created, destroyed, triggered, monitored, or 
updated by a freedom-conferring mechanism or another controlled action procedure.  
Actions caused by controlled action procedures are indirectly free. 
Let me illustrate with a simple example. Consider a basic controlled action procedure 
that unconsciously automates and causes wrist-flex actions during a Libet-style experiment. The 
controlled action procedure only causes actions of the wrist-flex kind and very rarely fails to 
cause actions of this kind when it is activated. It is thus contained and reliable. This action 
procedure is a controlled action procedure because it was created by freedom-conferring 
mechanisms to unconsciously perform the experimental task. For instance, perhaps the person 
consciously deliberated over the experimental task requirements and as a result of their 
conscious deliberations caused the action procedure. Creating the action procedure to perform a 
wrist-flex in response to the experimental stimuli is a directly free action. Further, all the actions 
caused by this controlled action procedure over the course of the experiment are indirectly free 
actions. 
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According to my definition of a controlled action procedure, all that’s required for an 
action procedure to be a controlled action procedure is for at least one of the direct control 
conditions - being created, destroyed, triggered, monitored, or updated by a freedom-conferring 
mechanism or another controlled action procedure - to be fulfilled. This means there are a 
numerous ways action procedures can be controlled action procedures and a wide taxonomy of 
controlled action procedures to explore. For example, an action procedure is a controlled action 
procedure if it’s created and could be destroyed, triggered, monitored, and updated by freedom-
conferring mechanisms or another controlled action procedure. Equally however, an action 
procedure is a controlled action procedure if it was not created, but could be destroyed, triggered 
and updated by freedom-conferring mechanisms or another controlled action procedure. 
Unfortunately, I don’t have the space in this thesis to explore every species of controlled action 
procedure. As a result, to simplify matters going forward let me first broadly cleave controlled 
action procedures into two varieties: paradigmatic controlled action procedures and non-paradigmatic 
controlled action procedures. 
Something is a paradigmatic controlled action procedure iff it’s a controlled action 
procedure that fulfils all the direct control conditions. This means it is created, and could 
be destroyed, triggered, monitored, and updated by a freedom-conferring mechanism or 
another controlled action procedure.  
I will say that actions caused by paradigmatic controlled action procedures are paradigmatically 
indirectly free. 
Something is a non-paradigmatic controlled action procedure iff it’s a controlled 
action procedure that does not fulfil at least one of the direct control conditions. This 
means the action procedure was either not created, could not be destroyed, triggered, 
monitored, or updated by a freedom-conferring mechanism or another controlled action 
procedure.  
I will say that actions caused by non-paradigmatic controlled action procedures are non-
paradigmatically indirectly free. 
To this point in the thesis I have only dealt with paradigmatic controlled action 
procedures. In this final chapter I shift the focus of my discussion to non-paradigmatic 
controlled action procedures (henceforth NP-CAP). One reason to discuss NP-CAPs is because 
I think it likely that they are the most common kind of controlled action procedure. This is 
because I think that cases where we have the capacity to create, destroy, trigger, monitor, and 
update action procedures are relatively rare. Another reason to discuss NP-CAPs is because they 
might be used to motivate prima facie arguments against indirect compatibilism. Unfortunately, I 
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don’t have the space in this chapter to consider every species of NP-CAP; instead I will focus on 
what is potentially the most problematic species of NP-CAP, the non-deliberative cause. 
Roughly characterized for now, non-deliberative causes are controlled action procedures that 
were created by a freedom-conferring mechanism or some other controlled action procedure, 
but cannot be destroyed, triggered, monitored, or updated.  
The prima facie reason non-deliberative causes are problematic is because they cause 
actions, and can influence other action procedures, in a manner that we can’t intercede on at all. 
For many, the actions caused by non-deliberative causes are likely to be judged unfree. However, 
according to indirect compatibilism the very fact that we created the non-deliberative cause is 
enough for the actions they cause to be indirectly free. Though I can’t argue for it here, I think 
that non-deliberative causes are the most potent kind of putative counterexample to indirect 
compatibilism. Hence if I can motivate the idea that actions caused by non-deliberative causes 
are indirectly free, then I think I can make the case (though I shall not do so here) that other 
kinds of NP-CAPs do not pose an issue for indirect compatibilism. 
 With all this in mind, here is the plan for this chapter. In §5.1 I will provide a complete 
account of non-deliberative causes. It’s only after I have finished giving my account of non-
deliberative causes that I can begin working through some of the interesting objections to 
indirect compatibilism. Each section from §5.2 to §5.5 will present a different objection to 
indirect compatibilism, along with my reply. In §5.2 I will reply to the objection that non-
deliberative causes can’t cause free actions because they are psychologically pathological. In §5.3 
I will reply to the charge that we aren’t morally responsible for actions caused by non-
deliberative causes, and thus these actions cannot be free. In §5.4 I will reply to the objection 
that even if non-deliberative causes cause free actions, they simply can’t be free simpliciter as they 
seem completely different in kind to the other free actions caused by a freedom-conferring 
mechanism. In §5.5 I will reply to the serious charge that I have turned to the dark side and have 
engaged in nothing but a priori theorising. Finally, in §5.6 I will conclude the chapter and in §5.7 I 
will conclude the thesis. 
 
5.1. Non-deliberative causes 
Before I begin describing and replying to some interesting objections to indirect compatibilism, I 
need to provide an account of non-deliberative causes. Remember that the reason I am doing 
this is because many of the objections that I will be replying to shortly are best motivated by 
cases of non-deliberative causes, perhaps the most problematic kind of NP-CAP. Let’s begin 
with a definition of a non-deliberative cause: 
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Something is a non-deliberative cause iff it’s a controlled action procedure that only 
fulfils the direct control condition created. This means the action procedure was created, 
but cannot be destroyed, triggered, monitored, or updated by a freedom-conferring 
mechanism or another controlled action procedure.  
Remember that actions caused by non-deliberative causes are non-paradigmatically indirectly free. 
Put simply then, a non-deliberative cause is a freely created action procedure that we 
have no ongoing control over. This means that non-deliberative causes cannot be destroyed, 
triggered, monitored, or updated by a freedom-conferring mechanism or other controlled action 
procedure. I use the term non-deliberative cause for this, even though there are uncontrolled 
action procedures over which we have even less deliberative control, because of the special 
issues they pose for indirect compatibilism. 
The easiest way to come to grasp non-deliberative causes is by examples, which I will 
provide in two parts. First, I will briefly describe a case of a non-deliberative cause that causes 
actions. After this, I will describe a case of a non-deliberative cause influencing other action 
procedures. Remember that indirect compatibilism judges that actions caused by non-
deliberative causes are free and that the influence of non-deliberative causes on our other action 
procedures is not freedom-undermining. That’s because the non-deliberative cause was freely 
created by a freedom-conferring mechanism or another controlled action procedure. For ease of 
explication I will assume indirect compatibilism gets these free action judgments correct for now. 
I will describe and reply to some important objections from the next section onwards. 
5.1.1 Non-deliberative causes causing actions 
One thing non-deliberative causes can do is cause actions over which we have no control. Let 
me illustrate with a simple case. Imagine an agent, Bud, who creates a non-deliberative cause that 
causes him to physically retaliate whenever he is attacked. One evening Bud is socializing with 
his mates at the pub after a particularly long day at work. Bud doesn’t drink, but his friends do, 
and by the end of the evening they are heavily intoxicated. After making sure that his friends 
have a safe ride home available, Bud informs his friends that he is going as he is feeling tired and 
will walk home as it’s a nice evening outside. On his way home, along a particularly dark stretch 
of road, Bud is unexpectedly attacked from behind. Without thought Bud turns and retaliates 
against his attacker landing a heavy punch square on their jaw. The punch leaves the attacker 
unconscious on their feet and they hit the ground hard. In that moment, Bud notices that the 
attacker was one of his heavily intoxicated ‘friends’ whom he had just been drinking with earlier. 
Bud regrets what he has done and wishes that he had never created the non-deliberative cause 
that makes him physically retaliate whenever he is attacked. 
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Perhaps Bud wishes that he could have deescalated the situation by talking down his 
attacker, subduing them, or fleeing the scene all together. However, none of these actions were 
open to Bud when he was attacked. Once a non-deliberative cause has been created, the agent no 
longer has control over said cause, causing actions. Bud freely created a non-deliberative cause 
that makes him physically retaliate when he is attacked and this means that when he is attacked 
the non-deliberative cause causes him to retaliate no matter what. According to indirect 
compatibilism, Bud’s retaliatory strike in this case is an indirectly free action and that is because 
Bud freely created the non-deliberative cause that causes him to physically retaliate whenever he 
is attacked. If you think indirect compatibilism gets these judgements wrong, that’s fine; in the 
coming sections I will be discussing and replying to what I think are some of the best objections 
to my view. For now, I just want to describe some non-deliberative causes and explain why 
indirect compatibilism judges that they cause free actions. 
5.1.2 Non-deliberative causes influencing other action procedures 
Of course non-deliberative causes don’t just cause actions; they can also influence other action 
procedures. Once again, let me illustrate with a simple case. Imagine an agent Bodi who creates a 
non-deliberative cause to prevent him from killing other people. Bodi is a police officer tasked 
with patrolling some rural stretches of road that surround the city. One evening while he is 
patrolling he notices that the traffic barrier on one of the bends has been broken. He pulls his 
patrol car over, holsters his gun and begins to investigate. Beyond the broken traffic barrier and 
down a bank he finds a rolled truck with a local driver still trapped inside. The driver is 
conscious and does not appear to be badly injured. While Bodi tries to free the trapped driver he 
quickly realizes that it will be impossible without assistance. Bodi begins casually conversing with 
the truck driver to keep him calm while they wait for assistance, but as they converse, a small fire 
catches at the back of the truck and begins spreading rapidly. The truck driver sees the 
approaching fire and, knowing he’s about to die, turns to Bodi and begs him to not let him suffer 
needlessly by burning to death. Bodi breaks down, for he too knows the truck driver is going to 
die and doesn’t want him to suffer by burning to death, but there is nothing he can do to prevent 
the truck driver from dying in this manner. Still, he realizes that if he could kill the truck driver 
then the driver would not have to suffer needlessly. In that moment Bodi regrets creating the 
non-deliberative cause that prevents him from killing other people.43 
                                                          
43This case is adapted from a case in Hart’s (1968) Punishment and Responsibility. Some readers will be familiar with this 
kind of case from ongoing debates around the moral status of killing and letting die (e.g., Rachels, 1975; Kamm, 
2007; Woollard, 2015). While I think there is no significant moral difference between the acts of killing and letting 
die, nothing hangs on this fact in the thesis. 
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Once the non-deliberative mental cause has been created, the agent no longer has control 
over its influence on other action procedures. To be clear, I don’t think the only way non-
deliberative causes could influence other action procedures is by removing them as options from 
the agent. In some cases non-deliberative causes could make it more, or less, difficult to choose 
some action procedures as options. Still, I will focus on cases where non-deliberative causes 
remove action procedures as options as these cases are potentially more problematic for indirect 
compatibilism.  
According to indirect compatibilism Bodi acts freely when he chooses to comfort the 
truck driver as best he can, even though he really wanted to kill the truck driver to prevent him 
needlessly suffering.44 That’s because it’s impossible to do something that is not an option for 
you do.45 I might really want to fly, but the fact that I can’t fly is not freedom undermining as it 
was not something I could do prior to being in the choice situation. Similarly, Bodi’s acting freely 
cannot be undermined by not being able to kill the truck driver, as this is something he could not 
do prior to being in the choice situation. Non-deliberative causes can allow agents to remove 
certain action procedures from their action sets, making them psychologically impossible to do. 
Once again you might think indirect compatibilism gets this judgment wrong and that’s fine, I 
will begin discussing objections and replies to my view shortly. All I’m doing at the moment is 
describing non-deliberative causes influencing other action procedures and explaining why 
nothing freedom undermining occurs, according to indirect compatibilism, when they influence other 
action procedures.  
Before moving on, I will briefly outline some of the different ways non-deliberative 
causes could influence other action procedures. I think that my account becomes much more 
concrete if I can outline some of the possible ways that non-deliberative causes might influence 
our other action procedures. Whether or not any of the suggestions are in fact realized in beings 
like us is not something I will address in this thesis, but is a task for my future self and the 
various brain sciences. The options I will briefly outline are: information screening, deliberation 
screening, choice screening and action screening. 
5.1.2.1. Information screening. One way non-deliberative causes can influence other action 
procedures is by information screening. This means that the non-deliberative cause selectively 
filters the information we have available, and in doing so makes some action procedures more, 
or less, attractive as options than other action procedures. In some cases the non-deliberative 
cause might selectively filter all the information about a particular action procedure causing it to 
                                                          
44Remember that on my view, free will is not about “freedom to do X”. Free will is about when we do act, do we do 
so in a manner that is reliably free. 
45See David Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming) Freedom and binding consequentialism.  
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not appear as an option to the agent. For example, one reason Bodi might think there are no 
other options available to him aside from comforting the truck driver is because he was sincerely 
unaware of the gun holstered on his side. When the non-deliberative cause filtered out this 
crucial piece of information, it meant Bodi had no good reason to think that the option to shoot 
the truck driver was available to him. And if Bodi had no good reason to think that the option to 
shoot the truck driver was open, then he had no good reason to do it. 
5.1.2.2. Deliberation screening.46 Another way non-deliberative causes can influence our action 
procedures is by influencing which action procedures we can deliberate over. Crucial, here, is 
that not all information, or options we are consciously aware of, are ones which actually enter 
the causal process of deliberation and action selection. The action procedures that we deliberate 
over represent the pool of action procedures that we can freely choose from when deciding what 
to do. If an action procedure is not part of the deliberation pool then it’s not an option for 
choice, even if we can entertain the idea, and there are no constraints on what we can choose 
within the choice set. For example, Bodi might be aware of the fact he has a gun holstered on his 
side and he might judge that if he kills the truck driver he will prevent the driver from suffering 
needlessly. But if the non-deliberative cause has filtered out the killing action procedure from his 
deliberation pool, then the option to kill the truck driver was never there for Bodi to choose, 
even though he can entertain the idea of killing the truck driver. 
5.1.2.3. Choice screening. Closely related to deliberation screening, another way non-deliberative 
causes might influence our action procedures is by influencing which action procedures we can 
actually choose. For example, Bodi might be aware of the option of killing the truck driver and 
the option to choose the killing action procedure might be in his deliberation pool, but the non-
deliberative cause causes him to be unable to choose it. Instead, the best option that he can 
choose is to comfort the truck driver. The key difference between choice screening and 
deliberation screening is that while in choice screening there is an apparent option open to 
choose, in deliberation screening there is not even the apparent option. The intervention is at a 
later stage: at the point of choice, rather than at the point of choosing options to (seriously) 
deliberate over. 
5.1.2.4. Action screening. The final way a non-deliberative cause can influence our action 
procedures that I will outline is by influencing which actions action procedures can actually 
cause. For example, Bodi might be aware of the option of killing the truck driver, find the option 
to choose the killing action procedure is in his deliberation pool and be able to choose the killing 
action procedure. But after he has chosen the killing action procedure, Bodi finds that the killing 
                                                          
46See David Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming) Freedom and binding consequentialism. 
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action procedure cannot cause killing actions. He might still be able draw his gun, aim at the 
truck driver’s head, rest his finger firmly on the trigger, and so on. However, the non-deliberative 
cause in this case actively filters the actions that are being caused by the killing action procedure 
so that no matter what Bodi cannot actually kill the truck driver.47 
5.1.3 Conclusion: Non-deliberative causes 
In this section, I have provided and illustrated some examples of non-deliberative causes. For 
now I have simply taken for granted that indirect compatibilism is correct and that the actions 
caused by these causes are free; that the actions that occur as a result of the influence of non-
deliberative causes are no less free than those that occur without their influence. In the next 
section, I will begin the process of explaining and replying to some objections to indirect 
compatibilism that arise from consideration of non-deliberative causes. Perhaps the most 
obvious is the one which I will discuss first; the objection that actions from non-deliberative 
causes cannot be free as they reflect a psychological pathology. Since indirect compatibilism says 
these actions are free, this presents an objection to indirect compatibilism. 
 
5.2. Objection 1: Non-deliberative causes are pathological 
Now that we have a grasp of non-deliberative causes let’s begin working through some of the 
most interesting arguments against indirect compatibilism that consideration of non-deliberative 
causes can be used to motivate. Indirect compatibilism judges that actions caused by non-
deliberative causes are free, and their influence on other action procedures is not freedom 
undermining. But if we can identify some non-deliberative causes that cause unfree actions, or 
influence other action procedures in a freedom undermining manner, then we have a 
counterexample to indirect compatibilism. This will be the basic strategy of the first objector.  
The first objector’s charge is that non-deliberative causes cannot issue in free actions 
because non-deliberative causes are pathological. That’s because anything which causes you to 
perform non-maximising actions without the possibility of intervention is pathological.48 Actions 
                                                          
47It’s plausible that each of these mechanisms cause you to have different intuitions about free action. I take it that 
some variance in judgments for cases of free action in the literature cases could be explained by people reading one 
of these mechanisms into the case. For example, information and deliberation screening are prima facie compatible 
with our free action because the non-deliberative cause doesn’t influence our capacity to choose directly. Action 
screening is less about our free action and more just a defeater to our freedom simpliciter. The capacity to choose is 
not directly affected, rather just like cases of physical restraint you are not free to act in the way that you choose. 
Choice screening might give us pause for concern as our capacity to choose is being influenced directly. I think it’s 
possible that thoughts about something like choice screening might have motivated the original challenge of the 
brain sciences. The earliest signs of predictive neural activity were often referred to as the ‘choice’, even though 
participants were unconscious of their ‘choice’ at this time. That’s because the neural activity was significantly 
associated with what participants would go on to report choosing. Credit and thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell for 
this helpful suggestion. 
48It is contentious, even amongst contemporary naturalistic accounts of disease, what makes something pathological. 
However, one thing in common between these different accounts is that pathology results in the impairment of 
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caused by pathologies are unfree. Hence actions caused by non-deliberative causes are unfree. 
Here’s the basic motivation behind the objection. Consider a paradigm mental pathology, 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), which is characterized by the sufferer’s inability to 
control certain repeated actions, or to influence repeated intrusive thoughts.49 Part of what 
makes OCD pathological is the fact that the sufferer acts in a non-maximising manner without 
the possibility of being able to intervene on their actions or their intrusive thoughts at the time 
of action. If non-deliberative causes are what realize mental pathologies like OCD, then indirect 
compatibilism judges that people in the grip of pathologies like OCD act freely. But if we believe 
that the actions caused by mental pathologies are unfree, then indirect compatibilism must be 
false. 
Here, then, is the first objector’s objection: 
Objection 1 
1) [Pathology non-maximising] Anything which causes you to reliably perform acts 
which are (a) non-maximising, by your lights, at the time of the action and (b) for 
which there is no possibility of intervention, is pathological. 
2) Some non-deliberative causes cause you to reliably perform acts which are (a) non-
maximising, by your lights, at the time of the action and (b) for which there is no 
possibility of intervention. 
3) [Lemma] Therefore, some non-deliberative causes are pathological (from 1 and 2). 
4) [Pathology unfree] All actions caused by pathologies are unfree. 
5) [Conclusion] Therefore, some non-deliberative causes cause unfree actions (from 3 
and 4). 
The argument is valid. In this section, I will attempt to undermine [Pathology non-maximising] 
and [Pathology unfree]. I will begin by undermining [Pathology unfree]. I will argue that either 
the pathology that is causing actions is not a non-deliberative cause, but just an action procedure, 
in which case indirect compatibilism has no problem judging the actions it causes are unfree, or 
the pathology that is causing the actions is a non-deliberative cause in which case the actions it 
causes are free, and ought to be judged to be free. Remember that built into the direct control 
condition is that to be a non-deliberative cause requires that the action procedure (which is the 
non-deliberative cause) does what it was created to do. If the pathology does not fulfil the direct 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
normal functional ability (e.g., Boorse, 1977; Wakefield, 1992; Griffiths, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 1994). The fact that 
non-deliberative causes cause people to perform below typical efficiency, by making them perform non-maximizing 
actions without any possibility of intervention, suggests, prima facie, that they are pathological. 
49See Abramowitz, Taylor and McKay (2009) for an excellent overview on obsessive compulsive disorder. Obsessive 
compulsive disorder is not the only example of a mental pathology that could ‘appear’ like a non-deliberative cause. 
Numerous mental pathologies, such as eating, anxiety and panic disorders are centred on the inability of the sufferer 
to control certain actions, or the influence of certain intrusive thoughts. 
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control condition, then it’s not even a non-deliberative cause and the actions it causes are unfree, 
even according to indirect compatibilism. If, on the other hand, the pathology is a non-
deliberative cause, then the actions it causes are free. That’s because the non-deliberative cause is 
doing exactly what it was freely created to do. But, I will argue, in these cases it is not so 
counterintuitive to suppose that the actions in question are indeed free. All in all, I will argue that 
some, but not all actions caused by pathologies are unfree, by making the case that those 
pathologies that are non-deliberative causes do indeed cause free actions. 
After this, I will undermine [Pathologies non-maximising]. Here, then, is my argument 
that some non-deliberative causes are not pathological because possessing them is globally 
maximising: 
Non-pathological non-deliberative causes 
1) [Not pathology] Anything which is globally maximising to possess is not 
pathological. 
2) [Global maximising] Some non-deliberative causes cause you to reliably perform acts 
which are (a) non-maximising, by your lights, at the time of the action, (b) for which 
there is no possibility of intervention and (c) are globally maximising to possess. 
3) Therefore, those non-deliberative causes that are globally maximising to possess are 
not pathological (from 1 and 2). 
The argument is valid. Is it sound? I think so. Even if a non-deliberative cause causes you to act 
in a manner that is non-maximising at the time of action, the overall benefits of being able to 
bind yourself to perform certain actions, and refrain from performing others, might be far 
greater. Something doesn’t count as pathological if, in general, under usual circumstances, having 
it is more beneficial than not having it.50 If the possession of a non-deliberative cause is globally 
maximising, then even if it sometimes causes acts that are locally non-maximising, the non-
deliberative cause is not pathological. If the non-deliberative cause is not pathological, then we 
have no reason to suppose that the actions caused by the non-deliberative cause are not free. I’ll 
demonstrate this claim by outlining how some non-deliberative causes can cause people to act in 
a more pro-social and cooperative manner towards others. If acting this way is globally 
maximising, then this is an example of non-deliberative causes that are globally maximising, 
whilst still sometimes being locally non-maximising. 
5.2.1 Non-deliberative causes and mere action procedures 
Let’s start with a case of mental pathology that prima facie looks like a non-deliberative cause that 
causes unfree actions and influences other action procedures in a freedom undermining manner. 
                                                          
50In many cases it could be vague whether or not possessing some non-deliberative cause is globally maximizing. I 
will have much more to say on vagueness and its relationship to our judgments for free action in §7.4. 
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Imagine that Andrew creates an action procedure that causes him to delete typographical errors 
in his thesis as he proof reads. Things are fine at first; Andrew scans each page and when he 
comes across a mistake he performs a deleting action and makes his corrections. Sometime later 
things start to go wrong; Andrew finds himself deleting text in the thesis even when he knows 
there are no mistakes. He also finds himself having recurring intrusive thoughts that there are 
mistakes on every page of the thesis that need deleting. Andrew concludes that his deleting 
action procedure is not doing what it was created to do and attempts to update and fix it. When 
that fails he tries destroying it and that fails too. Much to his dismay, Andrew realizes that he no 
longer has any control over the haywire deleting action procedure.51 
This case roughly approximates a case of OCD. I will assume for the moment that 
[Pathology unfree] is true, and Andrew’s actions are unfree because he is in the grip of a mental 
pathology. According to this first objector, the action procedure at the centre of Andrew’s OCD 
is a non-deliberative cause. Andrew created the deleting action procedure that he subsequently has 
no control over. He cannot control his deleting actions, or control the influence of his deleting 
thoughts. He is unable to update or destroy the deleting action procedure. At the very least, it 
seems to be something like a non-deliberative cause. Yet we are inclined to say that Andrew’s 
actions are not free. Hence we have a counterexample to indirect compatibilism: an action that 
the view categorises as free, but which is not free. 
I concede that this action is not free. However, it’s not a counterexample to indirect 
compatibilism because the action procedure at the centre of this case is not a non-deliberative 
cause at all. Andrew created an action procedure to delete any typographical errors he came 
across while proof reading his thesis. He did not create an action procedure that would cause 
him to delete the good text in his thesis or cause recurring intrusive thoughts about deleting. The 
fact that Andrew’s deleting action procedure is not doing what it was created to do signals that 
the action procedure is not a non-deliberative cause. That’s because it is built into the creation 
condition that to be a controlled action procedure, that action procedure does what it was 
created to do. So while the mechanism in question does count as an action procedure, it doesn’t 
count as a controlled action procedure. But indirect compatibilism is not the view that actions 
caused by action procedures are free: it’s the view that actions caused by controlled action 
procedures are free, and this is not a case in which the action in question is caused by a 
                                                          
51This is only meant as an illustrative case and nothing that I say hangs on the specifics of the case. For example, you 
might think that Andrew does have the ability to destroy, trigger off, or update this dysfunctional action procedure. 
After all, people do overcome their OCD, or at the very least learn to manage it. I think this is right, but it still seems 
that people very rarely overcome something like OCD without professional assistance and psychoactive medication. 
Thus, while it is not impossible to think that Andrew could destroy, trigger or update the dysfunctional action 
procedure it is very unlikely. 
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controlled action procedure. Hence, indirect compatibilism, correctly classified this as a case of 
unfree action.  
To illustrate this point, consider another person, Andrew*, who freely creates a non-
deliberative cause that is exactly like original Andrew’s deleting action procedure. That is, 
Andrew* freely furnishes his psychology with the OCD pathology. Once again, I am assuming 
for the moment that [Pathology non-maximising] is true and that anything that causes you to 
perform non-maximising actions without the possibility of intervention is pathological. 
Conditional on there be nothing wrong with Andrew* that causes him do this, according to 
indirect compatibilism when Andrew* goes on to delete the majority of his thesis he acts freely. 
Why? Because, the action procedure is in fact a non-deliberative cause: it does exactly what it was 
created to do. In this case it seems reasonable to think that Andrew* has created a non-
deliberative cause that is a mental pathology, and yet the actions that issue from that non-
deliberative cause are free actions.  
To recap, indirect compatibilism has no issue judging that original Andrew is unfree 
because the action procedure in this case is not a non-deliberative cause because it is not doing 
what it was created to do. On the other hand, indirect compatibilism correctly, to my mind, 
judges that Andrew*’s action is free because in effect he freely created a mental pathology.52  
Indirect compatibilism, then, only judges those actions which arise in virtue of mental 
pathologies to be unfree when they are caused by action procedures that fulfil none of the direct 
control conditions to be a CAP. But if someone freely creates a mental pathology then it seems 
plausible that the actions that result from that pathological non-deliberative cause are free. If I am 
right then [Pathology unfree] is false, and some actions issuing from pathological non-
deliberative causes are free. Next, I will undermine [Pathology non-maximising]. 
5.2.2 Non-deliberative causes, human pro-sociality and cooperation 
Here is the argument I outlined earlier, which if sound, shows that some locally non-maximising 
non-deliberative causes are not pathological. 
Non-pathological non-deliberative causes 
1) [Not pathology] Anything which is globally maximising to possess is not 
pathological. 
                                                          
52Once again nothing I say here hangs of the specifics of this case. One intuition I have about case Andrew* that I 
want to flag is that I think the actions caused by his non-deliberative cause are less free relative to actions caused by 
freedom-conferring mechanisms and other controlled action procedures. For now, I am sticking with the current 
orthodoxy of the free will literature that a necessary condition for being free is that it is all or nothing. Shortly, in §7.4 
I will outline how my account of indirect compatibilism naturally admits for the possibility of their being degrees of 
freedom and as a result vindicate my intuition about the status of Andrew*’s freedom. 
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2) [Global maximising] Some non-deliberative causes cause you to reliably perform acts 
which are (a) non-maximising, by your lights, at the time of the action, (b) for which 
there is no possibility of intervention and (c) are globally maximising to possess. 
3) Therefore, those non-deliberative causes that are globally maximising to possess are 
not pathological (from 1 and 2). 
The basic idea is that even if a non-deliberative cause causes you to sometimes perform actions 
that are locally non-maximising, possession of the non-deliberative cause could still be globally 
maximising. Provided we also think that anything which is globally maximising does not count as 
pathological, then [Pathology non-maximising] is false, and some locally non-maximising non-
deliberative causes are not pathological. 
If it’s globally maximising to possess some non-deliberative causes, then they are exactly 
the kinds of things that we should predict to find in beings like us. Here I will outline just one 
line of evidence that shows [Globally maximising] is true. Binding yourself psychologically to 
perform certain actions, or to refrain from performing others, can be incredibly beneficial, even 
if it can often result in performing locally non-maximising actions. Specifically, I will use the case 
of strong reciprocity, where an individual psychologically binds herself to punish and cooperate 
even when it is costly to them to do so, because binding themselves in this manner makes them a 
more attractive person to cooperate with. While I think these benefits are shared with other 
group members, here I will focus solely on the benefits to the individual who possesses the non-
deliberative cause. 
Reciprocity is taken to be the general mechanism that accounts for evolution and 
maintenance of pro-sociality and cooperation amongst large groups of unrelated individuals.53 
Roughly, reciprocity describes the tendency to repay good acts with good acts and bad acts with 
bad acts when dealing with other people. Here I will briefly outline two kinds of reciprocity in 
the literature, weak and strong, and will suggest that strong reciprocity could be caused by non-
deliberative causes. If it’s globally maximising to become a strong reciprocator in some cases, 
then we should expect to find people who possess non-deliberative causes. Further, provided 
you also think that anything which is beneficial, under usual circumstances, is not pathological 
then [Pathology non-maximising] is false, and some locally non-maximising non-deliberative 
causes are not pathological. 
Let’s start with weak reciprocity.54 Someone employing weak reciprocity will punish and 
cooperate when it is beneficial for them to do so. Strictly speaking someone employing weak 
                                                          
53Cooperation between related individuals is explained by the theory of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964; for review 
see Gardner & West, 2014). 
54Weak reciprocity is also commonly referred to in the literature as reciprocal altruism. 
122 
reciprocity could elect to forego punishing when it is too costly, or not cooperate when it would 
be more beneficial for them to defect. I will not discuss weak reciprocity in any more detail as it 
is not a strategy that I think could be realized by a non-deliberative cause (see seminal papers by 
Axelrod, 1984; Gouldner, 1960; Trivers, 1971; for recent review see Nowak, 2006). It would be 
better realized by a controlled action procedure that can be triggered on and off as required. In 
contrast, someone employing strong reciprocity will punish and cooperate even when it is not 
locally beneficial for them to do so (for example see, Boyd, Gintis and Bowles, 2010; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Gintis, Camerer, & Fehr, 2004). Hence it makes 
sense that such behaviour would be the result of a non-deliberative cause.  
Following Francesco Guala (2012) I will call the action of costly punishment negative 
strong reciprocity and the act of costly cooperation positive strong reciprocity. My suggestion is 
that one way we can make sense of why people perform actions that appear to be locally non-
maximising at the time of action, is because they are being caused by a globally maximising non-
deliberative cause.55 I will address both components of strong reciprocity next, as they 
correspond nicely to two ways a non-deliberative cause might function. Roughly, for now, the 
reason it is globally maximising, under usual circumstances, to be a strong reciprocator is because 
it causes others to interact with you in a much more prosocial and cooperative manner.   
5.2.2.1 Negative strong reciprocity. The easiest way to grasp how being a negative strong reciprocator 
can cause others to interact with you in a more prosocial and cooperative manner is by way of 
example. Remember, I am doing this in in order to illustrate how it can be globally maximising to 
have a non-deliberative cause that binds and causes actions that you cannot intercede on. 
Imagine you and a stranger are invited to play a one-off game. The rules of the game are 
simple; you will receive $100 and be asked to divide the money between you and the stranger. 
You can offer the stranger any amount, and if they accept you will each receive the amount 
contained in the offer. However, if the stranger rejects the offer you will each receive nothing. 
After hearing the rules, you decide to offer $1 to the stranger and keep $99 for yourself. The 
stranger automatically rejects the offer and you both receive nothing.56 
                                                          
55I am not claiming that all cases of strong reciprocity are caused by freely created non-deliberative causes. Some 
cases might be as some evolutionary psychologists tell us, part of our psychological tool-box evolutionarily selected 
for in the environment for evolutionary adaptation (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Here is why I think some cases 
are caused by freely created non-deliberative causes. First, there is evidence that the propensity to engage in strong 
reciprocity is part be contingent on their being strong group norms. For example, the Tsimane of the Amazon make 
more unfair offers and do not routinely reject unfair offers because they appear to have no strong group norms 
regarding the distribution of resources (e.g., Gurven, Zanolini, & Schniter, 2008). Second, there is evidence that 
engaging in strong reciprocity in one area does not predict engaging in strong reciprocity in another area (e.g., 
Yamagishi et al., 2012). Together these pieces of evidence together suggest that at least some cases of strong 
reciprocity are caused by freely created non-deliberative causes. 
56There is plenty of evidence that people engage in costly punishment of this sort both in the behavioural laboratory 
(see for example, Güth, Schmittberger, Schwarze, 1982, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; Gächter, & Herrmann, 2008) 
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 For many people the stranger’s rejection of the offer is entirely understandable, but it 
also makes little sense. To see why it makes little sense, we need do a bit of basic game theory. 
You make the first move you and must decide whether or not to make a fair offer (50/50) or an 
unfair offer (99/1). Assume for the moment that the stranger will automatically accept any fair 
offer, then if you make a fair offer the game ends with you each $50 up. Still, if you make an 
unfair offer you stand to gain more than if you make a fair offer. If you make an unfair offer, 
then the stranger has a choice to make, either they choose to reject the offer and receive nothing 
or choose to accept the offer and receive $1. The stranger’s choice is between receiving $0 and 
receiving $1. Rationally speaking the stranger should choose the $1. The solution to this game is 
that you make an unfair offer and the stranger accepts. But that can’t be right!  After all, most of 
us think that the stranger’s rejection of the unfair offer made complete sense. We are missing 
something important in this simple case.57 
 What if the stranger in this case were able to signal that they would as a matter of fact 
reject any offer that is not a fair offer? Suddenly the original player’s choice is no longer between 
receiving $50 or $99. It’s now between receiving $50 or $0, and no one would choose $0. By 
signalling that they would reject any unfair offer, the stranger is also signalling that they will make 
a locally non-maximising action. One effective strategy to game someone into acting in a pro-
social and cooperative manner is to convince them that you will perform a locally non-
maximising action and will punish them even when it is not beneficial for you to do so.58 
Let’s tie this back to my argument about why some locally non-maximising non-
deliberative causes are not pathological. One way that someone can psychologically bind 
themselves to punish all unfair offers is with a non-deliberative cause. So long as the stranger is 
guaranteed to punish all unfair offers, this causes the player to have to choose between being 
cooperative and receiving something or be uncooperative and receiving nothing. Under usual 
circumstances, a non-deliberative cause that causes you to punish all unfair offers is globally 
maximising because it causes others to have to act cooperatively if they want to choose the 
maximising action. Even if the non-deliberative cause causes you to act in a locally non-
maximising manner whenever people defect (don’t cooperate), overall the non-deliberative cause 
will cause others to act towards you in a much more prosocial and cooperative manner. If this is 
right then [Globally maximising] is true. Then, provided you think that things which are globally 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and cross-culturally (see for example, Roth, Vesna, Masahiro, & Shmuel, 1991; Cameron, 1999; Mathew, & Boyd, 
2013). Though, see Guala (2012) for a critical discussion on the scope of these kinds of evidence. 
57In a one-off game the weak reciprocator should accept the unfair offer. There is nothing beneficial about adopting 
a punishing strategy with someone you will not interact with again. 
58This line of thinking can be used to explain phenomena from blood feuds and vendettas (e.g., Ericksen, & Horton, 
1992; Nikiforakis, & Engelmann, 2011; Fehl, Sommerfeld, Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2012), and nuclear 
deterrence theory (e.g., Rauchhaus, 2009; Quackenbush, 2010; Sechser & Fuhrmann, 2013).  
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maximising don’t count as pathological, the non-deliberative cause in this case is not 
pathological.  
Let me briefly address a couple of concerns. First, I have stated that non-deliberative 
causes can be globally maximising under usual circumstances. It’s possible to imagine creating a 
non-deliberative cause, which binds you to perform certain actions, or away from being able to 
perform certain actions which is globally maximising in one environment but not globally 
maximising in another environment. Perhaps there is some sudden dramatic shift in the way that 
group members interact with one another that causes the non-deliberative cause to be 
maladaptive. My thoughts on this case are the same as in §5.2.2. The fact that the non-
deliberative cause is no longer globally maximising could cause it count as being pathological. 
However, just because some non-deliberative cause counts as being pathological doesn’t mean 
the actions it causes are unfree. Maladaptive non-deliberative causes are not dysfunctional as they 
are doing exactly what they created to do.59 Even if it turns out that in some cases [Pathology 
non-maximising] is true, provided [Pathology unfree] is false then the actions caused by the non-
deliberative cause are still free. 
Second, you might think that it’s possible to simply fake the fact that you are a strong 
reciprocator. If this were possible you could receive the overall benefits of being a strong 
reciprocator without psychologically binding yourself to have to perform locally non-maximising 
actions. Using the continued example of unfair monetary offers, to maintain the ruse you would 
have to continuously choose to do the locally non-maximising thing every time someone defects 
on you. There is, however, plausibly a discernible phenotypic difference between someone 
merely signalling that they will respond in a locally non-maximising manner to various group 
norm violations and someone that is signalling that they are psychologically bound to respond in 
a locally non-maximising manner to various group norm violations.60 The best way to signal that 
you are strong reciprocator to unfairness, killing, and so on is to actually make your psychology 
such that you will perform costly punishment on anyone who performs those actions. After all, 
the reason that strong reciprocators are so effective at causing others to act in a pro-social and 
cooperative manner towards them is because their commitment to various group norms is 
unwavering.61 
                                                          
59The idea that something is functional and counts as being pathological due to a mismatch with the environment 
comes from Griffiths and Matthewson (2018) and Matthewson and Griffiths (2017).  
60Creating a non-deliberative cause to enforce pro-sociality and cooperation might be a form of costly signalling. This 
means that is must be hard to fake to other group members. See for example, Smith, & Bird (2000); Gintis, Smith, & 
Bowles (2001); Lotem, Fishman, & Stone (2003). 
61One final piece of evidence that might sweeten my suggestion here comes from neuroimaging work on costly 
punishment (which is called effective punishment in this literature). One key brain location active during costly 
punishment is the dorsal striatum, a brain region associated with reward processing during goal-directed activities. 
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5.2.2.2 Positive strong reciprocity. Non-deliberative causes don’t just cause actions, they can also 
influence other action procedures, and in some cases this influence can remove options that we 
can choose from. Just as being psychologically bound to perform certain actions can cause 
people to act in a prosocial and cooperative manner, so too can being psychologically bound to 
be unable to perform certain actions. If you are able to signal to people that you are incapable of 
performing actions that violate various group norms then you make yourself a more attractive 
group member and cooperative partner. For example, I think that possessing a non-deliberative 
cause that removes the option of killing is a common non-deliberative cause that might be found 
in people’s psychology. And people who don’t have the option of killing you are more attractive 
as group members and cooperative partners. While this might result in them being unable to 
choose the maximising action in some cases, in usual circumstances the overall benefits will be 
far greater. Once again if this is right then [Globally maximising] is true and provided you think 
that things which are globally maximising don’t count as pathological then the non-deliberative 
cause in this case is not pathological. 
One other plausible upshot of removing certain actions and action procedures as options 
with a non-deliberative cause is that you remove yourself as a target of strong reciprocity. There 
are going to be cases where, by some accounts, the right thing to do, is to do the thing that 
violates some group norm. For example, in the case of Bodi that I described earlier, arguably the 
right thing for Bodi to do, if the option were available to him, would be to shoot and kill the 
truck driver before he burned to death. But killing the truck driver would violate norms against 
killing and cause strong reciprocators to punish Bodi. Very few people think that a person 
should be punished if they are unable to kill someone even if, on some accounts, killing would 
be the right thing to do. However, it’s plausible that many people think that someone should be 
punished for killing even if, by some accounts, that person does the right thing by killing. 
Do people really punish people for violating a group norm even when they judge that the 
act of violating a group norm was the right one? This is an open empirical question but there is 
some interesting suggestive evidence from a set of pilot data reported by Peter Railton (2014; 
unpublished). Railton presented students with a simple scenario where they were asked whether 
or not they would shove a corpulent gentleman on top of a possible suicide bomber in order to 
prevent him from getting on board the bus. If we accept that the number of people who say they 
would perform this action is indicative of what they think the right action is, then approximately 
two-thirds of people think the right thing to do is push the corpulent gentleman on top of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Not only is the dorsal striatum active during costly punishment, the strength of activation is proportionate to the 
cost of the punishment. People who engage in costly punishment are not only doing so with purpose they feel good 
about what they are doing (de Quervain, et al., 2004). 
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suicide bomber. However, when asked whether or not they would trust the person who pushes 
the corpulent gentleman on top of the suicide bomber, the majority of people respond that they 
would not. Mistrust is, by my lights, a form of punishment, as it will cloud any future interactions 
that others have with that person. Importantly, for me, insofar as this mistrust constitutes a 
punishment, then we have suggestive evidence of people punishing people for doing what even 
they think is the right thing. Of course, this is only a pilot dataset and a full confirmatory study is 
required, but it fits with the account that I have described. Still, I think we should expect people 
to possess non-deliberative causes not only to cause costly acts of punishment, but to prevent 
certain action and action procedure options from being able to be chosen. 
In summary, I have illustrated that under usual circumstances, it can sometimes be 
globally maximising to psychologically bind yourself to cause certain actions, or to refrain from 
producing others. Together with the idea that things which are globally maximising don’t count 
as pathological, this gives us good reasons to think [Pathology non-maximising] is false. As a 
result, we no longer have any reason to think that non-deliberative causes must be pathological 
and hence cause unfree actions. 
5.2.3 Conclusion: Non-deliberative causes are pathological 
In this section I have addressed the charge that non-deliberative causes cause unfree actions 
because they are pathological. The reason non-deliberative causes are pathological is because 
they often cause actions that appear, at the time of action, to be non-maximising. In this section 
I have attempted to undermine this argument in two ways. First, even if we accept that 
something that causes non-maximising actions counts as pathological, there is no reason to think 
that all pathologies cause unfree actions. That’s because there is a difference between pathologies 
realized by action procedures that fulfil none of the direct control conditions to be a CAP, and 
non-deliberative causes. Indirect compatibilism has no issues counting actions caused by action 
procedures that fulfil none of the conditions to be a CAP as unfree. On the other hand, indirect 
compatibilism counts actions caused by non-deliberative causes as free, even if such a non-
deliberative cause still counts as being pathological. I think this is the right judgement because 
the non-deliberative cause is doing exactly what it was freely created to do. 
Second, just because non-deliberative causes sometimes cause locally non-maximising 
actions without the possibility of intervention doesn’t mean they count as pathological. It can be 
globally maximising to psychologically bind yourself to perform certain actions, or away from 
being able to perform certain actions. To illustrate this claim I outlined the overall benefits of 
negative and positive strong reciprocity to the individual. Even though psychologically binding 
yourself to punish and cooperate means you might often perform locally non-maximising 
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actions, binding yourself in this manner also causes other people to act in a far more prosocial 
and cooperative manner towards you. This means that under usual circumstances it is globally 
maximising to possess the relevant non-deliberative causes. Provided you think that something 
which is globally maximising is not pathological then we have good reasons to think that some 
non-deliberative causes are not pathological and hence cause free actions. 
 
  5.3. Objection 2: Non-deliberative causes and moral responsibility62 
According to indirect compatibilism, actions caused by non-deliberative causes are free. 
However, once a non-deliberative cause has been created we have no ongoing control over the 
actions it causes, or the influence it has on our other action procedures. According to the second 
objection, because we are unable to intercede on actions caused by non-deliberative causes (or 
the influence they have on our other action procedures) we cannot be morally responsible for 
these actions. Moral praise and blame are only appropriate reactions when we deserve such 
reactions and actions not under our control are not deserving of our moral judgements. 
Importantly, because of the tight conceptual connection between moral responsibility and acting 
freely, if we are not morally responsible for actions caused by our non-deliberative causes then 
they are not free. Here, then, is the argument that underlies the second objection. 
Objection 2 
Consider some standard action A which is caused by a non-deliberative cause: 
1) If A is free then someone, S, performing A is morally responsible for A. 63 
2) A is caused by a non-deliberative cause. 
3) [Principle of intercession] S is morally responsible for A only if S is able to intercede on 
A.64 
                                                          
62Thanks and credit to Michael Duncan, James Norton and Nathaniel Gan for their assistance with this objection. 
63There is another way to run this argument. Let’s call it the freedom-first route: 
1) If S performing A is morally responsible for A, then A is free. 
2) A is caused by a non-deliberative cause. 
3) [Freedom to do otherwise] S performs A freely only if S is able to intercede on A. 
4) [No intercession] If A is caused by a non-deliberative cause, S cannot intercede on A. 
5) [Lemma A] S cannot intercede on A (from 2 and 4). 
6) [Lemma B] A is unfree (from 3 and 5). 
7) [Conclusion] Therefore, S is not morally responsible for A (from 1 and 6). 
Whether you prefer the moral responsibility first route or freedom first route will depend on whether you think 
moral responsibility or freedom is more foundational. I think that freedom is more foundational, but there are many 
theorists who don’t, such as those who follow the Strawsonian compatibilist tradition (Strawson, 1962). Nothing I 
say in this section hinges on the exact argument that I discuss. However, as this is a thesis about freedom, I have 
chosen to discuss the moral responsibility first route as it argues to the conclusion that actions caused by non-
deliberative causes are unfree. 
64I am assuming that something like the [Principle of intercession] is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. 
The [Principle of intercession] can be thought of as a corollary to some readings of the principle of alternative 
possibilities (Frankfurt, 1969) and the principle of avoidable blame (Otsuka, 1998). Simpler accounts, such as moral 
influencing accounts, hold that counting people as morally responsible is justified when it influences or pressures 
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4) [No intercession] If A is caused by a non-deliberative cause, S cannot intercede on A. 
5) [Lemma A] S cannot intercede on A (from 2 and 4). 
6) [Lemma B] S is not morally responsible for A (from 3 and 5). 
7) [Conclusion] Therefore, A is unfree (from 1 and 6). 
According to this argument, the reason that actions caused by non-deliberative causes are unfree 
is because we cannot be morally responsible for them. The reason we cannot be morally 
responsible for actions caused by non-deliberative causes is because we are unable to intercede 
on actions caused by non-deliberative causes. The argument is valid. 
The premise I will be challenging in this section is [No intercession]. I will propose that 
while someone cannot intercede on actions caused by a non-deliberative cause at the time of action, 
they were able to intercede, in a more general sense, at the time of creating the non-deliberative 
cause. Here’s the basic idea: when someone performs the action of creating a non-deliberative 
cause, they are also performing a number of temporally extended actions as well.65 After all, 
when someone creates a non-deliberative cause, they do so knowing what the likely future 
outcomes will be and they causally impact their future psychology in order to ensure those 
outcomes will occur. We are morally responsible for actions caused by a non-deliberative cause 
because we were able to intercede at the time when we created the non-deliberative cause. When 
we create a non-deliberative that we thought was best, we could have created a different non-
deliberative cause or no non-deliberative cause at all.66 If this proposal is right, then we are 
morally responsible for the consequences of our non-deliberative causes and with respect to the 
second objection we no longer have any reason to think the actions they cause are unfree.67After 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
people to behave in morally desirable ways (see for example, Schlick, 1935; Smart, 1961; though see also Arneson, 
2003, Vargas, 2013). However, moral influencing accounts are contentious and most theorists do not think that 
pressuring and influencing people into behaving in morally desirable ways is a sufficient justification for our 
practices surrounding moral responsibility. 
65This proposal has been adapted from Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming) Freedom and Binding Consequentialism. This 
paper centres on strong moral dispositions that are in some ways just like non-deliberative causes. Someone creates a 
strong moral disposition to ensure that their future choice options are causally constrained. While there is no 
description of strong moral dispositions that cause actions directly, I see no reason why there could not be cases 
where it’s our future actions, not just our future choice options, which are causally constrained. 
66I discuss whether foreseeability is required for you to be responsible for extended actions in §5.3.1.  
67Showing we are morally responsible for the consequences of our non-deliberative causes does not hinge on facts 
around action individuation, which is a contentious literature (for seminal papers see Ginet, 1990; Goldman, 1970; 
Davidson, 1971). There are other routes that I could have taken that would give us the same result. For example, I 
could have used a general moral tracing principle. We can be morally responsible for actions not under our control 
provided they can be traced back to actions that were under our control. While it is not possible to intercede on the 
actions that are caused by a non-deliberative cause, it was possible intercede on the non-deliberative cause, which 
caused the action, when it was being created. As a result, we are morally responsible for the consequences of our 
non-deliberative causes in virtue of being morally responsible for the creation of our non-deliberative causes. One 
way to understand moral tracing principles is as accepting [No intervention] but rejecting [Principle of Intervention]. 
What it hangs on is whether you think interceding is only at the time of action, or whether it is more general than 
this. For an in depth discussion about moral tracing approaches and their limitations see Fischer and Tognazzini 
(2009; 2012), McKenna (2005; 2008) and Vargas (2005). 
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I have finished developing this proposal, I will then briefly outline in §5.3.2 how it interacts with 
non-deliberative causes that don’t directly cause actions but instead influence other action 
procedures. 
5.3.1 Moral responsibility and actions caused by non-deliberative causes 
For now, let’s begin with a couple of cases that do not involve a non-deliberative cause. Imagine 
someone named Matt, who presses a button knowing that it will result in a nuclear bomb being 
dropped on Auckland, New Zealand, in twelve months. Matt knows that once the button has 
been pressed there is no way to intercede to prevent the nuclear attack. Matt stands before the 
panel and after deliberating over the various options that are available to him freely chooses to 
press the button. As it so happens, twelve month pass and the nuclear bomb attack occurs over 
Auckland, New Zealand. I don’t think that it should be contentious that Matt is morally 
responsible for the nuclear attack on Auckland. Of course, Matt was not able to intercede at the 
time of the nuclear attack in order to prevent it (or for that matter, any time after pressing the 
button), however he was able to intercede, in some more general sense, by refraining from 
pushing the button. I will return to this point shortly. Importantly, if you think that Matt is 
morally responsible for the nuclear attack, then I think you are part of the way to also thinking 
that people are morally responsible for actions caused by non-deliberative causes. 
Let’s put the case of Matt to one side for the moment. Non-deliberative causes are much 
more complex than actions with foreseeable consequences because they can cause a number of 
different probabilistic or otherwise unforeseeable outcomes. Imagine, now, someone named 
Katie who, while standing next to her friend Percy, pulls a lever. The lever is part of a device that 
contains a complex algorithm that is capable of causing almost every conceivable outcome in the 
world. Katie knows about the algorithm and knows generally what sorts of factors makes the 
device cause good outcomes and what sorts of factors make the device to cause bad outcomes. 
Still, Katie is ignorant of exactly how the algorithm works and all the significant factors that 
determine the outcome the device will cause.68 As it so happens, Katie pulls the lever because she 
thinks it would be best and as a result the device kills Percy, her friend standing next to her. I 
think that Katie is morally responsible for the death of Percy. Once again, I don’t think that it 
should be contentious that Katie is morally responsible for the death of Percy. Importantly, if 
you think that Katie is morally responsible for the death of Percy, then I think you are part of the 
way to also thinking that people are morally responsible for the actions caused by non-
deliberative causes. Shortly, I will draw upon the cases of Matt and Katie in order to give an 
account of moral responsibility for actions caused by non-deliberative causes. 
                                                          
68Alternatively, the algorithm in this case could be indeterministic. Then it would not matter if Katie had complete 
knowledge of the algorithm and factors that influence what outcome the device causes. 
130 
5.3.1.1. Moral responsibility and temporally extended actions. Before returning to a case of a non-
deliberative cause, getting clear on one reason we correctly count Matt as being morally 
responsible for the nuclear attack on Auckland will be a helpful exercise. After all, Matt was not 
able to intercede on the nuclear attack at the time that the attack was taking place, and with 
respect to the second objection this prima facie suggests he is not morally responsible for the 
nuclear attack. However, I have also stated that Matt could have interceded, in some more 
general sense, how should we make sense of this claim? On one way of individuating actions, 
when Matt performs the action of pushing the button he also performs the temporally extended 
action of attacking Auckland with a nuclear weapon. Why should we think that? Well, pushing 
the button causally impacts the future and ensures that a nuclear attack will occur twelve months 
into the future. When Matt performs the action of pushing the button he does so knowing what 
the future outcomes of him pushing the button will be. That is, he knows that pushing the 
button will cause a nuclear attack to occur in Auckland in twelve months and that he will be 
unable to intercede and stop the nuclear attack from occurring. The upshot of this proposal is 
that it is clear that Matt could have interceded on the nuclear attack on Auckland. After all, he 
could have interceded right at the beginning of the case and refrained from pushing the button. 
Importantly, the fact that Matt could have interceded on this temporally extended action gives us 
one reason to think we are correct to count Matt as being morally responsible for the nuclear 
attack.69 
5.3.1.2. Moral responsibility and non-deliberative causes. So far I have presented two different cases for 
two different purposes. The case of Matt showed that we are morally responsible for temporally 
extended actions and the case of Katie showed that we are be morally responsible for 
probabilistic outcomes. If you think that this is right then I have what is required to show that 
we are morally responsible for the actions caused by our non-deliberative causes. To illustrate 
this claim, let me bring back a case involving a non-deliberative cause. Recall the case of Bud that 
I described in detail earlier in this chapter. Bud created a non-deliberative cause that causes him 
to physically retaliate against anyone who attacks him. Imagine now that twelve months after 
Bud created the non-deliberative cause a frail man named Milhouse attacks Bud. Bud is not 
threatened by the attack and if the option were available Bud could have deescalated the situation 
                                                          
69As I stated in Footnote 67 this is not the only proposal that I could have developed to get this result. I could 
instead accept a stronger version of intercession such that that it does not count as ability to intercede if the possible 
intercession is not at the time of action. But with this stronger version of intercession, [Principle of intercession] 
becomes less plausible, and I would argue against it. This approach would be similar to what some have called a 
‘moral tracing principle’. While it is not possible for Matt intercede on nuclear attack on Auckland when it was 
happening, it was possible for Matt to intercede on the button press, which caused the nuclear attack on Auckland. 
As a result, Matt is morally responsible for the nuclear attack on Auckland in virtue of being morally responsible for 
the button press, which caused the nuclear attack on Auckland. 
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with no risk to himself or others. Unfortunately, Bud’s non-deliberative cause causes him to 
physically attack Milhouse, Bud punches Milhouse, causing his death. 
The second objection suggests that Bud is not free when he throws the punch against 
Millhouse because he is not morally responsible for that punch. And the reason Bud is not 
morally responsible for the punch that kills Milhouse is because Bud is unable to intercede on 
actions caused by his non-deliberative cause. Still, I think that many people (including myself) 
think that Bud is morally responsible for the death of Milhouse. By combining lessons from the 
case of Matt and Katie I can now give an account of why we correctly count Bud as being 
morally responsible for Milhouse’s death. 
On one way of individuating actions, when Bud performs the action of creating his non-
deliberative cause he also performs a number of temporally extended actions as well. After all, 
when we create a non-deliberative cause we causally impact our future psychology in order to 
ensure that certain actions occur in the future. When Bud performs the action of creating his 
non-deliberative cause he does so knowing the kinds of future actions his non-deliberative cause 
will cause. That is, he knows that creating the non-deliberative cause will cause him in the future 
to physically retaliate against anyone who attacks him and he knows he will be unable to 
intercede to stop himself from doing so. This was the lesson from the case of Matt. 
Let’s build on this. When Bud is performing the action of creating his non-deliberative 
cause, and alongside that a number of temporally extended actions, he cannot possibly know the 
exact outcomes of his non-deliberative cause. Bud might know generally what kinds of factors 
will result in his non-deliberative cause causing good outcomes and bad outcomes respectively. 
Further, he might know generally whether the non-deliberative cause will result in more good 
than bad outcomes overall. For example, if the person who attacks Bud is harder, better, faster, 
stronger, then the act of physically retaliating might result in a bad outcome. Similarly, if the 
person who attacks Bud is non-threatening and frail, such in the case of Milhouse, then the 
outcome will be bad as well. The exact outcome of each temporally extended action is 
probabilistic, as Bud cannot foresee exactly which factors accompany each temporally extended 
act and whether they result in the outcome being good or bad each time. However, just because 
the outcome of each temporally extended action is probabilistic each time doesn’t mean Bud is 
not morally responsible for them. This was the lesson from the case of Katie. 
In summary, when Matt performs the action of pressing the button he also performs the 
temporally extended action of a nuclear attack against Auckland. That’s because when Matt 
pushes the button he causally impacts the future to ensure a nuclear attack will occur. Similarly, 
when Bud performs the action of creating a non-deliberative cause he is also performing the 
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temporally extended action of punching. When Katie pulls the lever of the device she is morally 
responsible for the probabilistic outcome of Percy’s death. Similarly, when Bud performs the 
action of creating his non-deliberative cause he is morally responsible for the probabilistic 
outcome of killing Milhouse. By combining these cases we then have an account of why we 
correctly judge someone to be morally responsible for the consequences of their non-deliberative 
causes. To the best of my knowledge there is no morally significant difference between these 
kinds of cases, unless you think something important hinges on the difference between pushing 
buttons, switching levers, and creating a non-deliberative cause. But this difference doesn’t strike 
me as important with respect to determining whether or not someone counts as being morally 
responsible. 
Importantly for my purposes, because Bud can intercede on the temporally extended 
action of punching Milhouse, either by not creating the non-deliberative cause or creating a 
different non-deliberative cause, he counts as being morally responsible for causing Milhouse’s 
death. Further, because Bud is morally responsible for the consequences of his non-deliberative 
cause, relative to the second objection, we no longer to have a reason to think that Bud is acting 
unfreely when he punches Milhouse. 
5.3.2 Moral responsibility under the influence of non-deliberative causes 
There is something more to say about the relationship between non-deliberative causes and 
moral responsibility. Non-deliberative causes don’t just cause actions but can also influence our 
other action procedures. Sometimes this influence can restrict what options are open for 
someone to freely perform. Earlier in this chapter I described in some detail the case of Bodi. 
Bodi wanted to perform the action of killing in order to prevent a truck driver from burning to 
death. Unfortunately, Bodi possessed a non-deliberative cause that prevented him from killing 
people, so killing the truck driver was not an option that Bodi could freely choose to perform. 
With that said, Bodi was still free to choose to perform a number of other options. Call these his 
choice options. 
While we might want to count Bodi as being either morally responsible for having done 
the right thing or wrong thing overall, prima facie it appears as though Bodi is in fact morally 
responsible for two different actions. First, Bodi is morally responsible with respect to the action 
of creating the non-deliberative cause that causally constrains his future choice options. Second, 
Bodi is morally responsible with respect to which of his remaining choice options he freely 
chooses to perform. Bodi can count as being morally responsible for having done the right thing 
or the wrong thing with respect to each of these actions. The reason this complicates matters is 
because it’s possible for our right/wrong judgments to be incongruent across the two actions. 
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For example, someone can do the right thing with respect to their action of creating a non-
deliberative cause, yet do the wrong thing with respect to which of their remaining choice 
options they freely choose to perform. 
Following Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming) I think that whether or not someone counts 
as being morally responsible for having done the right thing or wrong thing overall depends on 
which of their actions we are focusing on and seeking to morally influence. I will not spend 
much time on this issue as it’s unrelated to the second objection and doesn’t speak directly to the 
issues of this chapter, which is whether or not the actions caused by non-deliberative causes are 
free and whether their influence is freedom undermining. However, at the very least it is of 
interest to very briefly sketch each possible right/wrong combination and to see whether we are 
likely to think that someone is morally responsible for having done the right thing or wrong 
thing overall. For ease of explication, I will stick with the case of Bodi.70 
5.3.2.1 The right non-deliberative cause and the right remaining option. This case is simply the original 
Bodi case presented earlier in this chapter. Bodi does the right thing when he performs the 
action of creating the non-deliberative cause that removes the option of killing (see §5.2.2). 
While Bodi cannot shoot the truck driver he freely chooses to perform the best available 
remaining option which was to stay with the truck driver and comfort him the best that he can. 
Given the fact Bodi does the right thing with respect to both actions in this case we should have 
no issue judging that Bodi is morally responsible for having done the right thing overall. 
5.3.2.2 The wrong non-deliberative cause and the wrong remaining option. Imagine, now, Bodi* who is a 
cunning serial killer who is deciding how he should kill his next victim. Bodi* freely created a 
repugnant non-deliberative cause that restricts his choice options to either killing his victim 
slowly and painfully, or killing his victim quickly and painlessly. The victim pleads with Bodi* to 
let them go but this is not a choice option because of the non-deliberative cause. As it turns out, 
Bodi* freely chooses to perform the worst available option and kill his unfortunate victim slowly 
and painfully. It should be uncontentious that Bodi* does the wrong thing when he performs the 
action of creating the repugnant non-deliberative cause. Similarly, it should be uncontentious 
that Bodi* does the wrong thing when he freely chooses to perform the worst remaining 
available option, killing his victim slowly and painfully. Given the fact Bodi* does the wrong 
thing with respect to both actions in this case we should have no issue judging that Bodi* is 
morally responsible for having done the wrong thing overall.   
5.3.2.3 The right non-deliberative cause and the wrong remaining option. Now back to Bodi. Bodi plausibly 
does the right thing when he performs the action of creating the non-deliberative cause that 
                                                          
70This proposal has been adapted from Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming) Freedom and Binding Consequentialism. 
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removes the option of killing. But now imagine that instead of choosing to comfort the truck 
driver as best he can, Bodi runs away from the scene leaving the truck driver to die alone. In this 
case it seems as though Bodi chooses the wrong option. While Bodi does the right thing with 
respect to the creation of the non-deliberative cause, he does the wrong thing with respect to 
which choice option he freely chooses to perform. I think in this case many people (including 
myself) focus on the fact that Bodi chooses the wrong choice option. As a result, we judge that 
Bodi is morally responsible for having done the wrong thing overall. 
5.3.2.4 The wrong non-deliberative cause and the right remaining option. Finally, Bodi* does the wrong 
thing when he performs the action of creating his repugnant non-deliberative cause. However, 
now imagine when the victim pleads with Bodi* to let them go, and Bodi* freely chooses to do 
the right thing by his lights and kill them quickly and painlessly. Remember that the only other 
choice option available to Bodi* is to kill his victim slowly and painfully. While Bodi* does the 
wrong thing with respect to the action of creating the repugnant action procedure, he seemingly 
does the right thing with respect to which choice option he freely chooses to perform. I think in 
this case many people (including myself) focus on the fact that Bodi* does the wrong thing when 
he performs the action of creating the repugnant non-deliberative cause. The reason Bodi*’s act 
of murdering someone quickly and painlessly turns out to be right simpliciter is because his 
repugnant non-deliberative cause causally constrained his future choice options to just those with 
murderous outcomes. As a result, we judge that Bodi* is morally responsible for having done the 
wrong thing overall. 
5.3.3 Conclusion: Non-Deliberative Causes and Moral Responsibility 
In this section I have discussed the charge that because we are unable to intercede on actions 
caused by non-deliberative causes, we cannot be morally responsible for them. Importantly, 
because there is a tight conceptual connection between moral responsibility and acting freely, if 
we are not morally responsible for the actions caused by our non-deliberative causes, then they 
are unfree. In reply, I have given one account (but it’s by no means the only possible account) of 
why we correctly count people as being morally responsible for actions caused by non-
deliberative causes. This is because people are able to intercede upon actions caused by non-
deliberative causes. This account drew on the cases of Matt and Katie that showed that we are 
morally responsible for temporally extended actions and probabilistic outcomes respectively. By 
combining these two cases we get an account of why we count as morally responsible for actions 
caused by our non-deliberative causes. For example, when Bud performed the action of creating 
his non-deliberative cause, he also performs a number temporally extended actions including the 
critical action of punching Milhouse. Further, even though the outcomes of these temporally 
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extended actions are probabilistic, such as the death of Milhouse, Bud is still morally responsible 
for them. That’s because when Bud creates the non-deliberative cause he knows generally what 
actions it will cause and causally impacts his future psychology in order to ensure those actions 
occur. Further, Bud generally knows the kinds of factors that will result in his non-deliberative 
cause causing good and bad outcomes and whether or not the non-deliberative cause will result 
in more good or bad outcomes overall. 
The main upshot of this proposal is that because the temporally extended actions occur 
alongside the creation of the non-deliberative cause it makes sense that someone could intercede 
on these temporally extended actions. Specifically, they could intercede by not creating the non-
deliberative cause, or by creating some other non-deliberative cause. This means that people are 
morally responsible for the consequences of their non-deliberative causes, and importantly 
shows that we no longer have a reason, with respect to the second objection, to think that 
actions caused by non-deliberative causes are unfree. 
 
5.4. Objection 3: Indirect compatibilism, degrees of freedom and vagueness71 
Before proceeding, it will be helpful once again to briefly remind ourselves of some of the key 
definitions and components of indirect (conscious control) compatibilism. According to indirect 
compatibilism someone performs an action freely iff the action is caused by freedom-conferring 
mechanisms (FCM), or controlled action procedures. Actions count as directly free if they are 
caused by a freedom-conferring mechanism, and count as indirectly free if they are caused by a 
controlled action procedure. Controlled action procedures come in two varieties: paradigmatic 
and non-paradigmatic. Something is a paradigmatic controlled action procedure (P-CAP) iff it’s a 
controlled action procedure that fulfils all the direct control conditions. This means that it is 
created, and could be destroyed, triggered, monitored, and updated by a freedom-conferring 
mechanism or another controlled action procedure. Actions caused by P-CAPs are 
paradigmatically indirectly free. Something is a non-paradigmatic controlled action procedure 
(NP-CAP) iff it’s a controlled action procedure that does not fulfil at least one of the direct 
control conditions. This means that it was either not created, could not be destroyed, triggered, 
monitored, or updated by a freedom-conferring mechanism or another controlled action 
procedure. Actions caused by NP-CAPs are non-paradigmatically indirectly free. 
According to the third objection there seems to be something prima facie wrong with 
indirect compatibilism if it counts directly free actions, paradigmatically free actions and non-
paradigmatically free actions as all being fully free. After all, there seems to be something very 
                                                          
71Thanks and credit to Kristie Miller for her assistance with this objection and section. 
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different between cases involving FCMs, P-CAPs and NP-CAPs. We are inclined to say, 
straightforwardly, that actions caused by FCMs are free. However, whether or not an action 
caused by a controlled action procedure is free seems to be a graded matter that depends on the 
number of direct control conditions – creation, destruction, triggering, monitoring, and update – 
that are fulfilled and the extent to which they are fulfilled. Direct control conditions are graded 
from having none at all to any extent, to having all of them to the full extent. 72 I will return to 
discuss exactly what this amounts to shortly. For now, it will be natural to suppose that we can 
model the degree to which an action is free, by supposing that actions that are free to degree 0 
are not free at all, and those that are free to degree 1 are fully free. The remainder are free to 
some degree between 0 and 1.  
For ease of explication I am going to assume that the degree to which an action is free is 
the average degree to which the action procedure which causes the action fulfils the direct 
control conditions. So for example, a P-CAP with creation to degree 1, destruction to degree 1, 
triggering to degree 1, monitoring to degree 1, and update to degree 1 has direct control 
conditions to degree 1. This means that the actions this P-CAP causes are fully free. Before now, 
I have supposed that P-CAPs were action procedures that fulfilled all 5 direct control conditions, 
but from now on I will say that they are action procedures that fulfil all 5 conditions to degree 1. 
This means that there can be NP-CAPs that fulfil all 5 direct conditions, but do so to less than 
degree 1. So for example, an NP-CAP with creation to degree .75, destruction to degree .25, 
triggering to degree .25, monitoring to degree .50, and updating to degree .75 has direct control 
conditions to degree .5 (the average of all of these). This means that the actions this NP-CAP 
causes are free to degree .5. Finally, an NP-CAP with creation to degree 1, destruction to degree 
0, triggering to degree .25, monitoring to degree .50, and updating to degree .75 has direct 
control conditions to degree .5. This means that the actions this NP-CAP causes are also free to 
degree .5.  
I think we are inclined to count actions caused by P-CAPs as free because they have all 5 
of direct control conditions and those conditions are fulfilled to the full extent. Further, the 
further away an NP-CAP gets from a P-CAP, the less I think we are sure that the action it causes 
is free. That’s because the further an NP-CAP is away from a P-CAP the lesser the degree of 
direct control conditions it has, either because it lacks some direct control conditions, or it only 
fulfils its direct control conditions to a limited extent, or some combination of both. What, then, 
                                                          
72There are possible complications involving the ranking, trumping, and commensurability between the various 
kinds of direct control conditions. Unfortunately, these are not issues I am able to address in this thesis. For the 
purposes of this section I don’t need the correct method of determining the overall degree of direct control 
conditions, instead what I need are accounts of how freedom of action depends on the degree of direct control 
conditions, however it is that is best calculated.   
137 
is required to address the third objection is an account of how freedom of action depends on the 
degree of direct control conditions of the action procedure which causes the action.   
In what follows I will present three broad kinds of accounts about how the freedom of 
an action depends on the degree of direct control conditions of the action procedure which 
causes the action. Remember that the purpose of doing this is to show how we might 
accommodate the range of intuitions that motivate the third objection, and to do so in a manner 
that is compatible with indirect compatibilism. Which account you think is best will depend on 
your various intuitions about free actions, and for my purposes, I don’t need to take a stand on 
which is preferable. In §5.4.1 I will begin by outlining some accounts that are consistent with the 
orthodox intuition that a necessary condition for an account of free action is that being free is all 
or nothing. Then, in §5.4.2 I will outline some accounts that are consistent with the intuition that 
acting freely can come in degrees, and that its possible for actions to be more or less free. Finally, 
in §5.4.3 I will outline an account that is consistent with thinking acting freely comes in degrees 
and that only actions caused by FCMs are fully free. 
5.4.1 Freedom of action, direct control conditions and vagueness 
Let’s begin with the simplest account of the relationship between freedom of action and degrees 
of direct control conditions. For any action A: 
[Basic account]: A is fully free if the action procedure that caused A has any degree of 
direct control conditions.  
Up to this point in the thesis I have assumed something like [Basic account] for ease of 
explication. Obviously this proposal will not do, as it is unable to accommodate the intuitions 
that motivate the third objection. The reason that we are inclined to distinguish actions caused 
by FCMs, P-CAPs and NP-CAPs is because our intuitions about cases of each kind are rather 
different. After all, it seems manifestly wrong that an action caused by a CAP with direct control 
conditions to degree 0.1 and another action caused by a CAP with direct control conditions to 
degree 0.9 are both fully free. However, insisting that actions caused by FCMs, P-CAPs and NP-
CAPs are all fully free is not something that indirect compatibilism need be committed to. In 
what follows, I will outline some different proposals regarding the relationship between our 
freedom of action and the degrees of direct control conditions that can accommodate the 
intuitions behind the third objection. 
 The major problem with the basic proposal is that it seems manifestly false that actions 
caused by NP-CAPs with small degrees of direct control conditions should count as fully free. 
Suppose we accept this intuition, alongside the intuition that being free is an all or nothing 
matter: it does not come in degrees. One way to accommodate these two thoughts is by 
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introducing some straightforward threshold. In that case, the freedom of an action is not 
guaranteed by the CAP having a non-zero degree of direct control conditions; instead it requires 
the CAP to have direct control conditions above a certain degree. So, for any action A: 
[Straightforward threshold]: A is fully free if the action procedure that caused A has 
some degree of direct control conditions either equal to or above a straightforward 
threshold. 
If [Straightforward threshold] is right, then there is a straightforward threshold that cleaves the 
actions that count as fully free from those that are not free at all. For the sake of illustration let’s 
imagine that the straightforward threshold value is 0.5. Actions caused by CAPs with direct 
control conditions either equal to or above degree 0.5 are fully free. Conversely, actions caused 
by CAPs with direct control conditions below degree 0.5 are unfree. Thus actions are either free, 
or not free, rather than free to some degree between 1 and 0. 
It’s interesting to note that if [Straightforward threshold] is right, then it might be 
possible to empirically discover what the straightforward threshold value of direct control 
conditions required to be fully free is. While I think that this is a worthwhile project to attempt 
in the future, I think the prospects of such a project succeeding are limited, for reasons I will 
outline below.  
There are two major issues with [Straightforward threshold]. First, I think it’s unlikely 
there is a straightforward threshold value that would successfully cleave fully free actions from 
unfree actions. For example, I might perform an empirical study and find that one group of 
people set the straightforward threshold at 0.4 and another group sets the straightforward 
threshold at 0.6. Perhaps the people who are setting the straightforward threshold at 0.4 are 
doing so to accommodate cases that they consider to be important cases of free action. Perhaps 
at least one of these groups is wrong, because there is a metaphysical fact about the correct 
straightforward threshold value, a fact that is, for instance, generated by people’s dispositions. 
But I am not confident that this is so. All that’s important for my purposes, however, is that 
there is unlikely to be any convergence around a single straightforward threshold value (even if 
there is in fact a correct straightforward threshold value).  
Second, I think the idea there is a sharp cut off between which actions count as fully free, 
and which as unfree, seems wrong. Once again, imagine that the straightforward threshold value 
is 0.5. Actions caused by CAPs with direct control conditions to degree 0.5 would be fully free. 
Conversely, actions caused by CAPs with direct control conditions to degree 0.49 would be 
unfree. Further, those latter actions would be just as unfree as actions caused by action 
procedures that have no direct control conditions. This just seems wrong. Cases involving direct 
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control conditions to degree 0.49 seem to us to be closer to cases involving direct control 
conditions to degree 0.5, and on this view those cases count as fully free. However, given the 
straightforward threshold value of 0.5, cases involving direct control conditions to degree 0.49 
are just as unfree as cases involving direct control conditions to degree 0. I think what these two 
issues suggest is that whether or not some actions count as fully free or unfree is, in some sense, 
a vague matter.  
One way to accommodate this thought is to think that while there is a threshold between 
what actions count as fully free and what actions do not, that threshold is vague and not a 
straightforward value. That is, whether or not an action counts as fully free doesn’t depend on 
the CAP having direct control conditions above some straightforward threshold value. Instead, it 
depends on the CAP having direct control conditions above some vague threshold. So, for any 
action A: 
[Vague threshold]: A is fully free if the action procedure that caused A has some 
degree of direct control conditions above a vague threshold.  
Here is the basic idea: while there are clear cases of actions being fully free (those caused by 
FCMs and P-CAPs) and clear cases of actions being fully unfree (those caused by action 
procedures with no direct control conditions) there are a whole range of cases in between (those 
caused by NP-CAPs). To allow for vagueness, then, would be to allow that the expression ‘free 
action’ admits of a number of borderline cases: actions that are neither determinately fully free, 
nor determinately unfree. These actions fall within the penumbra. 
Some (or perhaps even all) of the cases that fall within the penumbra will be those 
involving NP-CAPs, actions that I have said count as non-paradigmatically indirectly free. So 
rather than simply distinguishing directly free actions, and indirectly free actions that are 
paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic, we can instead suggest that there is a range of actions for 
which it is vague whether or not those actions count as free. These are the actions that fall within 
the penumbra. We can further accommodate many of our intuitions in these cases by noting that 
some of these actions are more towards the centre of the penumbra and some are more towards 
one of the edges of the penumbra. That is, some actions within the penumbra are closer to being 
determinately free and some are closer to being determinately unfree. One upshot of this view is 
we can accommodate the idea that in some sense freedom of action comes in gradations without 
actually needing to posit that freedom of action itself comes in degrees. Further, if one was 
worried that there would be an objectionably sharp cut-off between cases of an action being 
determinately free (or unfree) and being in the penumbra, we can posit higher-order vagueness. 
If there is higher-order vagueness, then the very borders of the penumbra are themselves vague. 
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As a result, it is an indeterminate matter whether, for some actions, it is indeterminate whether 
those actions are fully free. Once again, the fact that there can be determinate penumbral cases 
of free action and indeterminate penumbral cases of free action can explain a great many of our 
intuitions about cases I have said count as non-paradigmatically indirectly free.  
 Once again, for my purposes it doesn’t matter which account of vagueness you prefer. It 
could be that vagueness is purely epistemic.73 That is, there could be a fact of the matter 
regarding which actions count as fully free, and which actions count as unfree, with nothing in 
between. It’s worthwhile to note that [Straightforward threshold] is compatible with epistemic 
vagueness. On this view, there aren’t really any penumbral cases of free action. Instead, the 
penumbra simply reflects the fact that we don’t know which actions are determinately fully free, 
and which actions are determinately unfree. The reason we don't know this is because we don't 
know precisely what the extension of the expression ‘free action’ is, and what’s more, we cannot 
know this. Still, the expression ‘free action’ does have a precise extension and so there is a fact of 
the matter, for each action, whether or not that action counts as fully free. Nevertheless, since we 
can’t know where the cut-of is, between which actions count as fully free, and which actions 
count as unfree, this view will still explain our intuitions on the matter.  
By contrast, it might be that vagueness issues entirely from our language and concepts. 
As the expression ‘free action’ is imprecise in various ways, given what we mean by said 
expression, for some actions it is simply indeterminate whether or not they count as fully free. 
On such a view our concept of free action is vague, so that it simply admits of a whole range of 
possible precisifications, with each precisification being just as good as the other. For each 
precisification there is a clear answer to the question of whether or not the action counts as fully 
free or as unfree, but there is no reason to prefer one precisification over the others. As a result, 
it is a vague matter, for some actions, whether or not they count as fully free, or as unfree. Those 
who are attracted to supervaluationist74 or subvaluationist75 accounts of vagueness will likely 
think this is right. The difference between these two views is that supervaluationists think that 
there are truth-value gaps. They suppose that the actions that fall within the penumbra are such 
that it is neither true, nor false, that the action counts as fully free (or unfree). In contrast, 
subvaluationists think that the actions that fall within the penumbra are such that it is both true 
                                                          
73Those who defend epistemic approaches to vagueness include Sorensen (1988; 2001), Williamson (1994; 2000), 
Graff (2000), Fara (2008), and Rescher (2009). 
74Those who have defended supervaluationist accounts of vagueness include Fine (1975), Keefe (2000), Lewis 
(1986), and Varzi (2001). 
75Those who have defended subvaluationist accounts of vagueness include Corberos (2011), and Hyde and Colyvan 
(2008).  
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and not true, that the action counts as fully free. According to the subvaluationist there are no 
truth-value gaps, instead there are truth-value gluts.  
I am not going to take a stand on which of these approaches is superior, as this will 
depend on a whole range of other background beliefs about which view of vagueness is superior. 
All that matters for my purposes is that each of these approaches is consistent with indirect 
compatibilism, and that each can accommodate the range of intuitions that motivate the third 
objection.76   
5.4.2 Degrees of freedom and direct control conditions 
So far I have only provided accounts that are consistent with the orthodox intuition that a 
necessary condition for an account of free action is that being free is an all or nothing matter. 
However, I think it is very tempting to say that any distinction in freedom between actions 
caused by FCMs, P-CAPs and NP-CAPs is a matter of degree rather than being an all or nothing 
matter. 77 If direct control conditions are graded and come in degrees then why think that it’s an 
all or nothing matter whether or not an action is fully free. Instead, our actions can be more, or 
less, free: that is, it is a matter of degree how free they are. 78 One basic way to account for 
degrees of freedom is with a straightforward mapping between degrees of freedom and the 
degrees of direct control conditions. So, for any action A:  
[Degrees of freedom] A is free to a non-zero degree if the action procedure that caused 
A has any degree of direct control conditions. 
The most natural way to think of indirect compatibilism in terms of [Degrees of freedom] is to 
think that directly free actions (those caused by FCMs) and actions caused by P-CAPs are fully 
free and that actions caused by NP-CAPs are free to some degree less than 1. Specifically, 
actions caused by an action procedure with no direct control conditions do not count as free to 
any degree. Actions that are caused by NP-CAPs with direct control conditions to some in-
between degree, are free to some in-between degree. Finally, actions that are caused by P-CAPs 
                                                          
76It if it is a vague matter, for some actions, whether those actions are free, then by extension it can also be a vague 
matter whether there is free will. Recall that on my account whether or not we have free will is determined by 
whether a sufficient percentage of our actions are free. Of course, if we are epistemicists about the vagueness of free 
action then we will think that if it is vague whether or not we have free will this is because although there is some 
determinate fact of the matter we cannot know this fact. In contrast, supervaluationists will think that it is simply 
semantically underdetermined whether or not we have free will. On some precisifications we do and on others we 
do not, hence it is vague whether or not we do.  
77Current orthodoxy in the literature counts necessary condition for our freedom is that it is all or nothing. I won’t 
attempt to argue this current orthodoxy is wrong in this chapter. Instead, I will just outline how an account of 
freedom coming in degrees that naturally falls out of indirect compatibilism. To the best of my knowledge the only 
other account of degrees of freedom in the literature is due to O’Connor (2005; 2009). 
78Once again, if it can be a matter of degree whether or not our actions are free, then by extension, so too can it be a 
matter of degree whether or not we have free will. 
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with direct control conditions to degree 1, and FCMs, are fully free.79 I will have something to 
say to those who might want a way to distinguish P-CAPs and FCMs, but for now just follow me 
in thinking the actions in both cases are fully free. One benefit of this view is that it is flexible in 
accommodating a range of intuitions about free actions. We don’t just have to talk about directly 
free actions and indirectly free actions that are paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic. Instead, 
within non-paradigmatically indirectly free actions we can distinguish a whole range of gradations 
in the extent to which those actions are free.80 
While I think the idea that freedom of action comes in degrees is probably right, 
[Degrees of freedom] is obviously wrong. That is because it’s very unlikely that there is a 
straightforward 1-to-1 mapping between the degrees of freedom of an action and the degrees of 
direct control conditions a CAP has. For example, consider an action caused by an NP-CAP 
with direct control conditions to degree .001. It seems to me that we don’t think that such an 
action is free to degree .001; instead we would think, straightforwardly, that such an action is just 
unfree. Again, one way to accommodate this thought is to think that there is a vague threshold 
between what actions count as free to some non-zero degree, and what actions are unfree (see 
§5.4.1). Whether or not an action counts as being free to a non-zero degree depends on the CAP 
                                                          
79Someone might think that the only actions that count as fully free are those caused by FCMs. Actions caused by P-
CAPs might be free to a high degree, but they are fully free. I will describe such a view shortly. 
80There are a number of different ways we can think about the degree theoretic nature of free action. The idea that 
there are degrees of truth is formulated within a many-valued logic. Those who have defend such logics include 
Dunn and Hardegree (2001), Shramko and Wansing (2011), Gottwald (2001), and Weber and Colyvan (2010). Not 
all many valued logics have infinite values, some have as few as three (see for example Tye, 1994). For my purposes, 
it really doesn’t matter what account you prefer. One could think what comes in degrees is not the direct control 
conditions, but instead, truth. That is, propositions of the form [x is a free action] are (when appropriately filled out) 
true to a degree between 0 and 1. If they are true to degree 0 then they are not true, and if they true to degree 1 then 
they are maximally true, and truth in between, is just that, truth in between. The proposition [x is a free action] will 
be free to degree 1 for directly free actions (those caused by FCMs) and true to some degree for indirectly free 
actions (those caused by P-CAPs and NP-CAPs). Specifically, the proposition [x is a free action] will be free to 
degree 0 for actions caused by an action procedure with no direct control conditions. The proposition [x is a free 
action] will be free to a degree in between for actions caused by NP-CAPs, which have some amount of direct 
control conditions. Finally, the proposition [x is a free action] will be free to a maximal or high degree for actions 
caused by P-CAPs, which have the maximal amount of direct control conditions. 
Of course someone doesn’t have to understand this view in terms of degrees of truth. Instead of truth 
coming in degrees it could be that the world itself has a degree theoretic structure. As a result, it could be that direct 
control conditions can be instantiated in degrees and an action can instantiate the property freedom to a degree 
between 0 and 1. The idea that there is a degree-theoretic structure to the world arose out of the idea of fuzzy logics 
(Zadeh, 1965). Those who defend such approaches include Hyde (2008) and Smith (2008). If an action procedure 
instantiates the direct control conditions to degree 0, then the action it causes is unfree, and if it instantiates to 
degree 1, then it is free to a maximal or high degree, and if it instantiates it to a degree in between 1 and 0, then it is 
free to some in between degree. Directly free actions (those caused by FCMs) are fully free and indirectly free 
actions (those caused by P-CAPs and NP-CAPs) are free to some degree. Specifically, actions that are caused by P-
CAPs, which have the maximal amount of direct control conditions, are free to a maximal or high degree. Further, 
actions that are caused by NP-CAPs, which possess some amount of direct control conditions, are free to some in 
between degree. Understood in this way, claims about whether or not an action is free or not, ought properly to be 
framed as claims about the degree to which an action is free. These claims, moreover, will simply be true or false. 
For example, the proposition [x is free to degree 0.1] is true, iff x is free to degree 0.1. So truth itself does not come 
in degrees. 
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that caused it having a degree of direct control conditions above some vague threshold. So, for 
any action A: 
[Degrees of freedom with vague threshold] A is free to a non-zero degree if the 
action procedure that caused A has a degree of direct control conditions above a vague 
threshold. 
If [Degrees of freedom with vague threshold] is right, then whether or not an action counts as 
free to a non-zero degree is not just a straightforward matter of reading the degree of direct 
control conditions the CAP has; at least for the lowest values of direct control conditions. 
However, this only seems to be part of the picture. We might also think there is a second vague 
threshold between those actions which count as fully free and those actions which are free to a 
non-zero degree. For example, consider an action caused by an NP-CAP with direct control 
conditions to degree .999. Again, it seems to me that we don’t think that such an action is free to 
degree .999; instead we would think, straightforwardly, that such an action is just fully free. Once 
again we can accommodate this thought by thinking that there should not be one vague 
threshold but two: one between the actions that are fully unfree, and those that are free to some 
degree, and one between the actions that are fully free, and those that are free to some degree. It 
is worthwhile to note that any additional amount of freedom-conferring properties a CAP has 
above this higher threshold value (wherever that value might be) contribute nothing more to the 
freeness of an action on this proposal. Whether or not an action counts as being free to a non-
zero degree depends on the CAP having some degree of direct control conditions above some 
lower vague threshold. Furthermore, whether or not an action counts as being fully free depends 
on the CAP having some degree of direct control conditions that is above some higher vague 
threshold. So, for any action A:  
[Degrees of freedom with vague thresholds] A is free to a non-zero degree if the 
action procedure that caused A has a degree of direct control conditions above a lower 
vague threshold and below a higher vague threshold. A is fully free if the action procedure 
that caused A has a degree of direct control conditions above a higher vague threshold. 
Now, if [Degrees of freedom with vague thresholds] is right then, whether or not an action 
counts as free to a non-zero degree is not just a straightforward matter of reading the degree of 
direct control conditions a CAP has at the lowest values of direct control conditions. Similarly, 
whether or not an action counts as fully free is not just a straightforward matter of being just 
those cases where the CAP has all the direct control conditions. Once again, admitting of 
vagueness allows of a number of borderline cases: actions that are neither determinately free to 
any degree, nor determinately unfree. Further, there are actions that are neither determinately 
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fully free, nor determinately free to just a high degree. I will not reiterate my discussion of 
vagueness here (see §5.4.1). All that is important for my purposes here, is that by combining the 
resources of both degrees of freedom and vagueness, we can accommodate the full range of 
intuitions that are motivating the third objection in a manner that is consistent with indirect 
compatibilism. 
5.4.3. Accommodating the intuition that only FCMs are fully free  
There is one intuition, which I don’t possess, but that I imagine some people have and is 
worthwhile briefly mentioning. The intuition is that actions caused by P-CAPs, despite having 
direct control conditions to degree 1, are never fully free: the only actions that are ever fully free 
are those that are caused by FCMs. Let’s suppose for the moment that P-CAPs can only cause 
actions that are free to degree .8. This value is completely arbitrary and is only for explanatory 
purposes; nothing hinges on the value chosen here. Whether or not an action counts as being 
free to a non-zero degree depends on the CAP having some degree of direct control conditions 
that is above some lower vague threshold. Furthermore, whether or not an action counts as 
being free to a maximum degree .8 depends on the CAP having some degree of direct control 
conditions that is above some higher vague threshold. So, for any action A: 
[Limited degrees of freedom with vague thresholds] A is free to a non-zero degree if 
the action procedure that caused A has a degree of direct control conditions above a 
lower vague threshold. A is free to a maximum degree .8 if the action procedure that 
caused A has a degree of direct control conditions above a higher vague threshold. 
If [Limited degrees of freedom with vague thresholds] is right, then whether or not an action 
counts as free to a non-zero degree is a vague matter at the lowest degree values of direct control 
conditions. Similarly, whether or not an action counts is free to the maximum degree of 0.8 is a 
vague matter at the highest degree values of direct control conditions.  
Whether or not actions caused by FCMs are the only ones that count as being fully free 
is in part an empirical matter that I will address in a future research project. I think that actions 
caused by P-CAPs and even some NP-CAPs might turn out to be fully free. However, even if it 
turns out that I am wrong and only actions caused by FCMs are fully free, I don’t see why this 
would turn out to be an issue for indirect compatibilism. As I hope to have shown in this 
section, indirect compatibilism has the tools available to accommodate a wide range of different 
intuitions about the status of free actions caused by FCMs, P-CAPs and NP-CAPs. 
5.4.4 Conclusion: Indirect compatibilism, degrees of freedom and vagueness 
In summary, I have addressed a third objection according to which there seems to be something 
wrong with indirect compatibilism if it counts directly free actions, and indirectly free actions 
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both paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic, as all being fully free. That’s because there seems to be 
something very different about cases involving FCMs, P-CAPs, and NP-CAPs. In response I 
have outlined a number of proposals that are consistent with indirect compatibilism and can 
accommodate the full range of intuitions that are motivating the third objection. One way we 
might accommodate these intuitions is with vagueness. While actions caused by FCMs and P-
CAPs are determinately free and actions caused by an action procedure with no freedom-
conferring properties are determinately unfree, it is a genuinely vague matter whether or not 
actions caused by NP-CAPs with some in-between degree of direct control conditions are fully 
free or not. Another way we might accommodate these intuitions is with an account of degrees 
of freedom that falls naturally out of indirect compatibilism. While actions caused by FCMs and 
P-CAPs are fully free, actions caused by NP-CAPs are free to a degree determined by the degree 
of direct control conditions that they have. Most likely, in order to accommodate the full range 
of intuitions motivating the third objection we will need to draw upon both degrees of freedom 
and vagueness. Irrespective of the way we choose to do it, what is important for my purposes is 
the fact that we can accommodate these intuitions in a manner that is compatible with indirect 
compatibilism. 
 
5.5. Objection 4: Getting empirical traction on indirect compatibilism 
According to indirect compatibilism an action is free iff it is caused by freedom-conferring 
mechanisms (FCMs), or controlled action procedures (CAPs). Actions count as directly free if 
they are caused by an FCM, and count as indirectly free if they are caused by a CAP. According 
to the fourth objection everything I have said so far about my new account of free action, 
indirect compatibilism, has been an exercise in a priori reasoning. While I have extensively 
discussed empirical evidence from experimental philosophy and the brain sciences, I have not 
presented any empirical evidence that gives us empirical traction on the matter of whether or not 
indirect compatibilism is the correct account of free action. In response to this fourth objection I 
will present one new piece of evidence from my own investigations in the brain sciences that I 
think shows that an important empirical necessary condition is satisfied by my view. While this 
result alone does not tell us that indirect compatibilism is the correct account of free action, it 
does militate against some worries that the view cannot be true. 
5.5.1 Empirical evidence and indirect compatibilism 
Before describing the novel empirical finding, I think it is important to get clear on the scope 
that empirical evidence from the brain sciences can bring to bear on indirect compatibilism. No 
amount of evidence from the brain sciences can show that indirect compatibilism is the right 
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account of free action. There is no empirical sufficient condition for indirect compatibilism being 
true. That’s because whether or not indirectly free actions get to count as free is not a matter that 
the brain sciences can provide direct empirical traction on. There is no empirical fact of the 
matter here; there is simply a matter of whether the cases of indirectly free actions count, or 
upon reflection could, or should, come to be counted, as free. That’s not to say that there is no 
empirical evidence that could motivate arguments for indirect compatibilism being a preferable 
account of free action over direct (conscious control) compatibilism. For example, future 
projects in experimental philosophy that I am working on might establish that the general 
population count indirectly free actions as free, or come to do so reliably after reflection. Such 
evidence would show that indirectly free actions are already counted as free by our concept of 
free action, or that upon reflection, in order to include these cases, we are disposed to make 
principled revisions to our concept of free action. Both of these results would provide some 
good empirical reasons to favour indirect compatibilism as an account of our free action. 
However, I will not pursue this any further in this thesis. 
5.5.2 One Novel Empirical Finding from My Own Investigations 
The empirical necessary condition that my finding is relevant to is whether there are in fact cases 
of creating, triggering and updating of action procedures. If action procedures are never created, 
triggered or updated by methods that depend on FCMs, then indirect compatibilism will be false 
for the simple reason that there are as a matter of fact no indirectly free actions. While for 
various reasons it is more difficult to devise protocols that test for creation and destruction,81 I 
plan in future empirical work to look for evidence of triggering and monitoring, and I present in 
this section evidence for updating. In a paper reproduced in Appendix A (Latham et al., 2017), 
my co-investigators and I found electrocortical evidence of updating of CAPs in conditions 
which give us reason to believe that these updatings are a result of conscious control. 
The key discovery of this paper, for the purposes of this thesis, was the discovery of a 
very late period of electrocortical activity centred over the left frontal polar cortex. This 
electrophysiological activity occurred after people received feedback that they had been rewarded 
for their experimental performance. The exact experimental conditions under which we 
observed this electrocortical activity will be important later, once I have provided some general 
details about the experimental task, as I think it gives us some further reasons to think this 
electrocortical activity reflects a candidate neural realizer of an FCM. For the moment I will set 
aside these complications and just focus on the electrocortical component itself. 
                                                          
81It’s easier to devise experimental protocols that test for triggering and updating because these are processes that 
can be induced to occur numerous times over the course of an experimental task. It’s very likely that the processes 
of creation and destruction only occur on a single-trial with an experimental task. 
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This particular electrocortical component has been observed only once before in 
prospective memory tasks (see for example, West, 2011; West & Moore, 2002). In prospective 
memory tasks people encode an intention in response to an instruction stimulus to be performed 
at a later time. Interestingly, in our experiment, this electrocortical component was not observed 
in response to an instruction stimulus. Rather, it was observed in response to a feedback stimulus 
that signalled reward. This is significant, as participants can’t be encoding an intention to 
perform some specific action at a later time, as they were in prospective memory tasks, as they 
don’t know exactly what they will be required to do next. Instead, what I think people are doing 
is encoding an updated CAP that will continue to automate and control their performance over 
the course of the experimental task. However, in order to explain why I think this I first need to 
outline a few general details about the experimental task. 
5.5.2.1. Behind the empirical result: Methods of experimental task. Our experimental task involved 20 
right-handed males performing a variation of the monetary incentive delay task. At the beginning 
of each experimental trial participants were presented with an incentive cue that indicated what 
the possible outcome for that trial would be: reward, loss, or neutral break-even. It also signalled 
what hand, left or right, participants would be required to respond with for that trial. After an 
anticipatory period, a target stimulus was presented that participants were required to respond to 
as close to 1 s after presentation as possible. If participants were successful with their 
performance then they were rewarded on reward trials, or avoided punishment on loss trials 
(henceforth I will simply refer to both these outcomes as rewards). Importantly, in our 
experiment the outcomes were all rigged and participants were told that successful performance 
would only increase the likelihood that they would receive reward. The main reason we did this 
was in order to increase participant engagement with the experimental task. Under these 
conditions of uncertainty, on any given experimental trial, participants can never be completely 
sure whether the reason they are being rewarded is on account of their performance or because 
they are lucky. 
 This kind of experimental task lends itself to investigating four key stages in reward and 
no-reward related processing. For example, we are able to examine electrocortical changes with 
respect to anticipatory processes during the presentation of the incentive cue. We are able to 
examine the modulation of target processing during the presentation of the target stimulus. We 
are able to examine the modulation of response preparation and responses during the simple 
response task. Finally, we are able to examine reward consumption processes during the 
presentation of the feedback stimulus. As I mentioned previously, the complete breakdown of 
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these various results can be found in Appendix A. What I will be focused on here is the novel 
electrophysiological component observed well after the feedback stimulus had been presented. 
5.5.2.2. Behind the empirical result: Interpreting the result of the experimental task. Recall that the key 
discovery, for the purposes of this thesis, is a very late period of electrocortical activity located 
over the left frontal polar cortex. This electrocortical component has only been observed once 
before in prospective memory tasks, which require people to encode an intention, in response to 
an instruction, to be performed at a later time. Importantly, we didn’t observe this component in 
response to any task instructions but instead in response to a feedback stimulus that signalled 
reward. Again, the significance of this is that people can’t have been encoding an intention to 
perform a specific action at a later time in our experiment, as they didn’t know exactly what they 
would be required to do next. Now that I have described some of the basic methodological 
details I can complicate this result slightly by noting that the key discovery was only observed 
after feedback stimulus that signalled reward on experimental trials performed with the right 
hand! I still think that what people are doing is encoding an updated CAP that will continue to 
automate and control their performance over the course of the experimental task. However, 
what could explain why people are only selectively updating their CAPs on trials where they 
successfully performed with their right hand? 
Here is what I think is going on. Let me begin by drawing your attention to two points in 
the methodology that I think are important for explaining this result. First, participants were told 
that successful performance would only increase the likelihood that they would receive a reward, 
not guarantee it. This means that on any given experimental trial participants could never be 
certain whether or not they were being rewarded on account of their performance, or on account 
of luck. Second, everyone in this experiment was right handed. So, our key result was only 
observed when participants were rewarded after making a response with their dominant hand. 
People should be most confident in their performance when they are making a response with 
their dominant hand. As a result, on experimental trials performed with their dominant hand, 
people should be more inclined to think that they are being rewarded on account of their 
performance and not on account of luck. The reason, then, that we see participant’s updating 
CAPs on trials performed with the dominant hand is because they are confident that their 
performance was causally efficacious in securing their reward. After all, the best way to maximise 
payoffs in the experimental task was to continually update their CAP to emulate the successful 
performance shown by their dominant hand. It’s worthwhile to note that this explanation makes 
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a simple prediction for a future confirmatory study. People who are left handed should update 
their CAPs when rewarded following left, and not right, hand responses.82 
5.5.3 Conclusion: Getting empirical traction on indirect compatibilism 
In summary, I have addressed a fourth objection that is concerned I have not presented any 
empirical evidence that gives us empirical traction on the matter of whether or not indirect 
compatibilism is the correct account of free action. The only empirical evidence that directly 
bears on a sufficient condition as to whether or not indirectly free actions are free simpliciter will 
be from experimental philosophy, which can tell us whether or not people count cases of 
indirect freedom as free, or upon reflection could come to judge them as free, and this only if we 
hold that such experimental results can be sufficient rather than an adjunct to philosophical 
analysis. Still, a necessary condition for there to be indirect freedom is for there to be cases 
where our FCMs create, destroy, trigger, or update CAPs. Recall that in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
of this thesis, I addressed a wide range of evidence from the brain sciences that showed that this 
might not occur at all. While I established that such a conclusion is untenable it left the door 
open whether there was in fact any positive evidence of this occurring. Here I highlight one key 
result from my own investigations into the brain sciences: late stage negativity over the left 
frontopolar cortex that occurs after feedback under conditions of uncertainty when responding 
with a dominant hand. If I am right, then, this is evidence that people engage FCMs even on 
very simple tasks, provided those tasks are incentivised and performance matters. 
This evidence does bear on the question of whether or not there can be free actions at all 
given my view. Remember, actions are indirectly free iff they are caused by a CAP. The reason 
actions caused by CAPs are free is because said CAP was created by FCMs, or could be 
destroyed, triggered, or updated by FCMs. Therefore, it’s still a necessary condition for indirect 
compatibilism that FCMs play the active role we suppose they do for actions caused by CAPs as 
well. If FCMs play no role in our action procedures, then there are no CAPs. Further, if there are 
no CAPs then there is no indirect freedom, so indirect compatibilism is false. 
 
5.6 Conclusion: Objections and replies to indirect compatibilism 
In summary, in this chapter I have worked through what I think are some of the most interesting 
objections to indirect compatibilism. I began this chapter by introducing non-deliberative causes. 
                                                          
82You might think that the novel electrocortical component we observe is not a candidate realizer of FCMs updating 
CAPs. Instead it merely realizes some unconscious, perhaps indirectly free, updating process. While that’s possible, I 
see no reason to think that is what is occurring here. Remember, that the only other time this kind of electrocortical 
component has been observed is in prospective memory tasks where people consciously encode intentions, in 
response to instructions, to be performed in the future. Why think that what this electrocortical component realizes 
in our experimental task is that drastically different from what we observe in prospective memory tasks?  
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Non-deliberative causes are freely created action procedures that we have no ongoing control 
over. This means that non-deliberative causes cannot be destroyed, triggered, monitored, or 
updated by a FCM or other CAP. I think that non-deliberative causes are the most potent kind 
of putative counterexample to indirect compatibilism. So if I was able to motivate the idea that 
actions caused by non-deliberative causes are indirectly free then I think I can make the case that 
other kinds of NP-CAPs do not pose an issue for indirect compatibilism. 
 The first objection I addressed was that non-deliberative causes cause unfree actions 
because they are pathological, and the reason they are pathological is because they cause actions 
that appear, at the time of action, to be non-maximising. I undermined this argument in two 
ways. First, actions caused by non-deliberative causes that are pathological can nonetheless be 
free because pathological actions can be free under certain circumstances. Namely, when the 
non-deliberative cause does what it was intended to do. Second, some actions caused by non-
deliberative causes are non-maximising at the time of action, but maximising overall. Provided 
you think that something that is maximising overall is not pathological then we have a good 
reason to think non-deliberative causes are not pathological, and hence no reason to think that 
they are counterexamples to indirect compatibilism. 
 The second objection I addressed was that because we are unable to intercede on actions 
caused by non-deliberative causes, we cannot be morally responsible for them. Importantly, 
because of the tight conceptual connection between moral responsibility and acting freely, if we 
are not morally responsible for the actions caused by our non-deliberative causes then they are 
unfree. In reply, I argued we could have interceded by not creating the non-deliberative cause, or 
by creating some other one. I provided one account of why we correctly count people as being 
morally responsible for the actions caused by non-deliberative causes. If we think that people are 
morally responsible for temporally extended actions and probabilistic outcomes, by combining 
these we get an account of why we count as morally responsible for actions caused by our non-
deliberative causes. The main upshot of this proposal is because the temporally extended actions 
occur alongside the creation of the non-deliberative cause it makes sense to say that someone 
could have interceded on these temporally extended actions. This means that people are morally 
responsible for the consequences of their non-deliberative causes and so we no longer have any 
reason according to the second objection to think that they are unfree. 
The third objection I addressed was that there seems to be something wrong with 
indirect compatibilism if it counts directly free actions, and indirectly free actions, both 
paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic, as all being fully free. That’s because there seems to be 
something very different between cases involving FCMs, P-CAPs, and NP-CAPs. In reply I 
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described a number of proposals that are consistent with indirect compatibilism and can 
accommodate the intuitions that motivate the third objection. One way we might accommodate 
these intuitions is with vagueness. Another way we might accommodate these intuitions is with 
an account of degrees of freedom that falls naturally out of indirect compatibilism. However, in 
order to accommodate the full range of intuitions motivating the third objection we will more 
than likely need to draw upon both degrees of freedom and vagueness. Irrespective of the way 
we choose to do it, what is important for my purposes is the fact that we can accommodate 
these intuitions in a manner that is compatible with indirect compatibilism. 
Finally, I addressed a fourth objection according to which I have not presented any 
empirical evidence that might inform us of whether or not indirect compatibilism is the correct 
account of free action. The only empirical evidence that directly bears on a sufficient condition 
as to whether or not indirectly free actions are free simpliciter will be from experimental 
philosophy, which can tell us whether or not people count cases of indirect freedom as free, or 
upon reflection could come to judge them as free, and this only if we hold that such 
experimental results can be sufficient rather than an adjunct to philosophical analysis. Here I 
highlight one key result from my own investigations into the brain sciences: late stage negativity 
over the left frontopolar cortex that occurs after reward feedback under conditions of 
uncertainty when responding with a dominant hand. If I am right, then this is evidence that 
people engage FCMs even on very simple tasks provided those tasks are incentivised and 
performance matters. This, in turn, suggests that people do in fact update their action 
procedures. Now that I have finished working through the objections my defence of indirect 
compatibilism in this thesis is finished. 
 
5.7 Conclusion: Indirect compatibilism 
In this thesis I have defended a brand new account of free action: indirect (conscious control) 
compatibilism. This new compatibilist account of free action is the combination of two theses. 
The first is that the best understanding of the conceptual relationship between determinism and 
free will is that it is a conditional concept. The second is indirection: actions are free either when 
they caused by freedom-conferring mechanism, or else by sub-personal level processes 
influenced in various ways by freedom-conferring mechanisms (i.e., controlled action 
procedures). Freedom-conferring mechanisms are those conscious psychological processes that 
cause free actions. As such, indirect compatibilism is a heavy modification of an account of free 
action that I think is very obvious, yet to the best of my knowledge had not been explicitly 
defended in the literature on free will: conscious control. 
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In Chapter 2, I established that our folk concept of free will is a compatibilist concept, 
albeit of a unique kind. The folk concept of free will is a conditional concept. A conditional concept 
is a single concept that has an indexical component which fixes what is necessary for the concept 
to be satisfied, depending on what the actual world is like. If the actual world is indeterministic, 
and agents have libertarian powers, then these libertarian powers are what free will is and must 
be, else if the actual world is deterministic, and agents have their preferred compatibilist powers, 
then compatibilist powers are what free will is. I presented evidence from my own experimental 
philosophy investigation that shows that the folk concept of free will has a conditional structure, 
and thus shows the folk are free will compatibilists. 
In Chapter 3 I addressed two challenges posed by the brain sciences to free actions, and 
by extension, to free will. The first challenge was the broad challenge: evidence from the brain 
sciences shows that our freedom-conferring mechanisms cause no actions, and so none of our 
actions are free. The second challenge was the narrow challenge: evidence from the brain sciences 
shows that our freedom-conferring mechanisms cause very few actions. I established that while 
the broad challenge is wrong, the narrow challenge is plausibly right, and no less problematic. 
That is because if our freedom-conferring mechanisms cause very few of our actions, then far 
fewer actions than we initially supposed will be free. Further, if not enough of our actions are 
free, then we do not have free will: the discrepancy problem. I argued that we can accommodate 
many of our free action judgments by acknowledging that most cases that we judge to be free are 
not free because they are caused directly by freedom-conferring mechanisms, but because they 
are caused indirectly via action procedures which those freedom-conferring mechanisms 
influenced in some way. 
In Chapter 4 I described a number of different ways people might influence action 
procedures. The most obvious way people can influence action procedures is by creating them. 
But that is not the only route to influencing action procedures. People might be able to destroy 
the action procedure that they possess, or, they might be able to trigger on an action procedure 
they already possess, or, they might be able to monitor and turn off an action procedure, if they 
so choose, or, they might be able to update an action procedure they already possess to perform 
a different function. In each case, the resulting action procedure causes free actions because it 
was influenced by the agent’s freedom-conferring mechanisms. I argued that indirect 
compatibilism is a better account of our concept of free action than is straightforward 
compatibilism because it is better aligned with our pre-theoretic free action judgments (our 
judgments about which actions are free and unfree) and vindicates the thought that we have free 
will.  
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Finally, in Chapter 5 I worked through what I think are some of the most interesting 
objections to indirect compatibilism. I also highlighted one finding from my own cognitive 
neuroscience investigations that I think is evidence of people updating an action procedure, and 
thus shows that an important empirical necessary condition is satisfied by my view. If I am right 
about the result, then people act freely. Further, if I am right about indirect compatibilism, then 
people have free will. 
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Abstract 
 
In order to improve our understanding of the components that reflect functionally important 
processes during reward anticipation and consumption, we used principle components analyses 
(PCA) to separate and quantify averaged ERP data obtained from each stage of a modified 
monetary incentive delay (MID) task. Although a small number of recent ERP studies have 
reported that reward and loss cues potentiate ERPs during anticipation, action preparation, and 
consummatory stages of reward processing, these findings are inconsistent due to temporal and 
spatial overlap between the relevant electrophysiological components. Our results show three 
components following cue presentation are sensitive to incentive cues (N1, P3a, P3b). In 
contrast to previous research, reward-related enhancement only occurred in the P3b, with earlier 
components more sensitive to break-even and loss cues. During feedback anticipation, we 
observed a lateralized centro-parietal negativity that was sensitive to response hand, but not cue 
type. We also show that use of PCA on ERPs reflecting reward consumption successfully 
separates the reward positivity from the independently modulated feedback-P3. Lastly, we 
observe for the first time a new reward consumption component: a late negativity distributed 
over the left frontal pole. This component appears to be sensitive to response hand, especially in 
the context of monetary gain. These results illustrate that the time-course and sensitivities of 
electrophysiological activity that follows incentive cues do not follow a simple heuristic in which 
reward incentive cues produce enhanced activity at all stages and sub-stages. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Two vital aspects of reward processing, the anticipatory and consummatory stages, have been 
frequently investigated using variations of the monetary incentive delay (MID) task (Knutson, 
Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000). Each experimental trial in the MID task begins with the 
presentation of an incentive cue indicating the possible outcome for that trial: reward, loss, or 
break-even. After a brief anticipatory period, a target stimulus is presented that requires a 
behavioural response. If participants respond successfully to the target they are rewarded with 
money; otherwise they break-even or are penalized.  
Research using fMRI has found that anticipation of rewards and losses in the MID task 
are associated with an increased BOLD signal in the dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC), and 
supplementary motor region (Knutson & Greer, 2008; Knutson et al., 2000). Anticipation of 
reward has also been associated with a selective increase in activity in the nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc; Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005), a striatal structure implicated in 
assigning values to predictive stimuli (Berridge, 2007; Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; 
Haber & Knutson, 2009). Reward consumption, on the other hand, has been associated with 
activity in ventromedial frontal cortex structures (Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 
2001). 
Understanding reward anticipation and consumption requires not just the assessment of 
spatial anatomical correlates revealed by fMRI but also its temporal dynamics using event-related 
potentials (ERPs). While there is extensive research on ERPs associated with reward 
consumption and feedback processing (Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Bellebaum, Kobza, Thiele, & 
Daum, 2010; Foti, Weinberg, Bernat, & Proudfit, 2015; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 
2006; Proudfit, 2014), very few studies have investigated ERPs associated with reward 
anticipation and consumption in MID-type tasks. Those that have present inconsistent findings 
with respect to reward- and loss-related ERP modulation. As Novak and Foti (2015) have 
pointed out, electrophysiological components important for reward anticipation and 
consumption are susceptible to spatial and temporal overlap. This limitation could explain why 
consistent results in the context of MID-type tasks continue to remain elusive. 
1.1. Reward Cue 
While only a small number of studies have investigated ERPs in the MID task, a wide range of 
components are reported to be sensitive to reward, loss, and break-even cues. Given the 
motivational and affective significance of these cues as secondary reinforcers, their capacity to 
modulate ERPs is to be expected. What is unclear is which components reflect functionally 
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important processes in response to incentive cues in the MID task. It is important to note that 
the surface deflections we observe and that constitute ERPs are not in themselves components. 
Moreover, components are not isomorphic to discrete brain processes. Rather, ERPs and 
components that are assigned particular labels (e.g., N1, P3) reflect systematic variation in neural 
activity (Luck, 2014). 
 Several studies have reported that early components associated with low-level vision, 
post-perceptual processing, cognitive control, and template updating are sensitive to reward and 
loss cues relative to break-even cues. Results, however, are inconsistent, with null and entirely 
opposite effects commonly reported. For example, greater N1 amplitudes have been observed 
following reward cues relative to break-even cues in some studies (Doñamayor, Schoenfeld, & 
Münte, 2012), while other studies have observed no effect (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2006; Santesso 
et al., 2012). Greater P2 amplitudes have been observed for loss cues relative to reward (Santesso 
et al., 2012), but not in all studies (Goldstein et al., 2006). Modulation of N2 by cue type 
provides a particularly salient illustration of this inconsistency. While Novak and Foti (2015) 
observed greater N2 amplitudes for reward cues relative to loss and break-even cues, others have 
observed greater amplitudes for break-even cues relative to reward cues (Doñamayor et al., 2012; 
Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015) and for loss cues relative to reward cues (Yu & Zhou, 
2006).  
 P3 effects in the context of the MID have been interpreted to reflect attentional 
allocation to motivational stimuli, irrespective of whether they are appetitive or aversive (Novak 
& Foti, 2015; Pfabigan et al., 2014). Again the results are inconsistent suggesting that processes 
associated with the P3 may not be consistent across studies. Greater P3 amplitudes have been 
observed in response to: (1) reward cues relative to break-even cues (Broyd et al., 2012; 
Goldstein et al., 2006; Novak & Foti, 2015; Pfabigan et al., 2014; Pornpattananangkul & 
Nusslock, 2015; Vignapiano et al.); (2) loss cues relative to break-even cues (Broyd et al., 2012 
for null result; Novak & Foti, 2015; Vignapiano et al.); (3) reward cues relative to loss cues 
(Broyd et al., 2012 for null result; Novak & Foti, 2015; Pfabigan et al., 2014; Santesso et al., 
2012); and (4) loss cues relative to reward cues (Vignapiano et al.).  
 ERPs involved in action anticipation and preparation have also been inconsistent. Some 
studies have observed a greater contingent negative variation (CNV) following reward and loss 
cues relative to break-even cues (Novak & Foti, 2015; Plichta et al., 2013), but once again other 
studies have not (Goldstein et al., 2006; Sobotka, Davidson, & Senulis, 1992; Vignapiano et al.). 
If there is reward-related modulation of the CNV it appears to be restricted to late-stages, 200ms 
preceding behavioural response. Research also suggests the enhancement of preparatory activity 
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for self-timed actions. Pornpattananangkul and Nusslock, 2015 observed a significantly larger 
readiness potential (RP) when participants were preparing to respond to a reward-cued temporal-
bisection task.  
1.2. Target 
The prospect of receiving reward has been found to modulate ERPs associated with the 
presentation of target stimuli in MID tasks. Recently the target-P3 was found to be greater to 
target stimuli following reward cues (Broyd et al., 2012), consistent with earlier research showing 
greater P3 amplitudes to target stimuli associated with receiving reward (Homberg, Grunewald, 
& Grunewald-Zuberbier, 1981; Otten, Gaillard, & Wientjes, 1995; Ramsey & Finn, 1997). 
Moreover, the target-P3 has also been found to be enhanced for target stimuli following loss 
cues (Broyd et al., 2012). 
1.3. Anticipation of Results  
Incentive cue effects can also occur when anticipating feedback stimuli. Stimulus preceding 
negativity (SPN) amplitudes are modulated whenever a reward or punishment is possible. The 
SPN presents as a sustained slow negativity that is most pronounced over the right hemisphere 
and has been found to be reliably enhanced by reward and punishment expectancies. Across 
several studies, larger SPN amplitudes have been observed when participants are anticipating 
feedback that indicates they will receive a reward or avoid punishment, relative to when they are 
anticipating feedback that has no extrinsic motivational value (e.g., they can be neither rewarded 
or punished; Brunia, Hackley, van Boxtel, Kotani, & Ohgami, 2011; Ohgami, Kotani, Hiraku, 
Aihara, & Ishii, 2004; Ohgami et al., 2006). 
 In one study, the SPN has also been found to be modulated as a function of incentive 
cue in a variation of the MID task, with larger SPN amplitudes on trials where a reward is 
possible relative to those where no reward is possible (Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015).  
1.4. Consumption 
MID tasks have operationalized reward consumption through presenting feedback stimuli. 
Feedback stimuli indicate the accuracy and consequently the outcome of target detection and 
self-paced actions. Although this use of the term ‘reward consumption’ is prevalent in the 
reinforcement learning and MID literature (Baskin-Sommers & Foti, 2015), reward consumption 
likely encompasses additional processes that follow the receipt of visual or auditory feedback, and 
constitute the delivery and consumption of an actual physical reward (e.g., sucrose solution in 
animal studies; Castro & Berridge, 2014). While the issue of which ERPs reflect these different 
aspects of reward consumption is important, it is outside the scope of the present study, which is 
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restricted to feedback-locked ERPs. Within this class of stimulus, reward consumption has been 
associated with two distinct ERPs: Reward positivity (RewP) and feedback-P3 (fb-P3).  
The RewP is positive frontocentral deflection occurring 200 to 300ms that is strongest 
following reward feedback (Bellebaum, Polezzi, & Daum, 2010; Hajcak et al., 2006; Proudfit, 
2014). Multiple neuronal generators are associated with the RewP, including the ACC (Gehring 
& Willoughby, 2002; Hauser et al., 2014) and regions implicated in reward processing (Haber & 
Knutson, 2009) such as the ventral striatum and subregions of the medial PFC (Becker, Nitsch, 
Miltner, & Straube, 2014; Carlson, Foti, Harmon-Jones, & Proudfit, 2015; Carlson, Foti, Mujica-
Parodi, Harmon-Jones, & Hajcak, 2011).  
The RewP is also referred to as the Feedback Related Negativity (FRN). From a 
measurement standpoint, one is simply the inverse transformation of the other. Although the 
RewP and FRN are argued to be synonymous (Proudfit, 2014), with the core measurement 
difference being their polarity in difference waves, there are differences in interpretation. The 
FRN research literature has typically focused on the reinforcement learning functions that the 
component reflects, with dominant theoretical models proposing that it signifies either absolute 
prediction errors (e.g., the outcome differs from expected), or reward prediction errors (e.g., the 
outcome is worse than expected) specifically (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). These models have 
received broad support from a range of empirical studies showing that FRN (or RewP) 
amplitudes are larger when outcomes are unexpectedly better or worse (e.g., Holroyd, Krigolson, 
& Lee, 2011; Ichikawa, Siegle, Dombrovski, & Ohira, 2010; Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Bauer, & 
Sailer, 2011). 
Despite its ubiquitous presentation in equiprobable gambling tasks (e.g., Angus, Kemkes, 
Schutter, & Harmon-Jones, 2015; Foti & Hajcak, 2010; Hajcak et al., 2006; Hajcak, Moser, 
Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; Holroyd, Krigolson, & Lee, 2011) and expectancy violation tasks 
(Holroyd, Krigolson, & Lee, 2011; Ichikawa, Siegle, Dombrovski, & Ohira, 2010; Pfabigan, 
Alexopoulos, Bauer, & Sailer, 2011), only four MID studies have reliably observed greater RewP 
amplitudes following reward feedback than following loss or break-even feedback  (Novak & 
Foti, 2015; Pfabigan et al., 2015; Santesso et al., 2012; Yu & Zhou, 2006). Other MID studies 
have either observed RewPs in response to reward, loss and break-even feedback (Broyd et al., 
2012; Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015) or no clear RewP at all (Doñamayor et al., 2012). 
Overlapping with the RewP is the fb-P3, which is sensitive to expectancy violation 
(Bellebaum & Daum, 2008) and reward magnitude (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Greater fb-P3 
amplitudes have been observed in MID tasks following feedback when participants expected to 
win or lose money relative to expecting to break even (Doñamayor et al., 2012; Novak & Foti, 
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2015; Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015). The fb-P3 has also been observed when 
participants successfully won or avoided losing money relative to only receiving performance 
feedback (Broyd et al., 2012) 
Lastly, the presentation of feedback stimuli in the MID task has occasionally been found 
to modulate centro-parietal slow waves such the late positive potential (LPP), with enhanced 
amplitudes in response to feedback indicating poor performance regardless of whether this 
resulted in financial loss or not (Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015). 
1.5. The Present Study 
While a variety of electrophysiological components are elicited by the MID task, the effect of 
reward and loss anticipation and consumption on these components has been inconsistent. A 
likely explanation for this inconsistency is the spatial and temporal overlap of 
electrophysiological components. For example, the substantial scalp and temporal distribution of 
the P3 means it overlaps with other ERP components modulated by motivational and affective 
variables such as the Early Posterior Negativity and P3a. Similarly, the RewP and fb-P3 are 
present over similar timescales making the identification and quantification of one or both 
components difficult (Novak & Foti, 2015). The spatial and temporal overlap of ERPs 
confounds the measurement and interpretation of ERP results obtained in the MID task. 
Although several previous studies (Broyd et al., 2012; Novak & Foti, 2015; Pornpattananangkul 
& Nusslock, 2015) have examined ERPs that occur during the MID task, these studies have used 
quantification approaches that require a priori assumptions about which electrocortical activity 
will reflect functionally important processes. Only one study (Doñamayor et al., 2012) has used 
data driven exploratory approaches, and the permutation methods used in that study do not 
allow for the decomposition of overlapping components.  
 To overcome these issues and accurately assess what electrophysiological activity reflects 
functionally important processes during reward anticipation and consumption in the MID task, we 
used exploratory temporospatial principle components analysis (PCA) to quantify ERPs. 
Specifically, we applied PCA to ERPs generated at each stage of the MID task: cue, target, 
response preparation, and feedback. Temporospatial PCA has several advantages over typical 
approaches to ERP quantification. Firstly, temporospatial PCA is well suited to exploratory 
analysis of ERPs as it allows for the extraction of variance across time (e.g., samples) and space 
(e.g., electrodes), which decomposes an ERP waveform into its constituent components. This 
decomposition approach does not require a priori assumptions regarding the specific time-points 
or location that measurements will be taken from. Secondly, temporospatial PCA allows for the 
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identification of components that are obfuscated by temporal and spatial overlap, and prove 
difficult to measure using traditional ERP analyses (Dien & Frishkoff, 2005).  
Although this study was exploratory, we did have general predictions regarding which 
factor combinations would likely be identified as functionally relevant. Firstly, we anticipated that 
factor combinations reflecting the P3 and CNV following incentive cues would be modulated by 
cue type, with greater amplitudes for gain rather than loss or break-even cues. Secondly, we 
anticipated that a factor combination reflecting the readiness potential preceding responses 
would be modulated by response hand and incentive cue, such that amplitudes would be larger 
for the contra-lateral hand and following gain incentives than following loss or break-even. 
Thirdly, we anticipated that a factor combination reflecting the SPN prior to feedback would be 
enhanced by incentive cues related to expected gains or losses. Lastly, we anticipated that the 
factor combinations that reflect the RewP and fb-P3 following feedback presentation would be 
enhanced for trials where participants received positive rather than negative feedback. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
20 males (Mean age = 23.6, SD = 4.0) participated in exchange for monetary compensation 
(AU$15 per/hr). Participants also received an additional AU $15 ‘bonus money’ at the end of the 
experiment. All participants were right handed, and without past or current diagnoses of an 
affective disorder. This study was approved by the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics 
Committee and all participants provided informed written consent. Electrophysiological data 
from one participant was excluded from analyses due to insufficient usable trials. 
2.2. Procedure  
Upon arrival participants were provided with a brief overview of the study and consent form. 
Participants were not informed they could receive ‘bonus money’ until after they had provided 
written consent. Participants then completed a brief demographic questionnaire. 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and electrooculogram (EOG) electrodes were attached to the 
participant and they were seated in a darkened soundproofed testing chamber. The MID task 
was explained to the participant and they were guided through at least 10 practice trials. Once the 
experimenter was satisfied the participant understood the task, the experiment began. At the end 
of the task, participants completed a series of post-task questions. After these questions were 
completed the electrodes were removed and the participant was debriefed. Experimental 
materials were displayed on a 24-inch LCD computer screen with a refresh rate of 100 Hz. 
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Stimulus display and timings were controlled using the Psychophysics Toolbox for MATLAB 
(version 2013b).  
2.3. Design 
The task consisted of 360 trials divided into two 180 trial blocks. Each block was comprised of 
60 ‘probable gain’, 60 ‘probable loss’, and 60 ‘break-even’ trials. Each trial consisted of four key 
stages designed to produce different facets of reward and nonreward related processes. First, to 
examine reward anticipation related processes, we presented participants with an incentive cue. 
Then, to examine incentive related modulation of target processing, we presented participants 
with a target stimulus. To examine response preparation modulation, we asked participants to 
complete a simple temporal bisection task. Participants were instructed that to complete the 
bisection task, they had press a key when they thought 1000ms had elapsed from the appearance 
of the target. Participants were informed that successful performance on of the temporal 
bisection task would increase the probability of winning money rather than losing money. 
Finally, to examine consummatory processes, we presented participants with feedback regarding 
their performance.    
Each trial began with a fixation-cross in the centre of the screen. After a variable interval 
of approximately 1200ms, the fixation cross was replaced with a leftward or rightward pointing 
arrow for 200ms, serving as the incentive cue. On probable gain, probable loss, and break-even 
trials, the arrow was green, red, or black, respectively. Participants were informed of the 
contingency between the arrow colour and probable outcome. Because we wished to tease apart 
activity related to motor preparation from activity related to incentive cue type, we instructed 
participants to use either their left or right hand on the temporal bisection. Moreover, if there 
were an interaction between these response hand and cue type, it would suggest that the 
incentive based modulation of electrocortical activity involved in, for example, the potentiation 
of response preparation is specific to response hand. 
The direction of the arrow indicated which hand participants would need to use on the 
temporal bisection task on that trial. When the arrow (regardless of colour) faced left, 
participants had to press the ‘z’ key using the index finger of their left-hand. When the arrow 
faced right, participants had to press the ‘/’ key with the index finger of their right-hand. 
Probable Gain and Probable Loss trials were mapped to opposite hands within each block, with 
the hand used alternating between blocks (e.g., left-hand response on probable gain, right-hand 
response on probable loss). Break-even trials were made with the left or right hand, in equal 
proportions within each block.  
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In order to distinguish activity associated with anticipation of the target stimulus from 
activity associated with motor preparation, we embedded a temporal bisection task within the 
MID task (see Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015). In this version of the MID, the target 
stimulus indicates the point from which participants are required to judge 1000ms passing. A 
black square was used as the target stimulus. The target stimulus was presented 2000ms after the 
onset of an arrow and remained on screen for 200ms.  
Lastly, the outcome of each trial was signalled by feedback stimulus presented 1000ms 
after a response, or after 4000ms had passed from target onset (i.e., the latest possible time a 
participant would be allowed to make a response on that trial). Feedback stimulus remained on 
screen for 1000ms. Gains were signalled by a green upward pointing arrow and losses by a red 
downward pointing arrow. On break-even trials, an equals sign was presented, even when an 
incorrect response or no response was made. Probable gain and probable loss trials were further 
subdivided on the basis of the actual outcome. On 39 trials, outcomes were congruent (e.g., 
winning money on probable gain trial) and on the remaining 21 trials outcomes were 
incongruent (e.g., losing money probable gain trial). The actual response made by participants 
only affected the outcome of Probable Gain and Probable Loss trials when: 1) they made a 
response with the incorrect hand (e.g., left hand response on a right hand response trial), 2) they 
responded too quickly, which was defined as 250ms following the presentation of the target 
stimulus, or 3) they failed to make a response. We chose to do this as we wished to have a fixed 
ratio of trials in which participants received win/loss feedback. Because performance could have 
varied between expected win and expected loss conditions, we were concerned that this 
performance mismatch could have led to systematic imbalances in the number of trials available 
for feedback-locked analysis. An example trial is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. In this trial, the participant was required to form the intention to press the “z” key 
using their left hand, doing so in a context where they will probably lose – rather than gain – 
money. Participants were instructed that executing this action as close to 1000ms following the 
onset of the target stimulus increased the likelihood of winning money rather than losing it. At 
the end of the trial, the participant receives feedback signalling that they had won money. 
 
Participants were informed that they start on $10 and that on every successful gain-outcome trial 
they would gain $0.25, while on every loss-outcome trial they would lose $0.25.  
2.4. Physiological Recording & Data Reduction  
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EEG was recorded from 60 active Ag/AgCl electrodes (ActiCap, Brain Products, Gilching, 
Germany) located according to the International 10-20 system. EOG was recorded from two 
electrodes placed 1cm lateral to the outer canthi of each eye (for horizontal EOG) and from one 
electrode placed on the sub-orbital region of the right eye (for vertical EOG, e.g., Hofmann, 
Kuchinke, Tamm, Võ, & Jacobs, 2009). Raw data was amplified and sampled at 1000Hz by a 
Brain Products QuickAmp72, referenced to a common average with a ground electrode located 
at AFz and recorded using Brain Vision Recorder (version 1.20, Brain Products, Gilching, 
Germany). 
Raw EEG data was preprocessed offline using native EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 
2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014) functions.  Continuous EEG data were 
down sampled to 256Hz, re-referenced to the average of TP9 and TP10, bandpass filtered 
between .01-30hz (IIR Butterworth, 25db roll-off), and residual line noise was reduced using a 
50Hz Parks-McClellen notch filter. Sections of continuous data containing gross movement 
artefacts were removed and Independent Components Analysis (ICA) was used to remove 
electrophysiological artefacts introduced by eye movements (Jung et al., 2000). 
Separate segments were created for each ‘stage’ of reward processing.  For incentive cue 
segments the period 200ms prior through to 2000ms after cue presentation was selected. For 
target segments the period 200ms prior through to 500ms after the target presentation was 
selected.83 For response segments the period 1000ms prior through to 200ms after participant’s 
responses was selected. To examine responses that occur in anticipation of feedback, a period 
1000ms prior to feedback presentation was selected. Finally, feedback segments were created 
using the period 200ms prior through to the 1000ms after feedback presentation. Cue, target, 
and feedback segments were baseline corrected to their 200ms pre-stimulus periods. Response-
locked activity was baseline corrected to the period 200ms prior to target stimulus presentation, 
while feedback anticipation activity was baseline corrected to the period 200ms following 
responses.  Segments from trials in which participants made an incorrect response (e.g., used the 
incorrect key, failed to respond, or responded in < 250ms) were excluded from analyses. 
Retained segments were submitted to artefact rejection processes implemented in ERPLAB 
(Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014). Segments were rejected if on any electrode 1) the voltage 
difference was greater than 200uv, 2) the voltage changed by more than 50uv within a 200ms 
                                                          
83Although 16 factor combinations each accounted for greater than 1% of variance in target ERPs, and several of 
these factor combinations appeared to reflect ubiquitous components previously found to be effected by reward and 
loss incentives (e.g., the P3), these were not significantly modulated in the current task by cue type (all p > .047), 
response hand (all p > .023), or an interaction between the two (all p > .072; adjusted critical p = 0.003125). 
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sliding window across the entire segment, or 3) the voltage changed by more than 50uv between 
samples.  
Subject averages for cue, target, response and feedback anticipation ERPs were binned 
according to the cue type (probable gain, probable loss, break-even) and response hand (left, 
right). Feedback activity was binned according to according to cue type (probable gain, probable 
loss), response hand (left, right), and feedback type (positive, negative). Break-Even trials were 
not included in the analysis of feedback ERPs as only a single outcome was ever possible. 
Participants were excluded from the analysis of a task stage if there were not at least 10 trials in 
the bin. One participant was excluded from feedback analysis due to having 9 useable trials in 
one bin. Descriptive statistics for available and retained trials are presented in Table 1. Grand 
averages for all bins and segment types are presented in supplementary figures 1 (Cue), 2 
(Target), 3 (Response) and 4 (Feedback anticipation) and5 (Feedback). 
 
Table 1.  
Mean Trials Retained for Analysis in Each Condition 
 Cue Response Feedback 
Anticipation 
Feedback 
     
Probable Gain, left hand 53.6 55.3 55.7  
Probable Gain, right hand 52.8 54.4 55.2  
Probable Loss, left hand 52.4 53.2 54.3  
Probable Loss, right hand 52.7 54.5 55.5  
Break-Even, left hand 52.4 53.0 54.1  
Break-Even, right hand 51.0 52.2 54.0  
     
Probable Gain, left hand, win    36.2 
Probable Gain, left hand, loss    19.6 
Probable Gain, right hand, win    36.1 
Probable Gain, right hand, loss    18.8 
Probable Loss, left hand, win    19.1 
Probable Loss, left hand, loss    35.7 
Probable Loss, right hand, win    20.1 
Probable Loss, right hand, loss    36.3 
 
2.5. Statistical Analysis 
Quantification of ERP components was conducted using the PCA Toolkit (Dien, 2010a). PCA is 
a factor analytic method that identifies and separates linear combinations of data points across 
temporal and spatial domains, allowing identification of overlapping electrocortical activity. All 
PCA analyses followed an identical process. First, temporal PCA was applied using samples as 
variables, and conditions, participants, and electrodes as observations. Consistent with previous 
recommendations, we used a Promax rotation with Kaiser normalization (Dien, 2010b). The 
number of temporal factors extracted for rotation in each PCA was determined using the parallel 
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test (Cattell, 1966). Second, temporal factors were submitted to a spatial PCA using Infomax 
rotation (Dien, 2010b; Dien, Khoe, & Mangun, 2007) with electrodes as variables, and 
conditions, participants, and temporal factor loadings as observations. Factors extracted for 
rotation were again determined using the parallel test (Cattell, 1966). Grand averages of example 
data submitted to PCA are presented in Figure 2. More comprehensive grand averages for each 
stage of reward processing are included in supplementary information 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
To aid interpretation, peak factor loadings were converted into microvolts. For all task 
stages, factor combinations were retained for subsequent analyses if they accounted for more 
than 1% of variance (e.g., Foti, Hajcak, & Dien, 2009). For each set of analyses, we report the 
total number of extracted factors and total number of retained factors that met the 1% 
threshold. The latter were subjected to robust Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in accordance 
with published recommendations (Dien, Franklin, & May, 2006; Keselman, Wilcox, & Lix, 
2003), and as implemented in the PCA Toolkit (Dien, 2010a). This approach to null hypothesis 
testing has been shown to be robust to violations of homogeneity and non-normal distributions, 
and reduces Type 1 error rate (Keselman et al., 2003). Each ANOVA used a starting seed of 100, 
was bootstrapped 5000 times, and 5% upper and lower means trimming. Robust ANOVA tests 
are indicated by “TWJt/c”, and the interpretation of this statistic and resulting p values are identical 
to a conventional ANOVA.  Significance thresholds for omnibus tests were corrected for 
multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method, with the number of extracted factors 
subjected to the ANOVA determining the magnitude of the correction. Significance thresholds 
for pairwise comparisons were also corrected for multiple comparisons.  
 Regarding behavioural data, mean response times on correct trials (e.g., participants 
pressed the instructed key 250-3000ms following target onset) first underwent a linear transform, 
where 1000ms was subtracted from each response, providing a more easily interpretable measure 
of performance. The resulting values were then subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA as 
implemented in SPSS (IBM, V20), with partial eta squared is provided as a measure of effect size. 
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Figure 2. Grand average ERPs prior to PCA for cue-locked (A.1, A.2, A.3), response-locked 
(B), feedback anticipation (C), and feedback-locked (D.1, D.2) activity. Sites presented were 
those identified as being the spatial peak of relevant temporospatial factor combinations. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Behavioural Data 
Response time values were submitted to a three (cue type: probable gain, probable loss, break-
even) x two (response hand: left, right) factor ANOVA. Consistent with previous research 
indicating improved accuracy on incentivized trials, there was a main effect of cue type (F(2,36) 
= 3.65, p = .036, ηp
2 = .17). Post-hoc tests indicated that this effect was driven by a more 
accurate response times on probable gain trials (M = 232.39, SD = 402.52) than on break-even 
trials (M = 262.78, SD = 412.21; p = .018). There was no difference between probable loss trials 
(M = 241.30, SD = 410.29) and probable gain trials (p = 1.00) or break-even trials (p = .377). 
There was no effect of response hand on response times (F(1,18) = 1.57, p = .226, ηp
2 = .08), or 
an interaction between incentive cue and response hand (F(2,36) = .81, p = .398, ηp
2 = .043). 
3.2. Cue Activity  
A total of 18 temporal and 4 spatial factors were extracted for cue-locked ERPs. Of these 72 
factor combinations, 16 explained at least 1% of variance and were submitted to a three (cue 
type: probable gain, probable loss, break-even) x two (response hand: left, right) factor ANOVA 
with a Bonferroni corrected significance threshold of p < .0031. Three factor combinations were 
sensitive to cue type; their waveforms and scalp maps are presented in Figure 3. 
The earliest factor combination, TF8/SF1 (Temporal Factor 8/Spatial Factor 1), was 
maximal over P2 between 132-136ms, and appears to reflect a parietal N1, TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 9.85, 
p = 0.0014. Pairwise comparisons between cue types indicate the negativity is stronger for break-
even cues than probable gain cues (TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 7.28, p = 0.015) and probable loss cues 
(TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 20.41, p=0.00020). Factor loadings did not differ significantly between 
probable gain and probable loss cues, TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 0.50, p = 0.50.  
 The next factor combination to be affected by cue type, TF6/SF1, had a scalp 
distribution and latency similar to the P3a and was maximal over Cz between 276-280ms, 
TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 15.34, p = 0.00060. Follow up pairwise comparisons indicate that the loadings 
for probable gain cue were significantly smaller than probable loss (TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 22.67, p = 
0.00080) and break-even cues (TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 21.31, p = 0.00020), which did not differ 
significantly from one another (TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 0.89, p = 0.36). 
 Lastly, TF2/SF2, a P3b like factor combination, was maximal over PO7 between 360-
364ms (TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 20.95, p = 0.00020. Consistent with previous research indicating 
enhanced P3 amplitudes to incentive cues (Novak & Foti, 2015), factor loadings for TF2/SF2 
were significantly greater for probable gain (TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 40.73, p<0.00000001) and 
probable loss cues (TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 14.48, p=0.0020) than break-even cues. TF2/SF2 
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amplitudes were also significantly greater for probable gain cues than probable loss cues 
(TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 11.95, p = 0.0040). Although one factor combination appeared to reflect the 
CNV, this was insensitive to any of the experimental manipulations (see appendix 1). No other 
factor combinations were significantly affected by Cue type, response hand, or their 
interactions.84 
 
  
Figure 3. Cue locked waveforms and topographic maps for factor combinations reflecting the 
N1 (upper row), P3a (middle row), and P3b (bottom row). Waveforms and topographic maps 
are presented in microvolt scale. Topographic maps present the difference between cue types at 
the peak latency of each temporospatial factor combination. 
 
 
 
                                                          
84While there was reliable modulation of these factor combinations by Cue type, they were insensitive to response 
hand (TF8/SF1: TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 0.03, p = 0.87, TF6/SF1: TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 0.00, p = 0.99, TF2/SF2: 
TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 1.63, p = 0.23), or the interaction between response hand and cue type (TF8/SF1: TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) 
= 3.66, p = 0.071, TF6/SF1: TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 1.10, p = 0.39, TF2/SF2: TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 1.85, p = 0.21). 
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3.3. Response Activity 
Response locked ERPs yielded 5 temporal and 4 spatial factors, with 17 of the 20 factor 
combinations accounting for at least 1% of variance. These factors combinations were submitted 
to a three (cue type: probable gain, probable loss, break-even) x two (response hand: left, right) 
factor ANOVA with a Bonferroni corrected threshold of p < .0029. 
Only one factor combination, TF1/SF3, was sensitive to experimental manipulation. 
TF1/SF3 was a sustained right hemisphere negativity maximal over C4 132-128ms prior to 
responses and it likely reflects a readiness potential (RP). As shown in Figure 4, TF1/SF3 is 
modulated by response hand (TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 46.98, p < 0.00000001). Consistent with basic 
research on motor preparation ERPs (Brunia, 1988), amplitudes were significantly more negative 
for left hand responses than right hand responses. Moreover, the direction of this effect was 
reversed when amplitudes were measured from C3. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Response locked waveforms and topographic map for the factor combination that 
reflects the Readiness Potential. The waveforms and topographic map are presented in microvolt 
scale. The topographic map presents the difference between response hands at the peak latency 
of the temporospatial factor combination. Although this factor combination peaked over C4, the 
contra-lateral site, C3, is provided to illustrate the inversion of the waveform. Because this factor 
combination was maximal over C4 and for left-hand responses, the topographic map is most 
negative over the right hemisphere. 
 
While TF1/SF3 appears to reflect a readiness potential, contrary to some recent research, it was 
not significantly affected by cue type (TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 0.75, p = 0.48). Nor was there an 
interaction between cue type and response hand, TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 0.75, p = 0.48. 
3.4. Feedback Anticipation Activity 
For activity that occurred prior to feedback presentation, 11 temporal factors were extracted, 
with 3 spatial factors each. 9 of these 33 factor combinations explained at least 1% of variance, 
and were subjected to a three (cue type: probable gain, probable loss, break-even) by two 
(response hand: left, right) factor ANOVA, with a Bonferroni corrected threshold of p < .0056. 
A single factor combination was sensitive to any of the experimental manipulations used in the 
present task, which is presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Feedback anticipation waveforms and topographic map for TF2/SF3. The waveforms 
and topographic map are presented in microvolt scale. The topographic map presents the 
difference between response hands at the peak latency of the temporospatial factor combination. 
Although this factor combination peaked over CP3, the contra-lateral site, CP4, is provided to 
illustrate the inversion of the waveform. Because this factor combination was maximal over CP3 
and for right-hand responses, the topographic map is most negative over the left hemisphere. 
 
This factor combination, TF2/SF3, was centroparietal negativity that peaked over CP3 600-
596ms prior to the presentation of feedback. TF2/SF3 was reliably modulated by the response 
hand that participants had used, with more negative voltages over CP3 following right hand 
responses than left hand responses, TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 14.25, p = 0.0020. As was also observed for 
the factor combination preceding actual motor responses (TF1/SF3), the direction of this effect 
was reversed when measured over CP4. Although the topology and sensitivity of this factor 
combination superficially resembles that of preparatory motor activity, it is important to 
emphasize that it occurred in anticipation of receiving feedback (i.e., 400-500ms following 
responses). 
 A factor combination that had a similar time-course and scalp topology to the SPN was 
also extracted, but was not affected by any of the experimental manipulations (see appendix 2). 
3.5. Feedback Activity 
For Feedback-locked averages, a total of 10 temporal factors and 4 spatial factors were extracted. 
Of these 40 factor combinations, 14 explained at least 1% of variance. These 14 factors were 
subjected to a two (cue type: probable gain, probable loss) x two (response hand: left, right) x 
two (outcome: gain, loss) factor ANOVA with a Bonferroni corrected threshold of p < .0035. 
This ANOVA yielded three factor combinations that were sensitive to different aspects of the 
task. The waveforms of which are displayed in Figure 6.  
The earliest factor combination, TF4/SF1, was a frontocentral positivity that peaked 
over Cz between 224-228ms. TF4/SF1 was modulated by feedback outcome with more positive 
voltages observed in response to gain feedback than loss feedback, TWJt/c(1.0,17.0) = 15.20, p = 
0.0034.  The topology and latency of this TF4/SF1 suggest it represents the RewP. This 
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replicates a previous application of PCA to reward-consumption ERPs (Foti & Hajcak, 2009) 
and confirming that the RewP can be observed in response to feedback stimuli in the MID task. 
While TF4/SF1 was only modulated by outcome and not expected outcome or response 
hand, an overlapping factor, TF1/SF1, was sensitive to the interaction between cue type and 
feedback type, TWJt/c(1.0,17.0) = 22.82, p = 0.0014. TF1/SF1 had a centroparietal distribution 
peaking over Cz, 380-384ms following feedback presentation, suggesting it corresponds to the 
fb-P3 observed in other studies (Balconi & Crivelli, 2010; Novak & Foti, 2015). Pairwise 
comparisons of the interaction between cue type and outcome, with a corrected significance 
threshold of p < .0125, revealed three significant contrasts. First, TF1/SF1 was significantly 
more positive on probable gain trials when participants received loss feedback relative to when 
they received gain feedback (p = .0002). Second, more positive amplitudes were observed in 
response to win feedback on probable loss trials relative to probable gain trials (p = .007). Third, 
the opposite pattern was observed in response to loss feedback, with significantly more positive 
amplitudes on probable gain trials relative to probable loss trials (p = .009). Taken together, these 
comparisons indicate that TF1/SF1 amplitudes were enhanced when the outcome of a given trial 
violated the expectation established by the cue.  
Lastly, a factor combination, TF2/SF3, representing a late frontopolar negativity was 
modulated by the response hand used by participants on each trial, TWJt/c(1.0,17.0) = 22.06, 
p=0.0010. TF2/SF3 peaked between 880-884ms following feedback over Fp1 and was more 
negative for right-hand than left-hand responses. There was also a significant interaction between 
response hand and feedback type, TWJt/c(1.0,17.0) = 12.28, p = 0.0022. Pairwise comparisons 
indicate that gain feedback for right-hand responses elicited significantly more negative 
amplitudes than gain feedback for left-hand responses, TWJt/c(1.0,17.0) = 38.00, p < 0.00000001. 
Amplitudes did not differ as a function of response hand for loss feedback, TWJt/c(1.0,17.0) = 
0.19, p = .67. 
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Figure 6. Feedback locked waveforms and topographic maps for factor combinations reflecting 
the Reward Positivity (upper row), feedback-P3 (middle row) and late frontopolar negativity 
(bottom row). Waveforms and topographic maps are presented in microvolt scale. Topographic 
maps present the difference between feedback valence (upper row), cue type and feedback 
valence (middle row), and feedback valence and response hand (bottom row) at the peak latency 
of each temporospatial factor combination. 
 
4. Discussion 
In this study we applied temporospatial PCA to data from a modified MID task. This novel 
approach was used in order to identify electrophysiological components important for reward 
anticipation and consumption in the MID task. PCA successfully extracted several components 
differentially modulated by stimuli cuing anticipation of probable gain, probable loss, and 
breaking-even. When applied to feedback anticipation, PCA was able to extract a factor 
combination that resembled the SPN. However, this factor combination was not reliably 
modulated by incentive cue or response hand. Instead, we observed a lateralized centroparietal 
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factor combination that was acutely sensitive to the hand participants had just used to make a 
response. The application of PCA to reward consumption also extracted well-established 
feedback processing ERPs in the RewP and fb-P3, components that have proved difficult to 
observe in the MID task. In addition, a new component was revealed in the late stages of 
feedback processing. This component is a late negativity distributed over the left frontal pole 
that appears to be sensitive to response hand, especially in the context of monetary gain. While a 
component reflecting the RP was identified preceding responses, it appeared to be insensitive to 
the prospect of gains, losses, and breaking-even. Target components as well appeared to be 
insensitive to cue type. 
4.1. Incentive Cues 
This study provides important insight into the modulation of ERPs by incentive cues in the MID 
task. Specifically, it provides evidence that the ERP components modulated by probable gain, 
probable loss, and break-even cues reflect distinct processes. There is no simple heuristic where 
reward incentive cues produce greater activity than loss and break-even cues. Furthermore, 
reward enhancement may not be present until relatively late in stimulus processing. 
 The early parietal factor combination, reflecting the N1, was enhanced for break-even 
cues relative to probable gain and probable loss. As the N1 is associated with early processes 
related to selective attention, this observation suggests ‘neutral’ incentive cues may receive some 
preferential processing relative to reward and loss cues. This finding is inconsistent with the 
results of one previous study where N1 amplitudes were enhanced for reward cues relative to 
break-even (Doñamayor et al., 2012). However, grand averages from other MID studies also 
appear to show a greater N1 to break-even cues, but these effects have not been directly 
reported (e.g., Study 1; Novak & Foti, 2015).  
 This early negativity was distinct from two subsequent, independently modulated centro-
parietal and parietal positivities, which typically overlap to form the P3 (Polich, 2007). The first 
positivity had a latency and centro-pariatal distribution consistent with the P3a. The P3a is 
enhanced by stimuli requiring the automatic attentional switching or the initiation of inhibitory 
processes. Interestingly, P3a amplitudes were smaller for probable gain cues than probable loss 
or break-even cues, a finding broadly consistent with the observation that P3a amplitudes are 
enhanced by stimuli of negative affect (Delplanque, Silvert, Hot, Rigoulot, & Sequeira, 2006). 
The second positivity reflects the P3b and has a predominantly parietal distribution. 
Consistent with previous research, P3b amplitudes were larger for probable gain cues relative to 
probable loss and break-even cues (Broyd et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2006; Novak & Foti, 
2015; Pfabigan et al., 2014; Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015; Santesso et al., 2012). The 
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topology of the P3b that we observe was considerably left lateralized in contrast to the more 
central distributions observed in other studies. While it is difficult to identify a clear explanation 
for this lateralization, several studies have noted that object/color recognition and action 
processes may be more prevalent over the left hemisphere (Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norlund, & 
Grafton, 2005; Proverbio, Burco, del Zotto, & Zani, 2004). Aspects of these processes could 
conceivably be enhanced when an incentive cue indicates a possible reward.  However, given the 
ubiquity of the P3b across multiple contexts, and considerable problems that reverse inference 
creates, we are reluctant to ascribe any particular psychological process as causative of this 
lateralization. 
These data suggest that electrophysiological activity discriminates between different 
incentive cues and have distinct time-courses. First, an initial parietal negativity occurs that is 
more sensitive to break-even cues than probable gain or loss cues. Second, a centro-parietal 
positivity occurs that is more sensitive to probable loss and break-even cues than gain cues. 
Finally, a slow parietal positivity occurs that is more sensitive to probable gain cues than loss or 
break-even cues. Importantly, while these results replicate the common finding that the P3b/P3 
is greater to reward incentive cues, it also suggests this enhancement is not present until relatively 
late in processing. In sum, while earlier components reflect capture by motivationally salient 
stimuli that signal increased probability of losses, the later positivity corresponding to the 
P3b/P3 reflects capture by motivationally salient stimuli that signal increased probability of 
gains. 
In the context of incentive cues, earlier components (e.g., N1, P3a) may reflect the 
automatic capture and allocation of attention to stimuli signalling future events that may be 
disadvantageous: this includes both probable loss and break-even cues. Break-even cues require 
participants to expend physical and cognitive effort with no possibility of reward, representing a 
net-loss to participants. This conjecture is broadly supported by findings that non-reward 
feedback produce identical RewP amplitudes to loss feedback (Hajcak et al., 2006). This finding 
is also consistent with recent perspectives on the nature of incentive salience and incentive cue 
processing. Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) argue that even though an incentive cue may 
produce approach-related feelings of “wanting” in anticipation of a reward, this is not 
intrinsically a positive state. When the incentive cue – or features of the environment – 
simultaneously signals that a reward will not be forthcoming, this can produce a form of negative 
incentive salience, which is borne out as a feeling of frustration (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, 
& Price, 2013). Conversely, the presentation of a break-even cue could be also appraised as a 
relief from the possibility of loss that is associated with both probable loss and probable gain 
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trials. We speculate that whether break-even cue stimuli are interpreted as net losses or the relief 
from potential loss may be dependent on participants’ perceptions that they can influence the 
outcome of each trial, and the development of expectations on this basis. Because blunted RewP 
amplitudes are observed when participants have limited perceived agency or sense of control 
over action-outcome contingencies (Angus et al., 2015; Bellebaum, Kobza, et al., 2010; 
Mühlberger, Angus, Jonas, Harmon-Jones, & Harmon-Jones, 2017), this speculation could be 
tested using experimental designs that directly manipulate perceived control, in conjunction with 
examination of RewP amplitudes.  
In this study, we do not observe reliable incentive cue modulation of anticipatory slow-
waves such as the CNV. These effects have proved difficult to measure in ERP versions of the 
MID task with inconsistency both in the presence of modulation and the effects of probable 
gain, loss and breaking-even cues. Nevertheless, recent research has reported a semi-consistent 
enhancement to later-stages of the CNV by reward cues relative to break-even cues (Novak & 
Foti, 2015; Pfabigan et al., 2014). While further research is required to confirm this effect, it is 
possible that methodological differences are responsible for our null effect. Typical MID tasks 
involve an incentive cue followed by a target stimulus signalling for an immediate response. The 
slow wave that precedes the target is therefore a combination of anticipatory processes (e.g., the 
early CNV) and action preparation (e.g., the late CNV). In our version of the task participants 
were not required to make a response to the target stimulus but instead begin the temporal 
bisection task. It is unsurprising then that a component involved in action preparation is 
unaffected.  
4.2. Responses  
Unlike previous research we failed to observe any enhancement of the RP in response to 
incentive cues (Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015). There are a number of possible reasons 
for this null effect. Firstly, when reported, the effect size of RP modulation - as with the CNV - 
by incentive cue is weak relative to the effect size of the anticipatory ERPs that follow cue 
presentation. While we may simply have required significantly more statistical power to detect 
these effects, it is possible these effects may not be robust.  
Secondly, two key methodological differences may have influenced our result. First, 
unlike Pornpattananangkul and Nusslock (2015), the contingencies in our study were 
probabilistic. When a participant received a probable gain cue they were only more likely to gain 
money, whereas when they received a probable loss cue they were only more likely to lose. In 
contrast, in Pornpattananangkul and Nusslock (2015), incentive cues of various forms indicated 
with certainty what the outcome would be, provided that participants responses were accurate. 
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In our task, despite being told otherwise, the timing of participants’ responses never actually 
guaranteed the reward outcome.85 It is possible that RP modulation is sensitive to the efficacy of 
participant responses to secure the monetary gains or avoid the monetary losses indicated by the 
incentive cue. When accurate responses only increase rather than guarantee the possibility of 
reward, RP modulation may be reduced if not entirely absent. 
Thirdly, it is also possible that while RP modulation is enhanced by incentive cues, it 
does not distinguish between motivations to secure monetary gain or avoid monetary loss. 
Unlike Pornpattananangkul and Nusslock (2015) who had an equal amount of reward and break-
even trials, our study had an equal amount of probable gain, probable loss and break-even trials. 
The failure to observe RP modulation may due to the fact that the vast majority of our trials 
involved incentivised performance. Note that this could still occur even if the RP is not being 
modulated by the anticipatory cue as our results suggest. All that it requires is the experiment to 
be designed to emphasise incentivised performance. 
4.3. Feedback anticipation 
While we did observe a factor combination that reflects the SPN in topology and time-course, it 
was not modulated by any of the experimental manipulations. One reason for the absence of 
incentive cue modulation may be that participants’ perception of control did not differ between 
Probable Gain, Probable Loss, and Neutral cue conditions. In the present study, the outcome of 
each trial was predetermined, and participants’ responses could only alter this outcome if they 
failed to respond or responded using the incorrect hand. This element of the task design may 
have reduced participants’ perceived control, and contributed to an absence of cue related 
modulation. Consistent with this explanation, research has shown that SPN amplitudes are 
smaller when participants believe they have limited control over outcomes than when they 
believe they have greater control (Mühlberger et al., 2017, also see Masaki, Yamazaki, & Hackley, 
2010, Kotani, Ohgami, Yoshida, Kiryu, & Inoue, 2017).  
We did, however, find a factor combination that was robustly modulated by the response 
hand that participants had just used. This factor combination was superficially similar to typical 
preparatory motor responses (e.g., RP, LRP) in its topology and lateralization as a function of 
response hand. Importantly, however, it occurred at least 400ms after a response had been made, 
presenting 600ms prior the receipt of feedback regarding the success or failure of that action. A 
conservative interpretation is that this factor combination reflects the residual motor activity that 
follows responses (e.g., a slow motor potential; Müller et al., 1994). The broader implications of 
this factor combination within the context of the MID task and reinforcement learning is 
                                                          
85Aside from failing to perform at all. 
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unclear, however we note that the particular context in which it has evoked is broadly consistent 
with the notion of an “eligibility trace” which is thought to produced following an action and 
serves as a form of working memory regarding the behaviour that will – or will not be – 
reinforced by feedback (Doya, 2008). Alternatively, this component may reflect activity 
associated with hand movements following participants’ responses in the temporal bisection 
task. Specifically, following their response on each trial, participants likely returned their hand to 
a resting position, producing tactile and kinaesthetic activity. This tactile and kinaesthetic activity 
produces reafferent activity in the somatosensory cortex (Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010). 
However, in the present study we did not collect surface electromyography (EMG) from 
participants’ arms, and as such it is impossible to determine whether outcome anticipation or 
reafference better explains the results. Moreover, the omission of EMG measurements also 
limits our ability to address different explanations for CNV and RP modulation.  
 The limited modulation of SPN amplitudes by incentive cues and the presence of a post-
motor component may also be due to the duration of the interval between motor responses and 
feedback onset. Previous studies have reported that post-movement activity can be observed 
contra-lateral to the response hand up to 2 seconds following responses (Damen & Brunia, 
1994). Consequently, this activity may mask SPN modulation. However, that the application of 
PCA in our study has allowed us to disentangle post-movement activity from the SPN itself. 
Indeed, one of the factor combinations we observed reflected this post-movement activity and 
was more negative contralateral to the response hand, while the factor combination that we 
argue reflects the SPN was maximal over the right hemisphere and did not reliably differ as a 
function of response hand. 
4.4. Reward Consumption 
Previous MID research has had issues observing reward consumption ERPs. Even when these 
ERPs are observed, their modulation is inconsistent with the wide literature on reward 
consumption (e.g., Broyd et al., 2012; Novak & Foti, 2015). In this study, the novel application 
of PCA to feedback-locked ERPs in the MID task successfully separated and quantified the 
RewP and fb-P3. This is despite the substantial temporal and spatial overlap that has contributed 
to equivocal effects reported in the past. Consistent with research applying PCA to a non-MID 
task (Foti & Hajcak, 2009), the RewP had a frontocentral distribution and was greater to 
feedback signalling gains than losses. RewP amplitudes on probable win and probable loss trials 
did not differ, suggesting incentive cues do not modulate RewP presentation.  
The RewPs independence from incentive and expectation effects is important given the 
results of previous MID research. As pointed out by Novak and Foti (2015), loss and break-even 
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feedback on MID tasks are typically less frequent than reward. This element of their design 
confounds the effects of feedback type with stimulus probability making quantification of the 
RewP difficult. Importantly, in the present study, probable gain and probable loss trials had 
opposite feedback valence probabilities and produced, as expected, identical RewP amplitudes.  
This finding is inconsistent with some studies that have examined feedback processing 
from a reinforcement learning perspective (Holroyd, Krigolson, & Lee, 2011; Ichikawa, Siegle, 
Dombrovski, & Ohira, 2010; Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Bauer, & Sailer, 2011). In these studies, the 
RewP (or FRN) has typically been investigated as an electrocortical manifestation of reward 
prediction errors, with more negative amplitudes being observed for loss feedback than for gain 
feedback, and the difference between feedback valences being enhanced by greater reward 
expectancies (Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Bellebaum et al., 2010), and when outcomes differ from 
expectations (Pfabigan et al., 2015). However, these effects have not always been consistently 
observed, with several studies finding that the FRN is sensitive to binary differences in outcome 
(e.g., reward vs nonreward) and not expectancy and expectancy violation (Highsmith, Wuensch, 
Tran, Stephenson, & Everhart, 2016). The findings of the present study are in broad agreement 
with research that that interprets the RewP as a binary index of desired versus undesired 
outcomes, rather than a measure of expectancy violation and prediction error per se. If a 
prediction error or expectancy violation effect was observed, then RewP amplitudes would be 
larger on trials where participants had viewed incentive cues that indicated a likely counter-
factual outcome. It is important to note that because we did not vary reward probabilities 
throughout our task on a block by block or trial by trial basis it is difficult to draw any definitive 
conclusions with respect to which model of the RewP is best supported. 
In contrast to the RewP, the fb-P3 tracked expectancy violation. Greater amplitudes were 
observed when feedback signalled losses on probable gain trials and gains on probable loss trials. 
This pattern of results is consistent with the effects reported in previous studies where feedback 
events that are seen as infrequent or important are associated with greater fb-P3 amplitudes. 
Importantly, our results suggest that application of PCA to reward consumption ERPs in the 
MID task can measure both the valence aspects of the RewP, and expectance and salience 
aspects of the fb-P3. 
We also observed for the first time a very late negativity distributed over the left frontal 
pole. There is currently no existing explanation for this effect in the literature on reward 
consumption. While this component could potentially reflect an SPN to the offset of feedback 
stimuli, there is limited evidence that this is the case. Firstly, while the time-course and polarity of 
the factor combination is consistent with the SPN, it’s topology is not. Secondly, there is limited 
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evidence of the SPN being produced prior to feedback offset in other studies using the MID 
task, or in studies using gambling tasks (e.g., Foti & Hajack, 2012). As the negativity is sensitive 
to the participant’s response hand, especially in the context of reward feedback, we speculate this 
component may be associated with encoding and updating some form of successful response 
prototype. The greater negativity observed for right-hand responses might be a function of hand 
dominance as all the participants in our sample were right-handed. Similar fronto-polar 
negativities have been observed in prospective memory tasks when individuals successfully 
encode the intention to act in the near future, although these effects have only been observed 
following viewing instruction stimuli, rather than following feedback stimuli (West, 2011; West & 
Moore, 2002). An alternative explanation could be that this factor combination also reflects 
processes similar to an eligibility trace, albeit at a different stage of processing (Doya, 2008). 
Further research is required to reproduce the presentation of this component and establish what 
feature or features of reward consumption it is associated with.  
Lastly, while some studies (e.g., Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015) have reported 
LPP modulation to feedback stimuli in the MID task, we did not observe this in the present 
study. 
4.5. Conclusion 
The MID task offers a promising experimental approach to assessing and modelling reward 
processing and consumption. Results from our study show that the dynamics of reward 
anticipation can be parsed into discriminable stages that are differentially modulated by probable 
gain, probable loss, and break-even cues. In addition, use of PCA on feedback-locked ERPs can 
allow researchers to assess both the RewP and fb-P3 independently in the MID task. We also 
observe for the first time a late negativity distributed over the left frontal pole in response to task 
feedback. This new reward consumption component appears to be sensitive to response hand, 
especially in the context of monetary gain. Further investigation is required to understand the 
exact functions that these components signify in the context of reward anticipation and 
consumption. 
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Appendix 1 
 
One factor combination appeared to reflect the CNV. This combination, TF1/SF4 had a fronto-
central distribution and peaked between 1840 and 1844ms following the onset of cue stimuli (Fig 
A.1). While the topology and latency of this factor combination is consistent with previous 
reports of CNV modulation by incentive cues (Novak & Foti, 2015; Plichta et al., 2013), we did 
not observe reliable differences between probable gain, probable loss, and break-even cues. A 
robust ANOVA using a Bonferroni adjusted p value threshold of 0.003125 indicated that there 
was no significant effect of incentive cue (TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 3.07, p = 0.082), cued response hand 
(TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 12.53, p = 0.0044), or an interaction between the two, TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 0.01, 
p = 0.98.  
 
  
Figure A1. Cue locked waveforms for factor combination reflecting the CNV. Waveforms are 
presented in microvolt scale. 
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Appendix 2 
 
One factor combination appeared to reflect the SPN. This combination, TF1/SF1 had a fronto-
central distribution and peaked between 4 ms before the onset of feedback stimuli (Fig A.2). 
Although the topology and latency of this factor combination is consistent with previous reports 
of SPN modulation by reward expectancy (Brunia, Hackley, van Boxtel, Kotani, & Ohgami, 
2011; Ohgami, Kotani, Hiraku, Aihara, & Ishii, 2004; Ohgami et al., 2006; Pornpattananangkul & 
Nusslock, 2015), there were no reliable differences between probable gain, probable loss, and 
break-even cues. A robust ANOVA using a Bonferroni adjusted p value threshold of 0.0055556 
indicated that there was no significant effect of incentive cue (TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 1.85, p = 0.20), 
cued response hand (TWJt/c(1.0,18.0) = 4.68, p = 0.048), or an interaction between the two, 
TWJt/c(2.0,16.0) = 2.00, p = 0.20.  
 
  
Figure A2. Feedback anticipation waveforms for factor combination reflecting the SPN. 
Waveforms are presented in microvolt scale. 
